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1Introduction
In 1844, the famed artist George Catlin published Letters and Notes on the 
Manners, Customs, and Conditions of North American Indians, a grand synthesis of all 
that he had learned on the indigenous nations of the United States. He was largely 
sympathetic to the plight of the Indians, opposing removal as a violation of their rights 
and mourning the dozens of nations whose culture appeared to him lost, their morals 
corrupted. Near his conclusion, Catlin noted the recently completed struggle with the 
Seminole Indians in Florida, a conflict he believed to represent the last stand of Indians 
east of the Mississippi. He included only a brief summary of the war and begged the 
reader’s indulgence for his brevity, explaining that he was too close to the end of the 
book to detail it further. To Catlin, that was a lucky coincidence, but one that established 
a pattern he hoped later writers would follow, rationalizing that “the world will pardon 
me for saying no more of this inglorious war; … [but] as an American citizen I would 
pray, amongst thousands of others, that all books yet to be made might have as good an 
excuse for leaving it out.” He need not have bothered; the implications of the war had 
never been comprehended well enough to be forgotten.
1
Nevertheless, it was a remarkable admission. Just six years before in January 
1838, Catlin had traveled far south to Fort Moultrie, a United States fort on the coast of 
Charleston, to meet the captured Seminole war leader Osceola and several prominent 
Seminole chiefs. Though prisoners, the Seminoles had freedom to move within the fort, 
and they spent hours with Catlin in the fort’s officers’ quarters. There they recounted 
their own perspectives on the war and bitterly denounced the circumstances of their 
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 George Catlin, Letters and Notes on the Manners, Customs, and Conditions of the North American 
Indians: Written During Eight Years' Travel amongst the Wildest Tribes of Indians in North America (New 
York: Wiley and Putnam, 1844), 219.
2capture, having been lured into the open by a white flag and then deceitfully placed in 
chains under the orders of General Thomas Jesup.
2
The details of Catlin’s visit to the Seminoles were well known for another reason 
- the great Seminole leader Osceola lay dying, suffering from quinsy, a complication of 
tonsillitis, an illness he had almost certainly contracted before his capture in October 
1837. Inside the fort, Catlin spoke with the 
dying warrior and offered to paint his portrait. 
Osceola welcomed the attentions of a famous 
painter like Catlin and one can easily see how 
he influenced his own portrayal. Proud, 
dignified, and resolute, the Osceola depicted 
in Catlin’s Osceola, the Black Drink, a 
Warrior of Great Distinction made a clear 
statement of Osceola’s essential humanity in 
an era of Indian dispossession and removal.
3
Before the artist’s arrival, the warrior had sent for his white doctor and, knowing 
his death was imminent, declared through an interpreter “his country had been taken from 
him … by the strong & oppressive hand of the white people, & if he wished to live, it 
was only to show them that an Indian never forgot an Injury.” The Osceola of Catlin’s 
depiction memorialized the history of injustice the true Osceola swore never to forget; it 
was etched in the very melancholy of his features. It fit Catlin’s ideology as well. He 
believed Indians were to be celebrated, but only with a mournful tinge reflecting their 
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Catlin, Letters and Notes 220.
3
 The title of Catlin’s painting, The Black Drink, was a translation of Osceola’s name and referred to a 
ceremonial liquid.
3inexorable march toward extinction. Following his visit, Catlin returned to the northeast 
to exhibit his paintings of the Seminole leaders, inspiring numerous homages and copies. 
The morning that Catlin left South Carolina, Osceola himself provided the final 
brushstroke for Catlin’s image, passing away with his family at his side.
4
Catlin may have hoped that the Second Seminole War might be forgotten, but it 
was not an isolated conflict on the outskirts of a nation. In Florida, several of the most 
powerful antebellum political, social, and economic movements collided with 
discomforting results. There, Jackson and his fellow Democrats spent over thirty million 
dollars and ordered nearly 1600 men to their death to make their vision of the nation 
manifest. By obliterating the last vestiges of non-United States collective sovereignty and 
threatening the future of nonwhite autonomy, Jackson intended to extend the geographic 
reach of his two most vital constituencies, white settlers and Southern slaveholders, and 
consolidate the hegemony of the United States in the southeast, one of the most unstable 
regions in the Americas over the preceding several centuries. Removing the Seminoles 
would further integrate Florida into Deep South slave society and legitimize white 
owners’ specious claims on dozens of the Seminoles’ relatively autonomous African-
American allies. His actions had disastrous consequences for his nation, in both the short 
and long term. Yet, even as Jackson pursued the policies that would bring his nation to 
the brink of destruction, many of his most prominent opponents remained silent, 
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 John K. Mahon, History of the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 
1985), 214-218; Patricia Wickman, Osceola’s Legacy (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006), 26-
28; Frederick Weedon’s Diary Pages, January 28-31, Fort Moultrie, S.C., Frederick Weedon Family Papers, 
SPR 251, Alabama Dept. of Archives and History; Daily Cleveland Herald, February 13, 1838; New York 
Spectator, February 8, 1838. On Catlin’s personal views on Indians and their destiny, see William H 
Truettner, The Natural Man Observed: A Study of Catlin’s Indian Gallery (Washington: Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1979); John Hausdoerffer, Catlin’s Lament: Indians, Manifest Destiny, and the Ethics of 
Nature (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009).
4unwilling to alienate or antagonize powerful slaveholding interests. Their silence ensured 
that the contours of Jacksonian expansion would become the sole precedent for United 
States continental and overseas expansion, a blueprint which demanded the colonization 
of native populations and the annihilation of their nonwhite political forms. He laid the 
groundwork for the imperial state.
5
In arguing for a link between Jackson’s crusade of conquest and the imperialists 
of the nineteenth century, I define imperialism as a form of domination in which an alien 
power imposes its authority over a subject people in an alien land. This is distinguished 
from an imperial state, in which political institutions are explicitly tasked with ruling 
subject peoples, erecting a legal framework to ensure their subjugation, and appropriating 
their resources for the benefit of the dominant nation. Through their Indian policy, 
Jackson and his ideological allies set out to annihilate Indian sovereignty on the United 
States’ frontiers, but did not institutionalize the subjugation of the southeast Indians into 
law nor did they impose direct rule upon them following their removal. Rather, Jackson 
pursued conquest, the subjugation of a people and assumption of authority within a 
defined geographic space. His policies provided a blueprint for Gilded Age leaders, but 
stopped short of transforming the United States itself into an imperial state.
6
                                                
5
 To put those figures in perspective, Andrew Jackson’s administration predicted that the total cost of 
Indian Removal for all the remaining Indians in the eastern United States would total three million dollars 
out of total yearly federal expenditures of around twenty-five million dollars during the war years. For 
budgeting information, see Historical Statistics of the United States 1789-1945 (Washington: United States 
Department of Commerce, 1949), 310-311. 
6
 The use of the word “imperialism” is somewhat anachronistic here as it did not come into use until 
coined by an anonymous British writer in 1858 to criticize Napoleon III’s imperial pretensions. See 
“France, Under Napoleon III,” The Westminster Review, 344 (Oct., 1858), 167-194. On the history of the 
word “imperialism,” itself, see Richard Koebner and Helmut Dan Schmidt, Imperialism: The Story and 
Significance of a Political Word, 1840-1960, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964).  Jackson’s 
crusade of conquest differed markedly from what historian Peter Onuf identified as the central premise of 
the Jeffersonian creed, the creation of a new republican empire founded on the principles of the 
American Revolution. Where the conquests of Jackson and the imperialists of later eras were rooted in 
5I argue that Jackson designed his policies to eliminate the possibility of both 
nonwhite autonomy and Indian sovereignty within the North American continent. The 
two concepts are linked, though the latter is a specific form of the former. In Worcester v. 
Georgia, Justice John Marshall famously declared Indian nations to be “domestic 
dependent nations,” recognizing their right to self-government but subordinating their 
laws to United States federal authority and eliminating their right to form relationships 
with any foreign power except the United States. Throughout the first quarter of the 
nineteenth century, a succession of presidential administrations established the principle 
that the United States would negotiate with Indian nations through the medium of 
treaties, recognizing and reinforcing their claims to sovereignty. Through he expressed 
little interest in curtailing Indian self-government, Jackson was militantly opposed to 
negotiating with Indian entities, and attempted to form a new relationship with Indian 
nations founded on the imposition of control. Similarly, Jackson was hostile to nonwhite 
autonomy in general, and feared the influence of the Black Seminoles upon the slave 
populations of the southeast. I use the phrase nonwhite autonomy to differentiate 
Jackson’s pragmatic fears of Seminole and Black Seminole cross-racial collaboration 
                                                                                                                                                
the subordination of alien peoples, Jefferson explicitly welcomed foreign nationals of European descent as 
equal members in his imagined empire. See Peter Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire: The Language of Early 
American Nationhood (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2000), 17. For a partial overview on 
the conception and definition of imperialism, see Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 
1993), 3-14; Wolfgang Mommsen, Theories of Imperialism, trans., P.S. Falla (New York: Random House, 
1980); Jürgen Osterhammel, Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, trans., Shelley Frisch (Princeton, NJ: M. 
Wiener, 1996); P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 2 Vols (London: Longman Press, 1993); D.K. 
Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century (New York: 
Delacorte Press, 1965); Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-imperial Thought
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); James Muldoon, Empires and Order: The Concept of 
Empire (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); Frank Ninkovich, The United States and Imperialism (Malden, 
MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2004); Ann Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter Perdue ed., Imperial 
Formations (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 2007); John Darwin, The Empire Project: The 
Rise and Fall of the British World-System (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
6from his more abstract opposition to the expression of Indian rights independent of their 
relationship with the United States.
The situation in Florida differed from that of the rest of the southeast. In Georgia, 
land hungry settlers propelled the dispossession of the Cherokees through a process some 
scholars have identified as settler colonialism. As they have defined it, colonizing settlers 
eradicate indigenous societies with the intention of settling the land upon which they 
would erect their own societal structures. However, in Florida settlers were not clamoring 
for Seminole land. Unbearably hot and possibly sickly, the Florida climate itself 
discouraged white settlement. In contrast to the dispossession of other southeast Indian 
nations, federal Indian policies and the agitation of slave owners instigated the Second 
Seminole War rather than the land hunger of local settlers. Young white males were 
happy to assist in the dispossession of the Seminoles, but they were largely uninterested 
in Florida land.
7
Throughout its duration, contemporary Americans decided that the reality of the 
conquest of the Seminoles was a story best left untold. Not completely, of course. There 
were reports of battles, narratives of service, accounts of families massacred, and stories 
of Indians captured by deceit, but the fundamental arguments of the war - why it had 
been undertaken, how it was to be fought, why it had to be won - occurred wholly outside 
of the public view, if they occurred at all. Abolitionist David Lee Child recounted that 
one unnamed northern senator who had proposed an appropriation of half a million 
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 On settler colonialism, see Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology
(London: Cassell, 1999); Lorenzo Veracini, Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010); Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous Peoples in America and 
Australia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); Donald Denoon, Settler Capitalism: The 
Dynamics of Dependent Development in the Southern Hemisphere (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1983). 
7dollars to continue the war, had replied to a question as to why the war was being fought 
“that really he did not know what was the cause of the war – but he knew that war existed 
and must be prosecuted!” It was a lament echoed tragically a decade later when Henry 
Clay, the leading opponent of the Mexican-American War, mourned his son who had 
died serving his country: “My poor son did not however stop to enquire into the causes of 
the War. It was sufficient for him that it existed in fact.”
8
The Second Seminole War, like all wars, had many proximate and remote causes, 
stretching back decades and arising from the racial and imperial turbulence of colonial 
Florida. Decades before, the Seminoles had reinforced Spanish Florida against United 
States filibusterers, forestalling its annexation. The conflict continued for decades, 
spanning Jackson’s illegal campaign in the First Seminole War and resulting in the 
Seminoles’ agreement to emigrate to southern Florida. It appeared to culminate in the 
Treaty of Fort Gibson, when seven Seminole chiefs, likely bribed and coerced, spoke for 
the rest of their nation and agreed to emigrate further, to designated land in Arkansas.  
Nevertheless, several years later and weary of Seminole intransigence, Jackson scribbled 
on the back of a letter, “let a sufficient military force be forthwith ordered to protect our 
citizens & remove & protect the Indians.” Eight months later, on a cold morning on 
December 23, 1835 in the Florida wilderness, 180 Seminoles descended upon a hostile 
battalion of 110 Unites States soldiers and left only a single survivor, leaving no doubt 
that war had begun.
9
                                                
8
 David Lee Child, “Texas,” Philanthropist, May 27, 1836, 1.22, 2; William Henry Clay to John M. Clayton, 
April 16, 1847, in Henry Clay, The Papers of Henry Clay: Candidate, Compromiser, Elder Statesman, ed., 
Melba Porter Hay (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1991), 10: 322. The unnamed senator was 
likely Daniel Webster. On Webster, see discussion in chapter 4. On Child, see chapter 6. 
9
 Duncan Clinch to Adjutant General Jones, April 24, 1835, Territorial Papers, 25:129-130; Thompson,
Harris, and Clinch to Cass, April 24, 1835, Senate Document 152, 24
th
 Congress, 1
st
 Session, 38-39.
8Each of those provocations by the United States - the battalion marching against 
the Seminoles, Jackson’s plan to overawe the Seminoles through shows of force, the 
fraudulent Treaty of Fort Gibson, the adventurers in Spanish Florida – were in response 
to persistent fears of instability in the southeast. For many in the United States, the 
southeast Indians, especially the Seminoles in undeveloped Florida, threatened the United 
States in several distinct ways. By accepting fugitive slaves into their society, the 
Seminoles’ very presence imperiled slavery throughout Florida. Worse, many feared that 
the influence of slaves living amongst the Seminoles on slaves owned by United States 
planters would lead to widespread slave rebellion. Moreover, the Seminoles had a history 
of allying with European powers against the United States. The southern tip of Florida 
would have served as an ideal beachhead for a British invasion, which itself would 
benefit from slave insurrections that the Seminoles might provoke. Aside from the 
tactical vulnerability posed by the racial situation in Florida, dozens of whites held 
tenuous claims on free and enslaved African-Americans allied with the Seminoles, 
collectively identified as the Black Seminoles, who were shielded from the harsh chattel 
slavery of the South, but represented a potential fortune in human property. Removing 
the Seminoles would alleviate each of these interlocked threats and, as welcome 
byproducts, spur the economic development of Florida, deliver dozens of slaves to white 
owners, and open up Seminole land for white settlement.
10
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 On the Black Seminoles, see Kenneth Porter, The Black Seminoles: History of a Freedom-Seeking People, 
ed., Alcione Amos and Thomas Senter (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996); Kevin Mulroy, 
Freedom on the Border: the Seminole Maroons in Florida, the Indian Territory, Coahuila, and Texas
(Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 1993); Anthony Dixon, “Black Seminole Involvement and 
Leadership during the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842,” (PhD Dissertation, Indiana University, 
2007);Daniel Littlefield, Africans and Seminoles: From Removal to Emancipation (Westport: Greenwood 
Press, 1977); Kevin Kokomoor, “A Re-assessment of Seminoles, Africans, and Slavery on the Florida 
Frontier, Florida Historical Quarterly, 88.2 (Fall 2009), 209-236.  More national in scope, though brief are 
9To win the war and eliminate the problems the Seminoles posed in Florida, the 
administrations of Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren yoked the conflict to their 
vision of a white, democratic, independent nation. Relying on the military prowess of 
volunteers recruited throughout the South, they imagined brigades of independent young 
men, buttressed by the organizational might of the federal army, marching forth to 
liberate Florida from the Seminole threat. The offensive embodied their belief in the 
providential destiny of the United States, and they saw in the Second Seminole War a few 
more incremental steps toward a continent peopled by United States citizens, not 
European subjects or “savage” Indians. The war would make clear the futility of Indian 
resistance. Any expression of Indian autonomy in the face of United States aggression 
would be crushed. Compliance would be their only recourse.
The Second Seminole War unleashed energies which Jackson had not anticipated. 
He had proposed Indian removal and the destruction of Indian sovereignty as a means of 
securing white settlement and protecting national security. Yet, in their violent refutation 
of Indian autonomy, thousands of Americans embraced Indian killing for both themselves 
and their nation. As many Southerners repudiated the very conception of negotiating with 
Indian enemies, they celebrated the violent subordination of Indians in their midst. The 
war began as a pragmatic means of advancing the interests of slaveholders. It ended with 
an affirmation that expansion and the annihilation of nonwhite autonomy were national 
imperatives. 
                                                                                                                                                
Bruce Twyman, The Black Seminole Legacy and North American Politics, 1693-1845 (Washington: Howard 
University Press, 1999) and Brent Weisman, “Labor and Survival among the Black Seminoles of Florida,” in 
Florida’s Working-Class Past: Current Perspectives on Labor, Race, and Gender from Spanish Florida to the 
New Immigration, ed., Robert Cassanello and Melanie Shell-Weiss (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
2009), 64-85.
10
As a result, Jackson’s Democratic vision failed in two instances, first to solve the 
problems that undermined the development and security of the state and second to make 
manifest his conception of the nation. When the war ended, the thousands of soldiers and 
volunteers who had streamed into Florida had forced most of the Seminoles to emigrate 
to their new lands in Arkansas, but left hundreds behind. Notwithstanding a cost of over a 
thousand lives and tens of millions of dollars, the same impediments to national security 
remained. Jacksonian nationalism faltered as well. Success, partial as it may have been, 
was secured through the institutionalized, bureaucratized efforts of the army, not the 
irresistible passions of settler democracy. The volunteers who fought in Florida arrived 
boisterously and left quietly, their courage and force of arms having withered in the 
wilderness. In the end, the United States realized its progress in a war against nonwhite 
autonomy through negotiations with Seminoles and African-Americans and pledges to 
recognize the rights of their enemies.
Yet the fundamental failures of Jackson’s program were, as Catlin hoped, largely 
hidden. Certainly, Americans were aware that the several military campaigns had failed 
and numerous generals returned from the front with their reputations tarnished. It was a 
war championed by slaveholders and led by Democratic administrations determined to 
spread white supremacy throughout the American continent. It made clear the full 
consequences of the recently-controversial Indian Removal Act: Indian autonomy itself 
was to be punished by force. It was fought to consolidate white control of Florida and 
bring it into the Union as a slave state, to end the Seminole sanctuary for slaves in the 
Deep South, and to seize the hundreds of Black Seminoles – Henry David Thoreau spent 
a night in jail protesting the Mexican-American War over less. But while protesting 
11
voices were not silent, they came from the edges of American society, from abolitionists 
and reformers far from the centers of power. The nominal opposition party, the Whig 
Party, was, in this, largely silent. The history of the Second Seminole War was being 
hidden even while it was being fought. 
To accept an absence of debate as the vital characteristic of a nation otherwise 
embroiled in highly contentious partisan battles is to redefine the second American party 
system as radically stunted rather than path breaking. Debates over race, expansion, and 
the frontier defined the rest of the century, spanning the Mexican-American War to the 
Spanish-American War. In that light, the silence which largely surrounded the Second 
Seminole War takes on greater salience. Why did the annexation of Texas come to 
redefine its decade as the era of Manifest Destiny while the consolidation of Florida 
registered only barely? Why did the Indian Removal Act help secure a political 
movement, inspire mass protests across the nation, and pass the House by the thinnest of 
margins while only a few years later the Second Seminole War inspired merely a handful 
of dissenting votes in Congress? These are questions that confound prior histories of the 
period and are answerable only in light of the central lacuna of their era.
11
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12
That lacuna had devastating implications for the future of United States 
expansionary policy. Through the process of Indian removal, a policy whose full 
dimensions were revealed by the Second Seminole War, Jackson authored a subtle, 
though profound shift in the relationship between the United States and nonwhites within 
its sovereign territory. In broad strokes, Jackson’s Indian policy hardly differed from that 
of his predecessors. Though earlier federal administrations had praised the revolutionary 
potential of Indians, almost uniformly they pursued an unofficial policy of dispossession, 
removal, and ardent expansionism that disregarded their stated respect for Indian 
sovereignty. They utilized a variety of means - ensnarling Indians in debt and proceeding 
to leverage their vulnerability, threatening the use of force to extort biased treaties, 
unleashing violent settlers to make Indian habitation untenable, and outright coercion - to 
force Indians to abandon their land and further the expansion of white settlement. 
Whatever their motivations or sympathies, a long line of United States officials had 
begun the process of Indian removal years before Andrew Jackson ascended to the 
presidency.
12
                                                
12
 On the reality of early republic Indian policy, see Robert Owens, Mr. Jefferson’s Hammer: William Henry 
Harrison and the Origins of American Indian Policy (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007); 
Anthony F.C. Wallace, Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate of the First Americans (Cambridge, MA: 
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Emergence of U.S. Liberal Imperialism," The American Indian Quarterly, 32.3 (2008): 297-323; Reginald 
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2010); Christian Keller, “Philanthropy Betrayed: Thomas Jefferson, the Louisiana Purchase, and the Origins 
of Federal Indian Removal Policy,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 144.1 (Mar., 2000), 
39-66.
13
Nevertheless, the stated aims of early republic Indian policy before Jackson were 
not valueless, regardless of how they differed from reality on the ground. George 
Washington and Thomas Jefferson had acknowledged, if with hesitation, that Indian 
nations were self-governing communities with distinct legal, political, and societal forms. 
Believing that the gradual workings of progress inevitably doomed the Indian race to 
extinction, these leaders advocated assimilation as the only means by which they might 
escape their fate. It would not be easy. As Thomas Jefferson and others conceived it, 
assimilation would require a thoroughgoing transformation of Indian society: the casting 
off of hunting as a mode of production, the adoption of an agricultural-based domesticity 
in the mode of their white neighbors, the rearrangement of gender roles in which men had 
overburdened women with labor, and a decisive break with European powers, whose 
imperial pretensions had corrupted Indian societies by instilling aristocratic privilege in 
place of their original democratic culture. If they completed those tasks, arduous and 
harrowing as they may have been, Jefferson and others declared themselves willing to 
welcome Indians as equal partners in the United States, friends and brothers in the 
republican project.
13
Though this vision of domestic, dependent nations existing within the sovereign 
territory of the United States was necessarily discordant with the priorities of white 
settlement, national expansion, and the construction of concrete national borders, this 
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 On the putative foundations of early republic Indian policy, see Peter Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire: The 
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14
uneasy equilibrium largely persisted. Treating Indian nations as dependent was not the 
equivalent of trampling Indian rights. The removal of the Cherokees represented the 
clearest example of the difference between early republic Indian policy and that of 
Andrew Jackson. During the dispute between the Georgia state government and the 
Cherokees, President John Quincy Adams, an able adherent to the policies of his 
forbears, had actively advocated for the removal of the Cherokees, but steadfastly refused 
to coerce them and eventually restrained the Georgians’ worst excesses.  As president, 
Jackson threatened to unleash the full fury of Georgia law, government, and its populace 
against them, leaving southeastern Indians only a single choice. They could leave their 
property in the east or they could submit to the rule of their respective states as 
subordinates to the neighboring white citizenry. Nowhere were the consequences of that 
choice starker than in Florida.
14
The policies of Washington and Jefferson pointed toward a vision of national 
expansion that respected the political and legal structures of the colonized. By forcing the 
southeastern Indians to accept either removal or absorption into the white populace as
subordinate members, Jackson began his nation on an unsteady course toward empire. 
When the circumstances of future expansions changed, for example when whites coveted 
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the land of Indians who had nowhere left to emigrate or when the United States wrested 
control of the Philippines, Jacksonianism led to the Dawes Act of 1887 and the violence 
of the Philippine War of Independence. Proponents of the colonization of the Philippines 
explicitly seized on Jackson’s repudiation of the right of Indians to be ruled by the 
consent of the governed. Had they drawn from an earlier tradition of Indian relations or 
had Jackson’s contemporaries challenged his radicalism forthrightly, they perhaps would 
have devised strategies to secure their objectives without insisting on the subordination of 
the colonized.
15
Unfortunately, the Americans of the 1830s allowed their voices to be silenced and 
the Gilded Age leaders who launched the Spanish-American War knew of no other 
precedent. The decision of the antebellum elite to ignore the implications of what John L. 
O’Sullivan would soon popularize as “Manifest Destiny,” was the conesequence of a 
general understanding among political leaders of both parties that debate over slavery and 
empire would be silenced, both by mores, constricting debate, and by law, through gag 
rules in the House and Senate that forbade Congressional discussion of slavery. As 
slaveholders staked the future of their institution on the removal of nearby Indians, 
antebellum expansion became, in effect, a sectional issue, subsumed within slavery’s all 
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encompassing silence. Throughout the Second Seminole War, Democrats and Whigs, 
then, disagreed not over the war itself but over which side could win it more efficiently. 
For all of the very real advances of white male democracy in the wake of Andrew 
Jackson’s election, political realities stunted debate on some of the most consequential 
issues of the age.
16
Though historians have insightfully connected the Second Seminole War to the 
history of slavery – the war has been identified as “the largest slave rebellion in 
American history” as often as it has “America’s longest Indian conflict” – they have 
generally viewed the war through a local lens, examining the influence of the conflict on 
slavery in the Deep South and territorial Florida, but ignoring its implications for the rest 
of the country. The Second Seminole War, though on the margins of the nation, was, for 
a generation of Americans, the greatest drain of blood and treasure they knew. Abraham 
Lincoln, in his first speech to Congress following the fall of Fort Sumter cited the “very 
large sums (in the aggregate … nearly a hundred millions) to relieve Florida of the 
aboriginal tribes,” as evidence that the seceding states owed a debt to the Union that 
could not be repaid save by their allegiance. The war represented a unique opportunity to 
interrogate the influence of slaveholders upon the federal government, but it was an 
opportunity left untaken.
17
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The partially enforced absence of slavery from political and popular discourse had 
a stultifying effect upon American policy prior to its dramatic reemergence with the 
Wilmot Proviso, a proposal to ban slavery from all lands gained during the Mexican-
American War, in 1846. There were vital ideological debates of the era, but aside from 
the Nullification Crisis in 1832, few Americans debated the relationship between the 
interests of slaveholders and national policy. In 1844, presumptive presidential nominees 
Henry Clay and Martin Van Buren would critically wound their own careers by agreeing 
to ignore the potential annexation of Texas, but they merely echoed an earlier de facto 
agreement between Democrats and Whigs. The Second Seminole War, fought to protect 
slavery in Georgia and Florida, was outside the realm of discussion. Both parties 
benefited greatly from the gag rule they imposed on themselves; northern Democrats 
could effectively vote as pro-slavery ideologues without fearing competition from 
antislavery opponents while silence masked significant sectional and ideological tension 
between northern and southern Whigs. Into that black hole fell the Second Seminole War.
Despite the rise of institutionalized, vibrant party organizations, the degree to 
which these fully realized political organizations circumscribed debate is both startling 
and confounding. Considering the cataclysmic disputes which led to the Missouri 
Compromise and the furor which surrounded the annexation of Texas, slavery was only 
the most glaring absence from mainstream political dialogues. On a whole host of issues 
– national expansion, the repercussions of the Indian Removal Act, the nation’s 
relationship with other recently independent countries throughout the Americas – the 
structure of the two party system stifled, rather than stimulated, debate.
18
                                                
18
 On the importance of political identity, see first: Arthur Schlesinger, The Age of Jackson (New York: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1971). On the disinterest of antebellum northern Democrats in the ultimate 
18
The extent to which Whigs, and especially northern Whigs, acquiesced to their 
southern allies and dominant Democratic policies has been masked by prominent 
symbolic gestures which had precious little impact on national policy. Whig 
Congressional leaders did appoint the most prominent voice against Indian removal in 
Congress, John Quincy Adams who had recently deplored Jacksonian expansion as 
promulgating a slaveholder-driven “crusade of conquest,” to head the Committee of 
Indian Affairs in 1841, and nominated Theodore Frelinghuysen, the leader of anti-
removal forces a decade before, to run alongside Henry Clay in 1844. More telling, 
however, was Adams’ decision to quit days after receiving the appointment, declaring 
that “all resistance against this abomination is vain.” The Whigs felt free to reclaim their 
defense of the American Indian only after Jackson’s vision had already won out. Scholars 
have seized on the general opposition among Whigs to the annexation of Texas and, 
surely, they opposed the measure. However, they opposed the war not for its underlying 
ethos, but out of abject fear of the cultural ramifications of so jarring an addition to the 
Union. The vast majority of Whigs feared not the ethical implications of expansion but its 
practical effects.
19
That they complied was due not to latent white supremacy or a disinclination to 
oppose Jacksonian expansionism (though these were certainly factors). Rather, their 
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acquiescence flowed from an understanding of their increasingly complex political 
system and the influence of interest groups more generally, and the Slave Power 
specifically. Though even contemporary antislavery and Free Soil activists disagreed as 
to the extent of the Slave Power conspiracy or which leading Americans belonged to it, 
interest groups commanding vast influence were hardly foreign to Madisonian systems of 
government. Slaveholders, whose human property represented several billion dollars of 
wealth, represented an unorganized but coherent political faction to whom presidents and 
members of Congress had little choice but to capitulate, especially in light of the lack of 
political weight given to antislavery in the North. Considering the exigencies of their 
political situation, submitting to the priorities of slaveholders in the South, up to and 
including launching wars against obdurate Indian nations in the South, was good politics 
for successive administrations. For individual legislators, the insidious pressure of 
slaveholder interest was all the more difficult to resist.
20
As reformers and politicians confronted the Slave Power in antebellum political 
culture, the conditions that cloaked the Second Seminole War slowly gave way. 
Following the plainly pro-slavery objectives of the annexation of Texas and after several 
years of opposition to the excesses of the Second Seminole War, antislavery activists 
ensured that national expansion would be the central issue of the coming decade. Without 
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the dampening effect of silence, the rigid priorities of slaveholders and the steadfast 
opposition of an increasingly engaged North made war nearly inevitable. That conflict, 
and the defeat of the South, destroyed Jackson’s vision of a nation forged in racial 
conflict, but its legacy would live on. Modeling their policies on Jackson’s vision of 
racial superiority and continental expansion, succeeding generations of imperialists 
would fuse Jackson’s language of conquest with a series of laws that codified the 
subordination of nonwhites, making possible the imperial American state. In Puerto Rico, 
for example, when United States officials declared its citizens foreign “in a domestic 
sense,” and deprived them of the protections of the Constitution, their actions were rooted 
in an ideology crafted by slaveholders and perpetuated through a general consensus of the 
antebellum elite.
Decades before in Florida, the influence of slaveholder interests was significantly 
more obvious. By 1840, even following the disruptions of the Second Seminole War, the 
55,000 whites of Florida owned more than 45,000 slaves between them, making the 
territory one of the places most heavily dependent on slavery in the Union. Throughout 
the war, eastern Florida slaveholders inundated the War Department with letters and 
petitions urging officials to keep fighting the Seminoles until they were removed entirely. 
Whenever Black Seminoles surrendered or were captured, soldiers would carefully mark 
down their names, their physical characteristics, their age, their distinguishable markings, 
anything that would make it easier for their former owners to identify them. Slave 
catchers prowled army camps, hoping to recover slaves for their owners. Generals offered 
bounties of slaves to allied Indians, plantation owners purchased specious claims on 
Black Seminoles, and slaveowners resorted to the court system to prevent the government 
21
from granting freedom to the Black Seminoles. And, looming over the war, was the fate 
of the Seminoles. Their very presence in Florida destabilized its nascent slave society. To 
secure it, they would have to be removed, and removed completely. The unresolved 
questions over their fate flowed directly from Jackson’s decision to substitute 
unvarnished force in place of treaty making and led, haltingly, toward empire.
In this dissertation, through the use of public debates, newspaper commentaries, 
private letters, personal narratives, and official reports, I will contextualize the Second 
Seminole War within a larger national framework to explain why thousands of whites 
and Indians died there, dozens of Black Seminoles seized their freedom, and the vast 
majority of one of the most powerful Indian nations in the southeast began a long, bitter 
journey west. The answers, bound together with sharply contrasting visions of the nation, 
were foundational elements of the nation’s political culture, economic structure, and 
social fabric. Viewed from a distance, the era of the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842, 
appears something of a peaceful interlude in the midst of the maelstroms that beset much 
of antebellum history. Yet the very conditions that made such an oasis possible made the 
Civil War almost inevitable. The silence that descended over the Second Seminole War 
enveloped an entire generation between the Missouri Compromise and the annexation of 
Texas. It was a silence that could not last. In 1852, during the oration in which he 
famously asked, “what to the slave is the fourth of July,” Frederick Douglass argued, “it 
is not light that is needed, but fire; it is not the gentle shower, but thunder.” When George 
Catlin begged for silence in the aftermath of the Second Seminole War, the implicit 
answer he received in 1861 was, as Douglass put it in that same speech, “the storm, the 
22
whirlwind, and the earthquake.” Yet, though the hegemonic silence that enveloped the 
Second Seminole War may have died by fire, its legacy lived on far beyond the horizon.
21
State, Nation, and Expansion in Jacksonian America
In analyzing an array of issues - most importantly the motivations behind Indian 
removal, the connection between Indian removal and national expansion, and the role of 
slavery in national expansion - historians have begun with wildly divergent first 
principles, leading them to vastly different conceptions of the role of the frontier in 
antebellum American society. 
Following Andrew Jackson’s lead, who assured the public that “to save [the 
Indian] from … utter annihilation, the General Government kindly offers him a new 
home, and proposes to pay the whole expense,” historians sympathetic to Jackson have 
identified the motivation for removal as largely paternal. Though they find Indian 
removal still symptomatic of pervasive white supremacy, these scholars have generally 
believed Jackson to be concerned with doing justice to the dispossessed, given the 
undeniably difficult constraints of the era. Though allowing for the central injustice of 
Indian removal, they have tended to characterize leading Democrats as forced into action 
by the lawlessness of settlers and local officials in the lower South, concluding that 
removal was the most humane realistic solution to the conflict. Extending their view 
further, historians of this school have tended to find Whig opposition to Indian removal 
largely insincere, less concerned with the fate of the southeastern Indians than with 
opposing the policies of their rivals. By taking seriously the humanitarian concern of 
those who championed removal and submerging the opposition to it within the larger 
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ideological concerns of its opponents, these historians have tended to view Indian 
removal discretely, in isolation from the longer history of American expansion.
22
Others have offered a far different interpretation of the Democrats’ position, 
echoing Alexis de Tocqueville’s observation of the executors of Indian removal that “it is 
impossible to destroy men with more respect to the laws of humanity.” Those advancing 
this interpretation have depicted the paternal rhetoric of Indian removal as a Trojan horse 
used to justify overwhelming violence against recalcitrant Indians. Generally, historians 
of this perspective have identified Indian removal with subsequent expressions of 
Manifest Destiny, arguing that as patriarchs, white American men believed themselves 
morally justified to pursue national expansion in order to spread the virtues of civilization 
to other ethnicities and nationalities.
23
Another subset of historians view Indian removal and national expansion as the 
natural conclusion of the Jacksonian project. Highly skeptical of their paternalist rhetoric, 
they have instead identified Jackson and his allies as the earliest proponents of American 
imperialism. By arguing for expansion as the primary goal of Jackson and his successors, 
advocates of this interpretation usually identify white supremacy as the key component of 
Jacksonian democracy, characterizing Indian removal as part of a continuous process 
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culminating in the annexation of Texas and the Mexican-American War. They usually 
depict the Whigs as skeptics of expansion, believing it incompatible with their underlying 
faith in ordered progress and generally conservative outlook. To these historians, leading 
Whigs sincerely attempted to rein in the excesses of their political enemies and defended, 
if indirectly, the rights of those incorporated into the United States.
24
A related, though not identical, approach to national expansion argues that 
expansion came at the behest not of Jacksonian Democrats specifically, but due primarily 
to the lobbying of influential slaveholders. In this, they echo antislavery activists of the 
day who warned against the nefarious influence of a slaveholder conspiracy they 
identified as the Slave Power. Though the Slave Power theory would reach its full apogee 
prior to the 1860 election, abolitionists such as William Channing and Joshua Giddings 
during the 1830s laid the crucial groundwork for the theory. Historians of this school 
credit expansion to slaveholder agitation, though they do disagree over the extent of 
slaveholder control of the federal government. One explanation argues that their control 
over federal policy was real, but indirect, identifying in slaveholders’ warnings of slave 
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rebellion the means by which they compelled that same government to aid them 
protecting their investment in human property.
25
Alternatively, some historians have argued that if the priorities of slaveholders 
dominated national politics, they did so as a result of a general agreement among leading 
Americans to forestall further discussions over slavery so as to not risk dissolution of the 
Union. Taking seriously Martin Van Buren’s 1827 proposal to replace “geographical 
divisions founded on … prejudices between free and slave holding states” with a grand 
alliance between Southern planters and Northern democrats, they argue that the second 
party system was an artificial construct of political elites meant to substitute party feeling 
in place of sectional tension. In this context, statesmen refused to consider the 
implications of national expansion out of both an abject fear of disunion as well as the 
political cynicism of men like Van Buren who clung to the banner of their party, even if it 
meant a pact with slavery against the interests of their home states. Considering the 
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explosive nature of disputes over slavery, agitation over diverse issues including Indian 
removal represented, as one historian put it, the “sublimation” of concern over slavery.
26
Lastly, another school of historians largely focused on Indian history have argued 
that Jacksonian expansion can best be described as imperial. In their view, a series of jury 
rigged orders and informal understandings institutionalized a set of relationships in which 
the United States used its powerful military apparatus to exert effective control over 
significant aspects of Indian society. Though some scholars have argued that the 
definition of imperialism necessarily excludes continental expansion, others have 
countered that in extinguishing Native American sovereignty the United States acted 
identically to European nations in Asia and Africa. Moreover, to view the situation from 
the perspective of Indian nations like the Seminoles, who did not identify themselves as a 
part of the United States on any political level, is to obliterate the distinction entirely.
27
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The events that led inexorably to the Civil War eventually exposed the political 
machinery that initiated the Second Seminole War, but the same propulsive forces had a 
legacy in the overseas expansion of the late nineteenth century. Though historians have 
been correct in viewing continuities between national and continental expansion, they 
have generally read the line of casualty backwards. The imperialists of the Gilded Age 
resemble Jackson, Cass, Tyler, Polk, Upshur, and Calhoun because they explicitly 
modeled themselves upon their inspiration. Their policies, designed to obliterate 
indigenous sovereignty and promote white settlement, when uprooted from their specific 
context would be translated into imperial campaigns across the Pacific. This dissertation 
argues that language matters. The assimilationist speech acts of early republic leaders 
such as George Washington and Thomas Jefferson held great meaning to their 
contemporaries, even if that rhetoric was entirely devoid of actual content. As 
Jacksonsian language, which challenged the legacy of Indian reformers and self-styled 
philanthropists, itself went unchallenged, it created an easily appropriated legacy for 
future expansionists and would-be conquerors.
28
People, Places, Events
The vast majority of events during the Second Seminole War occurred between 
the northern edge of the Withlacoochee River and 150 miles south, to the banks of Lake 
Okeechobee. Throughout the eighteenth century, several different groups of Native 
Americans gradually migrated to Spanish Florida, drawn by its fertile soil and its ease of 
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trade with several European outposts. The largest bands were Lower Creeks migrating 
south to evade the increasing power of Upper Creek leaders in present-day Georgia and 
Alabama, but other Indians, including Choctaws, Yamasees, and Chickasaws migrated as 
well. These diverse bands of Indians, many of whom spoke related, but not identical 
languages, generally considered themselves to be politically and socially distinct from 
each other. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they would buttress their 
numbers through an alliance with the Black Seminoles, free and enslaved African-
Americans, most of whom were owned by Seminole masters, who formed communities 
near Seminole lands. In exchange for regular tribute, the Seminoles offered substantial 
autonomy to their slaves, utilizing them as strategic allies to augment their military 
strength. However, many whites and Creek Indians held disputed claims to the ownership 
of the Black Seminoles, and throughout the 1810s and 1820s, they attempted to gain their 
possession through legal and other means.
29
When England gained control of Florida following the Seven Years War, the 
Florida Indians formed a strong trading relationship with imperial officials stationed at 
the far reaches of the English empire. They bitterly resented the return of Florida to Spain 
following the American Revolution, unhappy with Spanish restraints on their trade. As 
time went on, the Florida Indians began to act collectively, signing treaties with England 
and formalizing their economic relationship with their new Spanish neighbors. During the 
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first decade of the nineteenth century, the Seminoles entered into an uneasy alliance with 
the Spanish, though they remained frustrated with the terms of Spanish trade.
30
During the second decade of the nineteenth century, Florida was transformed by 
the revolutionary fervor that spread throughout the Americas. Spanish presence in the 
colony was always light and, after diverting the vast majority of their resources to 
quelling Latin American revolutions, Spanish rule over Florida appeared close to falling. 
Between 1812 and 1819, several United States adventurers launched unauthorized 
filibustering offensives against Spanish Florida, hoping to secure its annexation. Though 
ambivalent toward Spanish rule, the Seminoles recognized the bellicosity of the United 
States and feared the extension of white settlement on their land. To combat the threat, 
they reluctantly aided the Spanish against several invasions and pledged their allegiance 
to the British during the War of 1812. By the end of the decade, leading Southerners had 
identified the Seminole-British alliance as a threat to their region, culminating in General 
Andrew Jackson’s unauthorized invasion of Spanish Florida and the destruction of 
numerous Seminole settlements. After Jackson obliterated Spanish control of the colony, 
the Spanish reluctantly sold Florida to the United States in the Adams-Onís Treaty. 
Despite Jackson’s victory, many in the southern United States still lobbied for the 
removal of the Seminoles, believing their presence in Florida provided a ready beachhead 
for a renewed British invasion and threatened to destabilize slavery throughout the 
region. Moreover, many southern slaveholders held semi-legitimate claims on dozens of 
Black Seminoles, some of whom had escaped from southern plantations. If they could 
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force the Seminoles to emigrate, then, many southern slaveholders stood to benefit, 
directly and indirectly.
31
Weakened by the events of the 1810s, the Seminoles agreed to surrender 
significant tracts of land to the United States in the 1823 Treaty of Moultrie Creek, 
though they retained about four million acres. After a year, dissatisfied with the fertility 
of their remaining land and suffering from massive displacement, many Seminole bands 
applied to United States territorial officials for higher annuities and more supplies. These 
officials, strongly desiring the removal of the Seminoles to further integrate Florida more 
deeply into the fabric of the nation, began to leverage Seminole privation to persuade the 
Indians to emigrate west. In the wake of Nat Turner’s revolt and the fear mongering that 
accompanied British abolition, securing the institution of slavery was as much about 
national security as economic development. Following Andrew Jackson’s elevation to the 
presidency and the passage of the Indian Removal Act, Jackson and his subordinates 
seized on Seminole deprivations as a means of pressuring them to accept removal to new 
lands in the Arkansas Territory. By 1834, through the signing of two treaties tainted by 
varying degrees of fraud, the United States succeeded in their goal to the dissatisfaction 
of the most militant Seminoles.
32
In December 1835, angered by Seminole intransigence in violation of what they 
held to be a sacred compact, United States officials dispatched Major Francis Dade and 
110 men to enforce the compliance of the Seminoles. As they marched, several hundred 
of Seminole and Black Seminole partisans descended on their position, leaving only one 
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white survivor. Enraged, Jackson ordered thousands of volunteers and soldiers to put 
down the Seminole rebellion, seize the Black Seminoles, and force the surviving Indians 
to emigrate. Led by their hereditary chief Micanopy and the famed warrior Osceola, the 
Seminoles girded for war. With militant Seminoles deeply opposed to removal and 
fearful that the United States intended to seize the Black Seminoles, the Seminole 
coalition was prepared for a long, drawn-out conflict. For the United States, the results 
were catastrophic.
The first general to reach Florida, Edmund Pendleton Gaines, launched an 
immediate offensive. Overwhelmed by Indian forces, his men entrenched themselves on 
the Withlacoochee River, initiated peace talks without the consent of the War 
Department, and eventually returned, defeated. In May, 1836, General Winfield Scott 
arrived in Florida and began a complicated series of maneuvers, hoping to trap Seminole 
bands in a vice. His laborious planning allowed the Seminoles time to avoid his attack 
and space to continue to raid the frontier. Frustrated at the failures of Scott, his political 
rival, Jackson installed his personal friend Quartermaster General Thomas Jesup as the 
commanding officer of the war effort. As the war entered into its second year and the 
United States poured increasing amounts of money into it, Whig politicians began to raise 
objections and questioned the Jackson and Van Buren administrations’ effectiveness. 
Jesup, a partisan Democrat, flailed in Florida. Like his predecessors, he was 
unable to locate his enemies in the vast wilderness. Though often on the brink of a 
diplomatic agreement with his enemies, several treaties collapsed just prior to the date of 
emigration. Jesup’s only breakthrough came through negotiations with the Black 
Seminoles. Convincing his superiors to forgo claims on fugitive slaves, Jesup offered 
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freedom to the Black Seminoles in return for their aid as guides against their erstwhile
Indian allies. His offer worked, but the vast majority of Seminoles remained beyond his 
reach. In late 1837, exhausted by the futility of his efforts, Jesup devised an extraordinary 
stratagem.  He had a group of men meet with Osceola under a white flag, then, at a 
prearranged signal, surround the chief and take him into custody. Animated by the 
romantic image of the noble savage, many across the country scorned Jesup for betraying 
their nation’s honor.
In the aftermath, though the Seminoles had won nearly every pitched battle, the 
daily attrition of concerted guerilla warfare began to take their toll. With entire Seminole 
families constantly moving throughout southern Florida and lacking the opportunity to 
plant crops, significant numbers of Seminoles began to suffer from severe privation. 
Finding continued opposition nearly impossible, increasing numbers of Seminoles began 
to surrender to United States forces throughout 1838 and 1839. Though the war continued 
for several more years under the command of several officers including future president 
Zachary Taylor, its outcome was nearly inevitable. By 1840, United States commanders 
were tasked with rounding up the stragglers through wilderness raids, delicate 
negotiations, and, in one controversial incident, the importation of Cuban bloodhounds. 
By 1842, his resolve dwindling, commanding officer Colonel William Worth convinced 
the newly inaugurated Tyler administration to end the war, leaving several hundred 
Seminoles in southern Florida, beyond the reach of white settlement. At a cost of 
thousands of lives and tens of millions of dollars, the Second Seminole War had ended. 
Organizational Principles
33
This work will be organized thematically, though each chapter will proceed 
roughly chronologically from the one before with significant temporal overlapping. Each 
chapter will place the Second Seminole War in different contexts, exploring it from the 
perspective of Americans who diverged widely and wildly, in geographic origin and 
ideological commitments. Though unconventional, this organizing principle better 
illuminates the complicated relationship between the frontier periphery and the political 
culture of Washington, DC. For example, though the nation’s two most prominent voices 
advocating the moderation of American policy were General Thomas Jesup, the longest-
serving general in Florida, and groups of antislavery reformers in the North, there was no 
dialogue between them. Indeed, the reformers considered Jesup, the notorious betrayer of 
Osceola, to be no better than a war criminal, and Jesup, a slaveholder, paid little heed to 
distant Northern voices of protest. By subsuming the war into broader issues of national 
expansion, the eradication of nonwhite autonomy, and the consolidation of planter 
hegemony, the politics of slavery cleaved political coalitions, isolated military 
commanders, and allowed local planters de facto authority over national frontier policy. 
Chapter 1 will provide an extended prologue to the rest of the dissertation. 
Focusing largely on the twenty-five year period prior to the beginning of the Second 
Seminole War and culminating with the ambush of Dade’s command, this chapter will 
chart the gradual decline of an earlier era of expansion and Andrew Jackson’s influence 
on the southeast. As Jackson’s experiences on the Tennessee frontier increasingly 
convinced him that autonomous Indian communities threatened national security, he 
began to repudiate the ideals of an earlier generation of Americans and worked to 
eliminate rival powers on the nation’s borderlands. In the face of United States pressure, 
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Seminole leaders were forced to submit to their demands, gradually ceding land and 
property until impending removal convinced militant leaders that violent resistance was 
their only recourse.
Chapter 2 largely considers the war as seen through the eyes of General Thomas 
Jesup. It charts the failures of Edmund Gaines, Winfield Scott, and Richard Keith Call to 
come to terms with the multifaceted politics of antebellum Florida. Only Jesup, by 
pragmatically considering the interests of the Seminoles, Black Seminoles, and local 
slaveholders, managed to navigate the complicated depths of Floridian power dynamics. 
Through a focus on Jesup’s correspondence with his superiors in the War Department, 
the chapter will argue that he struggled against orders that demanded the Seminoles’ 
removal, finding removal morally dubious and an utterly needless means of advancing 
his nation’s objectives. In his opposition, Jesup faced harsh opposition from many 
slaveholders who saw the war not merely as necessary to safeguard slavery in the Deep 
South, but as a means to enrich themselves through the re-enslavement of the Black 
Seminoles. Struggling with the burden of winning the war, Jesup cast about for tactics 
that would ensure victory, tarnishing his reputation by deceitfully capturing Osceola and 
alienating slaveholders by promising freedom to the Black Seminoles. By the end of his 
command, Jesup had broken with Democrats across the country by proposing that the 
Seminoles be allowed to remain in Florida. He returned to Washington in disgrace.
33
Like the preceding chapter, chapter 3 will focus on events in Florida, describing 
the experience of the thousands of volunteers from the Deep South who streamed into the 
region during the first months of the war. Embodying Jackson’s vision of a nation of 
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independent white men and reared in a culture of masculinity and mastery, most 
volunteers based their service explicitly on the defense of the white homestead against 
marauding Indian and black hordes. When the Seminoles frustrated their efforts, the 
volunteers responded by reconceptualizing the purpose of their service, through the 
medium of mastery which they so valued, as personal and public displays of bravery 
against nonwhite enemies. Historians such as Amy Greenberg and Robert May have 
probed the degree to which the priorities of slaveholders, both economic and cultural, 
circulated among the filibusterers of the 1850s, but this chapter will establish the ways in 
which the ideology of mastery informed and motivated expansionists throughout earlier 
eras of American history.
34
Chapters 4 covers roughly the same time period as the previous chapters, but they 
intersect only tangentially. Through a reading of congressional debates throughout the 
war, this chapter finds almost total assent among mainstream Whigs and Democrats to 
the removal of the Seminoles from Florida. By extending the analysis beyond the debate 
surrounding the Indian Removal Act and its immediate aftermath, this chapter argues that 
scholars have drastically overestimated the extent to which opposition to Indian removal 
animated the Anti-Jacksonian coalition. Though Whigs were heavily critical of the 
conduct of the war, they seldom disagreed with the administration’s war aims. Their 
silence, along with nearly lock-step support among Democrats, ensured that the nation 
would pursue the Second Seminole War to its bitter end. The difficulties of the war did 
lead some Democrats to suggest novel strategies as it dragged on throughout the late 
1830s. With Thomas Hart Benton’s suggestion to pass a Homestead Act and utilize white 
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settlers to guard against Seminole attacks and appropriate Indian territory, Democrats 
attempted to officially replace the nuanced political maneuverings of army officers such 
as Thomas Jesup with the seemingly inexorable march of land hungry whites on the 
frontier.
Chapter 5 will examine the growing opposition of antislavery reformers to the 
Second Seminole War. Joining together their struggle against both the Second Seminole 
War and early attempts to annex Texas, this chapter will argue that abolitionists of most 
persuasions perceived Jacksonian expansion as immoral attempts to extend the reach of 
slavery and trample the rights of nonwhites. It will culminate with Joshua Giddings’s 
1841 speech in the House of Representatives, which defied the gag rule that silenced 
Congressional debate of slavery. In contrast to the collaboration of more prominent 
Whigs, the breadth and the substance of the abolitionists’ association of expansion with 
white supremacy offered an alternative vision of an America in which the status of 
nonwhites lay at the heart of a functioning democratic society. Contrasted with the 
national parties, both of whom were too wed to southern interests to oppose the slave 
interest, the abolitionists’ marked opposition to aggressive expansion revealed the 
strength of slaveholder control over national institutions during the Jacksonian era.
35
Chapter 6 will return to Florida and detail the course of the war from the 
perspective of the Seminoles and Black Seminoles. Seminole and Black Seminole leaders 
began the war believing that by dispersing into small groups into the Florida expanse, 
they could frustrate the United States into moderating its absolute insistence on removal. 
The Seminoles did not understand that their adversaries were so committed to the 
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consolidation of white supremacy that they would purse it without regard for the cost, in 
money or lives. Instead, as the Seminoles and Black Seminoles fought, more conciliatory 
factions within the Seminole leadership frayed their alliance, even as Thomas Jesup 
successfully convinced leading Black Seminoles to surrender in return for a guarantee of 
their freedom.
Chapter 7 will describe events in both Florida and Washington, as President John 
Tyler, Senator Thomas Hart Benton, and Colonel William Worth worked together to end 
the war, overcoming the wishes of a populace committed to absolute removal. They 
found that negotiations could not end the war. Throughout the last years of the conflict, 
the Seminole leadership proved too decentralized to enforce treaties on its populace even 
while large numbers of United States citizens violently opposed the principle of 
negotiating with Indians. When more violent means of winning the war - the importation 
of bloodhounds and the summary execution of the enemy - failed as well, Tyler, Benton, 
and Worth seized on a plan to allow several hundred Seminoles to remain in Florida 
through an informal declaration of peace. The remaining Seminoles, unbound to the
United States by law and lacking any channel of official communication, would be 
policed by settlers lured to Florida by promises of free land in return for their service.
The Second Seminole War produced two enduring conflicts of historical 
significance. In the most overt struggle, thousands of United States troops and volunteers 
streamed into Florida determined to eradicate the Seminole threat and clear all obstacles 
to Florida’s incorporation into the Union as a loyal member of the Deep South. The 
majority of whites who fought in Florida did so for reasons not entirely clear to 
themselves. Echoing the advice of Whig Representative James Harper, they “did not stop 
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to inquire who was right and wrong;” rather, they lent their service to a vast adventure, 
forcibly removing nonwhites from their homeland and appropriating their resources to 
enrich themselves and their countrymen. Their invasion of the Seminoles’ homeland 
linked together currents of conquest, the gradual transformation of the nation’s frontiers
into land primed for slavery, and efforts to constrict nonwhite autonomy throughout the 
United States. The war marked a crucial turning point for the nation, away from the 
ideals of liberty and toward an intense focus on appropriation and consolidation.
36
The second battle was quieter, and limited to the margins of public debate. It 
derived from an insight among those best positioned to conceive it: the military officers 
compelled to win the war and the abolitionists most attuned to its effects. Neither could 
ignore questions of morality and righteousness. In part owing to the Second Seminole 
War, abolitionists began to perceive the intrinsic and intricate connections between the 
future of slavery, the expansion of the frontier, and the military domination of the region. 
Through their opposition to the war, they felt increasingly alienated from the two-party 
system, which ignored their warnings, and appeared entirely corrupted by the Slave 
Power. It was in the collision of these two interrelated conflicts – the federal army on the 
frontier doing the implicit bidding of slaveholders and the growing discontent among 
those who perceived and abhorred that development – that would define the course of the 
nation over the coming decades.
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Chapter 1
“Perish Principle But Save the Country”: 
Andrew Jackson, Florida, and the Evolution of United States Indian Policy
In 1835, recalling the aftermath of Andrew Jackson’s brazen and unauthorized 
invasion of Florida in 1819, John Quincy Adams retold the story of how he had defended 
the general’s actions. He remembered utilizing the arguments of Grotius, Puffendorf, and 
Vattel, the recognized authorities on the laws of nations, as well as Jackson’s response: 
“D-n Grotius! d-n Puffendorf! d-n Vattel! – this is a mere matter between Jim Monroe 
and myself!” That disjuncture emblemized the rivalry between the two men. Similarly 
ambitious, Adams and Jackson both understood themselves to have inherited a legacy 
from the Founders and had pledged their lives to the perpetuation and expansion of the 
Union. Belying their bitter rivalry, they supported many of the same policies during their 
presidencies: territorial acquisition, the consolidation of United States governmental 
authority on its frontiers, Indian removal, and the independence of the Americas from 
European influence. Yet, for all that they had in common, when Adams told a fellow 
politician, “I especially mean to say that Andrew Jackson is a bad man because he has no 
principles,” he could do so without taint of hypocrisy. Upon Jackson’s death in 1845, one 
of Jackson’s many eulogizers, a man who marched beside him in war, asserted that 
Jackson would do anything to save his beloved nation - that in the moment of need he 
would cry out “perish principle … but save the country.” In marshaling a similar 
expansionary program as his predecessors yet stripping its language of their putative 
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ideals, Jackson distorted early United States Indian policy and initiated a new era of 
national expansion.
1
Early republic United States leaders articulated lofty visions of their nation’s 
future. Believing that Native Americans were destined for extinction, these leaders 
expanded their own conception of the nation and, at least publicly, welcomed their Indian 
neighbors into it. Their proposals were fraught with racism, paternalism, faulty science, 
and condescension, but they did offer forthright statements that Indians were imbued with 
the rights of life, self-government, and property. These ideals, however, proved 
exceedingly abstract against the realities of the early United States and its borderlands. 
As settlers jostled for land and the alliance between European agitators and hostile 
Indians impeded national expansion, nearly every federal leader surrendered to 
expediency, empowering violent white frontiersmen, defrauding Indians through treaties, 
ensnarling them in debt, and declaring outright war against the remainder. Andrew 
Jackson, along with his Indian and borderlands policies, was a product of that reality, a 
weapon who numerous leaders, including James Madison and John Quincy Adams had 
enthusiastically aimed at Indian and European targets for over a decade. Despite that 
shared history, in the wake of Jackson’s Indian removal policies, John Quincy Adams 
confided to his journal in 1841 that rather than accept the position of Chairman of the 
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House Committee on Indian Affairs, he would prefer to turn his eyes away from “the 
sickening mass of putrefaction” of contemporary United States Indian policy.
2
 Nevertheless, when Andrew Jackson loudly and decisively turned his back on 
that tradition, many believed a great moral chasm had been breached. His political 
campaign against Indian autonomy was inextricably bound together with the nation’s 
tumultuous relationship toward its borderlands. With England, Spain, and France 
commanding vast territories on the nation’s frontiers, early republic leaders viewed 
nonwhites as dangerous elements, potential enemies of the state in the event of a foreign 
war. The War of 1812 seemed to justify those fears, as Indian nations from Canada, the 
Ohio valley, and the southeast eagerly joined the British ranks. Jackson, who personally 
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identified with white frontiersmen, nurtured an insistent hostility against Indians as 
people who could not be trusted as loyal allies in war and who impeded white settlement 
in peace. On that basis, between 1812 and 1835, he obliterated the southeast borderlands, 
circumscribed Indian autonomy, and brought about the forced emigration of the 
indigenous populations of the region. A veteran of multiple frontier wars, Jackson 
understood the reality of early republic Indian policy as well as anyone. In introducing 
the Indian Removal Act as being consistent with older policies through more honest 
means, he was entirely justified by history. The ideals of early American Indian policy 
were of little solace to the thousands who were dispossessed.
As president, John Quincy Adams believed in those ideals, even as he tarnished 
them. Like Jackson, he disdained the chaos of the nation’s borderlands as constraining 
economic and geographic expansion and imperiling national security. He was all too 
willing to empower Andrew Jackson to bring about their destruction. Once the 
borderlands had perished, however, Adams found himself torn between building the state 
and upholding the principles of his nation. Though he welcomed voluntary Indian 
removal as a member of James Monroe’s cabinet and as president, he nonetheless 
maintained his belief in what he perceived as earlier traditions of early republic Indian 
policy. In separate instances, he protected Creeks and the Cherokees from iniquitous 
white speculators and acquisitive state governments. In Florida, his agents often, though 
not invariably, defended Indian property rights against white claimants. As little sway as 
those ideals might have held on the frontier, they did check many United States leaders in 
power, including Adams.
3
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Even unfulfilled ideals were not valueless. One can envision later presidential 
administrations dedicating themselves to the language rather than the grounded reality of 
their predecessors’ policies. Had evangelical Whigs succeeded in defeating the Indian 
Removal Act in the House of Representatives, the reform-minded wing of the party likely 
would have held greater influence in the party’s nascent coalition and could have dragged 
the country toward a more humanitarian, if still highly paternalistic, Indian policy. In 
contrast, the results of the newly minted Jacksonian tradition were clear: the destruction 
of Indian self-government and the appropriation of their property.
Between 1812 and 1835, the relationship between the Seminoles and the United 
States embodied this vital shift in United States Indian and borderland policy. In the early 
nineteenth century, United States officials first encountered the Seminoles as ambivalent 
allies of a teetering Spanish empire. When the Seminoles, like many of the southeast 
Indians, decisively cast their lot with Spanish and British interests against the United 
States in 1812, Andrew Jackson marshaled the bellicose settlers of the region and moved 
to obliterate the borderlands altogether.  Amidst the ruins, a series of politicians operating 
within the discourses of early republic United States Indian policy acted in contradictory 
ways, at once marginalizing Seminole sovereignty while still encouraging them to plant 
ever deeper roots in Florida in the mold of white settlers. Even as those officials and 
Seminoles leaders cautiously circled each other, their negotiations were gradually 
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overtaken by two intertwined political movements. Within Florida, slave owners and 
settlers in the state legislature agitated for the removal of the Seminoles just as Andrew 
Jackson was elected to the presidency in Washington. After taking office, Jackson 
informed the Seminoles of their predicament. If they remained in Florida, he would do 
nothing to protect them from murderous settlers, reprobate speculators, and iniquitous 
state legislators who had designs on their land. 
The generation of Seminoles that waged the Seminole War had witnessed violent 
upheavals - the fall of the Spanish empire, failed foreign invasions from three countries, 
Andrew Jackson’s unauthorized offensive – and remained staunchly opposed to both 
assimilation and removal. They defined their claim to self-determination broadly, 
reproaching every attempt from agents of the United States to curtail it. In the face of 
American pressure to move west in 1829, when aging Seminole chief John Hicks made 
clear his determination to remain in Florida: “I am getting to be very old, and I wish my 
bones to be here,” he expressed the sentiment that his people shared emphatically. By the 
mid-1830s, however, many factions within Seminole society felt a nearly apocalyptic 
sense of dread. Over the past two decades, they had witnessed the rise and fall of empires 
and had watched as their geographic and cultural position gradually eroded in the face of 
United States expansionism. Prophets, chiefs, and warriors came to the same conclusion. 
Rather than be ground to dust by the institutional might of Andrew Jackson’s United 
States, many Seminoles made the only decision left to them, at a cost of thousands of 
lives and untold suffering.
4
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This chapter will describe the fall of the southeast borderlands and the effects of 
Jackson’s persistent attacks on Seminole autonomy, chronicling Florida’s long and 
circuitous path from the backwaters of the crumbling Spanish empire to a United States 
territory. It will detail the international intrigues that dominated the last years of the 
Florida colony and the slow, grinding process of consolidation that brought it into the 
orbit of the Deep South. As American policy evolved, the Seminoles responded as well, 
adapting politically and diplomatically to the changing world around them. Their 
response to their increasingly bellicose white neighbors would culminate in the infamous 
ambush of Dade’s command and demonstrated that no matter Jackson’s intentions, his 
Indian policy could not be imposed by fiat, but would have to be enforced.  
Early Republic Borderland Policy and the Contested Ground of Florida
Had the attention of the Spanish government not been focused on its Latin 
American colonies, the tumultuous events of Florida during the 1810s might easily have 
sparked a war with the United States. Two different United States officers, George 
Mathews and Andrew Jackson, launched brazenly illegal invasions of Spanish Florida, 
violating nearly every norm of international diplomacy. Though both were motivated by 
a fervent desire for national expansion, the different tactics of the two men revealed a 
vital disjuncture in the worldviews of Jackson and Mathews’s patron, James Madison. 
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Mathews took advantage of the chaos of the Florida borderlands to commandeer Florida 
land with the intention of incorporating Spanish whites into the United States. He had no 
interest in curtailing the autonomy of nonwhites nor was he concerned with their status 
should he succeed in annexing Florida. For Jackson, the Spanish were distinctly a 
secondary concern. The Seminole Indians who he believed to be armed and radicalized 
by British agents, were his avowed adversaries, and he would spend much of the decade 
of the 1810s tearing down the Florida borderlands and killing or removing everyone he 
deemed hostile to the United States, whether they be British, Spanish, Indian, or African-
American. To Jackson, they were all potential enemies of the state.
In January 1811, when Mathews re-entered the service of his nation, he was 
positive he stood on the precipice of a new world, though its shape was impossible to 
know. War appeared imminent. England had continued to restrict the neutral United 
States’ trade with France, implicitly asserting its authority over its former colony. To the 
west, Tecumseh and William Henry Harrison had already fought the first of several 
pitched battles. Yet even those events paled in comparison to recent happenings on the 
world stage.  Mexican Creoles had already declared their nation’s independence from 
Spain, and it was likely that South American elites would soon follow. Whatever the 
result, the upheavals in the New World would surely be enormous and, in them, George 
Mathews and his patron, President James Madison, saw an opportunity.
The teetering Spanish empire retained nominal control over two colonies adjacent 
to the United States, East and West Florida. Madison believed both to be vitally 
important to possess in order to expand the nation’s geographic space, preempt British 
claims, and protect American shipping lines. West Florida spanned the northern coast of 
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the Gulf of Mexico, encompassing much of the Florida Panhandle and stretching west, 
into modern-day Louisiana. The United States did hold something of a legitimate claim to 
West Florida, as Madison and Jefferson had both long maintained that the terms of the 
Louisiana Purchase conveyed the colony to the United States. Armed with that 
interpretation, as Spanish Central and South America descended into civil war, Madison 
sent word to leading citizens of West Florida that if they obtained an expression of 
consent from the people, he would move to incorporate it into the United States under 
international law. However, Madison’s plan surprised even him by working too well. 
Rather than evincing a vague future intention to join the United States, the West Florida 
convention declared the colony independent and requested immediate annexation.
5
  
East Florida, however, would prove far more difficult to acquire due to the 
presence of the Seminoles. Though East Florida was formally comprised of the rest of 
modern-day Florida, in practice, Spanish authority was confined to St. Augustine and its 
immediate environs. With some justification, the 2000 Spanish residents of this largely 
unprofitable colony believed themselves to be afterthoughts on the edge of the world.  In 
contrast, there were at least 3000 Indians living in Florida who, following the ruptures of 
the American Revolution, acted increasingly independently from their onetime allies, the 
more populous Creek nation to the north. Benefiting from a vibrant economy centered on 
the trade of deerskins, the Seminoles leveraged their prosperity to become the preeminent 
military power in the region. However, their power was not absolute. The Spanish had 
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granted a monopoly over Indian trade to a Scottish trading firm, Panton, Leslie and 
Company, leaving the Indians vulnerable to price manipulations and, consequently, 
heavily in debt by 1810.
6
Aware of Spanish weakness, Madison sent George Mathews to pass along a 
message to the leading citizens of East Florida that should East Florida declare 
independence from Spain, “a common interest” would bind them to the United States and 
he would welcome their incorporation. A better patriot than a diplomat, Mathews had 
served in the Continental Army, the Georgia state legislature, and the House of 
Representatives. Already aged at 72, Mathews had little patience left for delicate 
negotiations and excitedly sent word from Florida that though the inhabitants were “ripe 
for revolt, they [were] however incompetent to effect a thorough revolution without 
external aid.” Not one to hesitate, Mathews decided to provide that external aid himself. 
After writing to Madison and taking his lack of reply as tacit consent, he raised 125 
troops from among Georgia citizens and Spanish Floridians in March 1812. Dubbing 
them the Patriot Army, he formed a militia and seized Amelia Island, a small island near 
Georgia just inside the East Florida boundary line and close to St. Augustine. Once in 
power, he intended to form a new government, express interest as the executive of a 
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nascent independent state in joining the United States, and, as a representative of the 
Madison administration, accept his own offer.
7
For all of Mathews’s ambitions, he still commanded only a small sliver of land off 
the coast of Florida and had yet to make contact with the Seminoles. The Seminole nation 
was relatively young, formed from a heterogeneous mix of Creek dissidents, Yamasee 
War refugees, and outlying Choctaws bands during the seventeenth century. Feeling 
increasingly alienated by Creek leaders throughout the second half of the eighteenth 
century, many Lower Creek clans had migrated to northern Florida, likely drawn by its 
relatively untapped soil, abundant hunting opportunities, and lack of powerful European 
and Indian rivals. There, isolated by distance and culture and, having expelled some local 
Indians and absorbed their remnants, they formed a new political entity, the Seminoles. 
Incorporating other Indian bands of a different linguistic heritage, the ties that bound the 
Seminole nation were tenuous, but by 1784, both the Spanish and English recognized 
them as independent from the Creeks.
8
Once in place, Mathews moved not to recruit the Seminoles to his cause, but to 
assure their neutrality. In April 1812, he traveled to a Seminole camp to meet with the 
two most influential Seminoles at the time, Chief Payne and his younger half-brother 
Bowlegs. Having prospered within Spanish Florida, both men owned large European-
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style plantation houses, slaves, and hundreds of heads of cattle. Mathews personally met 
with Payne and tried to persuade him of the Patriots’ disinterest in Seminole property. An 
old man and weary of conflict, Payne took Mathews at his word and promised to keep the 
Seminoles out of the fray. His younger brother went further. Long distrustful of their 
Spanish neighbors and desperate to end the Panton Company’s monopoly which had 
impoverished his people, Bowlegs offered to fight at Mathews’ side. With success in his 
grasp, Mathews demurred. “It was a quarrel among white people,” he told Bowlegs, “and 
he did not want their assistance.”
9
Mathews might not have had had any interest in the Seminoles, but others in the 
borderlands were more aware of their power and influence. Spanish agents and African-
American slaves traveled to Seminole camps with dark tidings of the Patriots’ designs. 
Hearing of Seminole disquiet, Mathews attempted to reassure the Seminoles once again. 
He had his men kidnap Tony Proctor, a well-known and respected slave of the Forbes 
Company who had earned renown as a translator. Upon meeting with the Seminoles, 
Proctor deceived Matthews by feigning to translate his words of conciliation, and instead 
warned the Seminoles “these fine talks are to amuse and deceive you. They are going to 
take your country beyond the St. Johns, the old people will be put to sweep the yards of 
the white people, the young men to work for them, and the young females to spin and 
weave for them.” Though unaware of the deception, Mathews sensed the Seminoles’ 
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hostility and lost his temper, swearing that if the Seminoles resisted, they would be driven 
from their land and their villages would be burned to ash. Aware of the discord, Spanish 
Governor Sebastián Kindelán pounced. Days later, when Proctor returned it was at the 
side of a Cuban soldier offering Kindelán’s terms: in return for their aid against the 
Patriots, he would give them arms, gifts, and bounties for the scalps of Patriot leaders. 
The Seminoles were in the field.
10
Over the coming months during the fall of 1812, Seminole attacks shattered the 
Patriot force. Sneaking behind the Patriot main body, Seminole war parties struck at 
Patriot positions in northern Florida, scalping settlers and capturing dozens of slaves. 
“Nothing can be heard by the lonely traveler,” wrote one volunteer to his family with 
palpable fear, “save the screeching of the owl or howling of the wolf, his fears 
anticipating an attack from the more dreadful lurking Indian.” Mathews had been content 
with the Seminoles’ profession of neutrality and it became his undoing. Unwilling or 
unable to conceive of the full range of the Seminole chiefs’ interests, he had taken their 
word at face value, not realizing the Spanish might offer inducements of their own. He 
did not envision a place for them within his imagined Florida republic, but similarly did 
nothing to neutralize their autonomy as well. One observing American officer 
despairingly informed his superiors that the Patriots “only fears now seem to be about the 
Indians. In providing means for their present security they appear to have lost sight of the 
first grand object, the conquest of the Province, & … it is doubtful whether the ‘Patriot 
Army’ will ever revive again.” Mathews returned to Georgia, defeated.
11
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Mathews, like his patron, believed that the instability of the Florida borderlands 
impeded the development of the United States. A believer in republican theory, he 
utilized his faith in an imagined empire of liberty to drive the Spanish out of Florida. 
When Spanish whites did not flock to his cause, he had no means of attacking St. 
Augustine or of leveraging his position on Amelia Island. The Seminoles and Black 
Seminoles were, to him, irrelevant to the fate of Spanish Florida until they drove him out 
of Florida altogether.
Andrew Jackson did not repeat Mathews’s mistakes. For several years before the 
onset of the War of 1812, he had carried on a correspondence with the new governor of 
Tennessee, Willie Blount, advocating the removal of the state’s Indians to both expand 
and secure the nation’s territory. The incipient war with England only confirmed his 
fears. Learning that a dissident Creek band of Red Sticks had massacred several 
Tennessee families in May 1812, Jackson hurriedly wrote to Blount and asked him for 
authorization to lead 2500 men against the perpetrators. “They must be punished – and 
our frontier protected,” he thundered, “and I have no doubt but the[y] are urged on by 
british agents and tools.” To Jackson, there was no distinction between British agitation 
and Indian atrocity. War against the British could not be won unless every one of their 
allies, and potential allies, was removed.
12
Jackson’s Anglophobia was well-earned. Famously scarred as a young boy by a 
British officer during the American Revolution, Jackson believed he had witnessed the 
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depths of their tyranny first hand. The racialized violence of the War of 1812, with its 
legions of armed Indians, appeals to slaves throughout the South, and massive, possibly 
polyglot, foreign armies marching throughout the country, reinforced the nature of the 
threat. To Jackson, the solution was comprised of a series of interlocked steps. The 
British would have to be defeated. The Spanish would have to be driven out of Florida. 
The remaining southeast Indians would have to be removed. Failing in any of those three 
tasks would leave the South vulnerable to foreign invasion and make the massive scale of 
the slaveholding society with which he identified nearly impossible.
13
Finally, in September 1813, Blount authorized Jackson to march against the 
dissident Creeks in eastern Alabama. The general led a multiracial force, staffed largely 
of Tennessee militiamen and allied Creeks. The fighting was brutal. In the Creek town of 
Tallushatchee, Jackson’s men surrounded dozens or warriors and, in the words of Davy 
Crockett who was present, “shot them like dogs.” Jackson’s friend and future Florida 
governor, Lieutenant Richard Keith Call, was stunned at the aftermath, having witnessed 
bodies piled against one another and dogs feasting on their former masters’ corpses. 
Jackson proceeded south, killing 300 Red Sticks at Fort Strother where he spent the 
winter, consolidating his forces. There, he received word from the Hillabees, one of the 
most militant enemy bands, that they were willing to lay down their arms. However, as 
Jackson carried on a correspondence and set the terms of the agreement, one of his 
lieutenants, acting independently and ignorant of Jackson’s negotiations, unknowingly 
launched an attack on the largest Hillabee settlement, killing dozens, capturing hundreds, 
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and burning the town to the ground. Jackson never expressed remorse for the mistake. 
The following spring, he marched on the main Red Stick force at Horseshoe Bend where 
he launched his final assault. The killing dwarfed even that of Tallushatchee. Jackson’s 
men laid waste to Creek warriors, shot noncombatants, sliced long strips of skin from 
their victims to make bridle reins, and cut off the tips of the nose of the fallen to better 
count the dead. 850 Red Sticks died against 26 United States troops.
14
  
The remnants of the Red Stick army fled south to Florida, out of the United States 
and toward Seminole land. As the dissident Creeks had long been hostile to the cultural 
and economic manifestations of Americanization – the expanding slave trade among their 
people, the widening conception of private property, the growing entanglement with a 
broadening market economy, and the concomitant abandonment of traditional Indian 
cultural practices – they were natural allies of the Seminoles. By 1814, British officers 
had recruited thousands of such dissidents to their cause throughout the southeast, 
welcoming Creeks, Seminoles, and African-Americans to their ranks. Though the Treaty 
of Ghent ended the war before the British could marshal their new army, the conflict 
nonetheless swelled the Seminoles’ ranks and offered them direct lines of communication 
to British emissaries.
15
In the aftermath, Jackson, ever mindful of the British threat, adamantly reiterated 
his vision of the future of the Creeks, friendly and hostile. He urged representatives of the 
Madison administration to strip a large tract of land from the Creeks cutting through 
Alabama and Georgia to isolate them from Spanish Florida. He wanted the government to 
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abrogate all Cherokee and Chickasaw claims within Tennessee and entirely isolate the 
southeast from any potential European influence. In August 1814 at Fort Jackson as a 
newly minted brigadier general of the United States army, Jackson met with friendly and 
hostile Creek leaders and made his demands clear. They would have to surrender nearly 
half of the land to which they laid claim in Alabama and Georgia and allow the United 
States to build on the remaining land as it saw fit, including the construction of military 
outposts. If the Creeks, many of whom had fought beside him against the Red Sticks, 
chose not to sign the treaty and cast their lot with the British, he assured them they would 
face his wrath. The Creeks signed. A year later, after the Treaty of Ghent ended the war 
between the United States and England and explicitly superseded the harsh terms Jackson 
had imposed on the Creeks, Jackson insisted that his own treaty remained in effect, 
defying England, several Indian nations, and the rest of the federal government.
In the midst of the war with England, Andrew Jackson’s campaign against the 
Creek Indians did as much to advance the United States’ interests as any other facet of 
the war. The Treaty of Fort Jackson opened vast tracts of land to white settlement and left 
the Creek nation severely weakened. By leveraging the southeast borderlands conflicts to 
his nation’s benefit, he had deeply wounded Creek political and economic autonomy. He 
understood, as Mathews had not, that European nations largely projected their strength in 
North America through their Indian allies. Neither could be dealt with in isolation. 
Through the defeat of hostile Indians, the United States would acquire more land for 
settlement, forestall future invasions, and provide energetic young men an outlook to 
pursue self-realization. Andrew Jackson’s insight, one that he would apply over the 
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coming decades, was that those same lessons applied to Indians with whom he was 
nominally at peace as well.
Jackson’s Physical and Rhetorical Assault on the Florida Borderlands
Though the Treaty of Ghent formally ended the War of 1812, its aftershocks 
continued to plague the southeast throughout the rest of that decade. James Monroe’s 
secretary of state, John Quincy Adams, and Andrew Jackson each believed that the 
southeastern borderlands, which still housed hostile Indians and British agents, remained 
a threat to national security. Faced with frontier raids and the threat that the War of 1812 
might be rekindled, the Monroe administration expected Spain to enforce its territorial 
sovereignty over its colony by deporting British agitators and isolating the Seminoles 
from foreign envoys. When it became clear that Spain would not, and could not, do so, 
Andrew Jackson decided to eliminate the problem himself, unilaterally invading Spanish 
Florida and making their further possession of the colony untenable. When Adams 
became aware of the full breadth of Jackson’s campaign, he worked backward, seizing 
upon every justification under international law that might support his and Jackson’s 
cause. Jackson, however, had wider goals. To him the problem of the southeast 
borderlands was not the influence of the British at all, but rather the very presence of 
autonomous nonwhites who might threaten the United States.
16
The end of the War of 1812 did not mean the end of a British presence along the 
Gulf Coast. In 1817, along the Suwannee River, a Scottish merchant from the Bahamas, 
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Alexander Arbuthnot, established a trading post through which he conducted trade with 
the Seminoles and their allies. He became a tireless exponent for the Indians, dashing off 
letters to the Monroe administration, the British governor of Nassau, the British minister 
to the United States, and the Spanish governor in St. Augustine. His trading posts 
guaranteed the Seminoles supplies at reasonable prices, while his advocacy promised 
them the opportunity to reclaim both disputed Creek lands and land they had ceded to the 
Forbes Company. Jackson, who remained a general in the United States army, did not 
welcome his presence. Even more troubling to Jackson were reports of British agents 
throughout East and West Florida, promising firearms, supplies, and vast tracts of land to 
Indians and African-Americans. 
Perhaps nothing could have drawn Andrew Jackson’s attention like the 
confluence of British agents, Seminole intransigents, and autonomous African Americans 
in the southeast. Their presence threatened to destabilize the slave system, fully resurrect 
the southeast borderlands, and drive yeoman white settlers from the frontier. For Jackson, 
who fervently believed in the right to own slaves, disdained the British unreservedly, and 
had dedicated his life to expanding the nation in the name of herrenvolk democracy, 
Spanish Florida seemed to foretell a dark future in which racial warfare and British 
designs undid the republican project. 
For others who supported Jackson, the problem was even more immediate. If the 
Seminoles and the British remained, slavery could not flourish in the southeast 
borderlands at a time when the institution was enjoying a boom period, economically and 
culturally. The nation’s slave population had tripled since 1776 and, even by 1817, a 
brisk network of forced migration had spread slavery throughout the South, enveloping 
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and transforming whole regions with startling rapidity. For those who viewed the 
institution even more favorably than Jackson, as the social and economic lynchpin of the 
South, action was ever more urgent.
17
With the marked decline of Spanish prestige in the region, settlers and squatters in 
southern Georgia began to settle along the Georgia-Florida border, in the proximity of 
several major Seminole towns. Tensions in the area were already high, and centered 
immediately on an autonomous African-American community in West Florida, identified 
throughout the southeast as the “Negro Fort.” Though an American force demolished the 
fort in July 1816, hundreds of African-Americans fled from its ruins to East Florida, 
further empowering and radicalizing an increasingly polyglot Seminole society and 
sparking a series of reprisals along the Georgia-Florida border. The borderland violence 
culminated in the fall of 1817, when United States troops burned the Lower Creek 
settlement Fowltown and, as revenge, Seminoles launched an attack upon a boat carrying 
forty soldiers and eleven of their dependents, leaving only six survivors. With war 
appearing inevitable and expecting aid from their erstwhile British allies, the Seminoles 
intensified their raids on American border towns in Georgia.
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Well-armed following decades of trade with the Panton Company and molded by 
several years of nearly constant warfare, the Seminoles were hardly defenseless. 
Moreover, so long as President James Monroe respected the territorial integrity of 
Spanish sovereignty, the Seminoles believed themselves immune from direct reprisals. In 
early 1818, Monroe reinforced that presumption, privately disavowing a proposal then 
winding through Congress that would have authorized him to occupy East Florida for 
fear of inflaming a wider war. Nevertheless, mindful of the effects of Seminole raids on 
the frontier, Monroe ordered Jackson and Edmund Gaines to quell Seminole attacks and, 
risking Spanish displeasure, authorized them to cross into Spanish Florida in pursuit of 
the Seminoles. However, he made clear that Spanish forts, even if they housed 
Seminoles, were off limits. Jackson, testing his boundaries, replied with a proposal to use 
the Seminole attacks as a pretext to seize East Florida. Monroe never answered Jackson’s 
request, years later claiming that an illness had prevented him from reading his message 
and acting on it immediately. Jackson, true to his nature, took Monroe’s silence as tacit 
permission, and moved with alacrity to bring down Spanish Florida.
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In March 1818, Jackson, at the head of a large force, traveled to the site of the 
Negro Fort and constructed a base of operations. He then marched east to the Spanish 
fortress of St. Marks, burning abandoned Indian towns on his way. At Fort Marks, he 
seized a Spanish fort where he discovered and captured his imagined archfiend, 
Arbuthnot, and continued east to the Suwannee River razing Indian villages on the way. 
Aware of Jackson’s strength and unprepared for war, the Seminoles chose not to engage 
and retreated further south into Florida’s interior. While Jackson pursued his prey, he 
received a bit of luck. One night, Robert Ambrister, a British officer delegated to meet 
with the Seminoles, stumbled into Jackson’s camp, believing it to be his own. Jackson 
immediately returned to St. Marks, executed both Britons following a brief trial, and 
continued west to Pensacola, which he captured over the protests of the governor of West 
Florida. Satisfied with his demolition of Spanish Florida but frustrated at his failure to 
confront the Seminoles, Jackson returned home to domestic outrage and official 
statements of ignorance from his superiors after bringing his nation to the brink of war 
with two nations. Militarily what became known as the First Seminole War was a 
resounding success. Diplomatically, it was less so.
In May 1818, following the war, Jackson sent along a brief report from one of his 
subordinates, Captain Hugh Young, to Secretary of War John Calhoun, retroactively 
justifying their foray into Spanish territory. It made clear Jackson’s priorities by subtly 
shifting the logic of early republic Indian and borderland policy, retaining their focus on 
physical expansion but excising their assimilative and republican ideals. In his report, 
Young rejected Enlightenment theory and championed martial strength in its place. 
Noting that the Seminoles’ and the other four civilized tribes’ only “title to territory rests 
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on forcible occupancy and the dispossession of other tribes,” Young argued that their 
claim to the land was a chimera. To Jackson and Young, the United States should not 
deal with the Indians except as occupiers of land they did not own, as squatters, not as a 
people. His argument represented a significant departure from older traditions of Indian 
policy. For all of their equivalencies and hypocrisies, previous leaders had at least 
recognized Indian title and, even if they did acquire Indian land through less than ethical 
means, they did not disavow the Indian right to own that land altogether.
20
Similarly, in he and his defenders’ justification for the executions of Ambrister 
and Arbuthnot, Jackson articulated a vision of his nation engaged in perpetual war with 
the English and their Indian allies. By implication, Jackson deemed anyone who 
reinforced the sovereignty of the southeast Indians as acting outside the law. 
Consequently, Arbuthnot, a civilian who had committed no military acts against the 
United States, was found guilty of aiding nonwhite partisans as a de facto English agent. 
Similarly, the Seminoles who had consorted with British agents and gone unpunished by 
the decrepit Spanish colonial government were subject to American reprisals for their 
crimes if not legally then, by Jackson’s lights, morally. He deemed them outlaws who 
“had forfeited the rights of civilized men.” They had no right to a fair trial, were immune 
from strictures against cruel and unusual punishment, and had no moral or legal recourse 
                                                          
20
 Ammon, James Monroe 412-413; James E. Lewis Jr., The American Union and the Problem of 
Neighborhood: The United States and the Collapse of the Spanish Empire, 1783-1829 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 96-115; Heidler and Heidler, Old Hickory’s War 121, 206; Hugh 
Young, “A Topographical Memoir on East and West Florida with Itineraries of General Jackson’s Army, 
1818,” ed., Mark F. Boyd and Gerald Ponton, Florida Historical Quarterly, 13.1,13.2,13.3 (Summer 1934, 
Fall 1934, Winter 1935) 16-19, 82-104, 129-164.
62
to challenge their status. To Jackson, the gradual decline of the Spanish empire had left a 
power vacuum in the borderlands. He intended to fill it with sheer, unvarnished force.
21
Jackson’s radical advance did not go unnoticed. In January 1819, as Congress 
debated whether to censor Jackson for his execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister, Henry 
Clay took to the floor. The senator had already earned acclaim for his eloquence and he 
intended this to be a command performance. Though Clay seldom expressed much 
concern over the fate of Indians, he had demonstrated a distinct respect for the Indian 
right of self-government over his career, most famously as John Quincy Adams’s 
Secretary of State when he urged the president to use force against Georgia settlers to 
defend Creek property. Elite men and women, foreign ministers, and curious onlookers 
crowded into the chamber to listen and they were not disappointed. In his speech, Clay 
reminded Jackson that “we are fighting a great moral battle, for the benefit not only of 
our country, but all of mankind. The eyes of the whole world are in fixed attention upon 
us.” And Jackson had wilted under the gaze. With disgust, Clay castigated the general’s 
motives and declared his reliance on vengeance and the “right of retaliation” a novel and 
shameful justification for United States Indian and borderland policy. Clay steadfastly 
believed that his American System, rooted in an unyielding faith in republicanism and 
progress, and not force, would bring the nation’s borderlands further into their orbit. In 
undermining those precepts, Jackson’s pursuit of conquest, racial subordination, and use 
of extra-legal tactics endangered the nation. The next day, Clay sent word to Jackson that 
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he hoped their friendly relations would continue. Clearly, he did not know Andrew 
Jackson as well as he thought he did.
22
Andrew Jackson may have had to deal with the slings and arrows of Congress, but 
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams faced the cannons of Spain. In late 1818 and early 
1819, Adams, highly ambitious and believing himself to have a clear path to the 
presidency, correctly deduced that Spanish leaders had given up hope of retaining Florida 
following the upheavals in the New World. Dedicated to national expansion as an 
economic necessity and believing in the spread of republicanism as a moral good for the 
world, Adams decided that rather than defend Jackson, he would vindicate him. He cast 
his eye across the recent history of the Florida borderlands and performed a precise 
rhetorical sleight of hand. Taking Jackson’s reconceptualization of an eternal war 
between English agents and Indian proxies as his own, Adams re-imagined the 
borderlands not as a crucible of liberty, but as a cesspool of despotism.
Legitimizing Jackson’s invasion, Adams argued that to retain national sovereignty 
a nation was required to deter partisans within its national borders. Therefore, he argued, 
as it was “the obligation of Spain to restrain, by force, the Indians of Florida from 
hostilities against the United Sates and their citizens,” their failure to do so justified 
Jackson’s actions on the ground of self-defense. Having failed to consolidate its control 
over its own territory, Spain had ceded its claim to inviolate borders, essentially 
legitimizing Jackson’s invasion. But Adams’s reconceptualization could only function as 
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long as he imagined Indian nations as necessarily dependent upon imperial claimants and 
lacking standing of their own in the diplomatic sphere. He stated what his predecessors 
had left implicit - Indians had no rights the federal government was bound to respect. 
Hence, when Adams characterized the chaos of Florida as “this creeping and insidious 
war, both against Spain and the United States; this mockery of patriotism; these political 
filters to fugitive slaves and Indian outlaws,” he publicly endorsed the destruction of the 
Florida borderlands and prioritized the reality of early republic Indian policy, with its 
focus on the circumcision of nonwhite autonomy, over its oft-articulated ideals. In 
February, 1818 when Adams reached the Transcontinental Treaty with Spanish minister 
Louis de Onís and formally acquired East and West Florida, he did so by acting in the 
mode of Jackson.
23
The Transcontinental Treaty was the capstone to several decades of United States 
campaigns to seize Florida from Spain and annihilate the southeastern borderlands. For 
all of its efforts, the United States owed its success primarily to Latin American 
revolutionaries who had stretched the Spanish empire beyond its breaking points and left 
most of its remnants, aside from Cuba, relatively valueless to Spain. But the threat 
remained: if, in the future, the British again allied with the southeast Indians, it would be 
due to a lack of vigilance on the part of United States officials to police the frontier. As 
his actions had shown, Andrew Jackson, for one, would not let that happen. And, though 
in later decades he would be the loudest voice of protest against what he would come to 
deride as Jackson’s crusade of conquest, as Secretary of State, Adams had granted 
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Jackson’s lawless invasion ideological heft. Only with the demise of the southeast 
borderlands and the adoption of responsibility for the Indians of the area, would he come 
to understand the full implications of his actions. In time, he would show far more respect 
for the precepts of international law and nationhood, and would come to believe in the 
ideals of Clay’s eloquent faith in an expansion pursued through more moral means.
24
Governor Jackson and United States Indian Policy
Following the cession of Florida to the United States, Monroe chose Andrew 
Jackson to serve as the territory’s first governor. Jackson’s bellicosity appealed to the 
president; he was sure that once Jackson had imposed his rule on the territory, the 
“smugglers & slave traders will hide their heads; pirates will disappear, & the Seminoles 
cease to give us trouble.” Following a perfunctory ceremony in Pensacola in July 1821, 
Jackson took possession of Florida and, as his first act as governor, set about searching 
for a suitable residence. The Government House, the traditional seat of the governor, had 
appeared barely habitable. It was a fitting metaphor for the state of the territory as 
Jackson regarded the remains of Spanish similarly decrepit, having left behind no 
working legislature and little in the way of public regulations. East Florida, at least, 
enjoyed a functioning system of government, allowing Jackson to focus on other 
concerns. With monomaniacal intensity, he set about undermining the Seminoles’ 
property rights and ability to negotiate with the United States under international law.
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After receiving his initial orders from Adams, Jackson requested clarification on 
the United States policy concerning the Florida Indians and offered his own advice on the 
subject. In his own experience, he assured Adams, the vast majority of Indians in Florida 
were once dissident Creeks whom Jackson claimed to have “conquered” during the War 
of 1812 and the First Seminole War. Therefore, it was only proper that he be given the 
authority to round up the Florida Indians and transfer them back to Creek country, in the 
process opening the frontier to white settlement. Having dealt with the Creeks over the 
previous decade, Jackson was well aware that the Indians living in Florida, whether 
Creek or Seminole, detested the current Creek leadership and would never consent to 
being re-admitted into their former nation. However, his vision of the Florida Territory, a 
land of borders, fences, farms, and slaves, held no space for the Seminoles or their 
culture. Regardless, Secretary of War John Calhoun denied Jackson’s recommendation, 
arguing that they would need the approval of both Georgia settlers and the Seminoles 
themselves to relocate them to Georgia and neither would be forthcoming.
26
The Seminoles themselves understood the past decade to have demonstrated their 
relative weakness. Though they had suffered few casualties during the First Seminole 
War, Jackson had brought about massive social and cultural displacement as he burned 
their towns and forced their retreat south. Politically, the Seminoles were likely fractured 
as well. Bowlegs had died of natural causes following the First Seminole War and his 
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natural hereditary successor, Micanopy, came to power as Spain and the United States 
negotiated the Adams-Onís Treaty. During such a tumultuous transition period, no 
Seminole chief would manage to consolidate enough authority to control the disparate 
bands of Florida Indians for nearly a decade. Complicating the situation, the Seminoles 
lacked any means of communication with the new territorial government. In the past, 
Spanish officials had welcomed Seminole chiefs into major settlements and freely 
distributed presents to assure their loyalty. No such invitations were forthcoming from 
Jackson.
27
In desperation, the Seminoles stumbled upon two candidates to carry their 
message to the governor. Horatio Dexter, a plantation owner and Indian trader, and 
Edward Wanton, a former agent for the Panton Company, approached the Seminoles as 
representatives of a group of leading St. Augustine merchants who wanted permission to 
build a settlement on Seminole land. Both Dexter and Wanton had dealt with the 
Seminoles before and, to further ingratiate favor with tribal chiefs, employed Tony 
Proctor as their interpreter. When the two parties met, however, the Seminoles were far 
less interested in Dexter and Wanton’s land proposal than their access to Jackson. 
Shrewdly, the chiefs categorically refused to strike a land deal until Dexter and Wanton 
agreed to serve as their intermediaries with the territorial government. As their interests
and those of the Seminoles largely coincided, Dexter and Wanton agreed readily. Each 
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wanted to prevent the arrival of Georgia settlers - the Seminoles to preserve their land, 
Dexter and Panton to secure a more orderly and profitable settlement.
28
Dexter and Wanton’s intervention enraged Andrew Jackson. In a letter to John 
Calhoun, with words that echoed his charges against Alexander Arbuthnot, Jackson 
bellowed that the unofficial Indian agents intended to “impress upon the minds of the 
Indians their absolute right to the country.” American emigration to Florida was, in 
Jackson’s estimation, ongoing, inevitable, and desirable. The Seminoles, who had 
continuously opposed the United States over several decades, could not arrest Florida’s 
development.  “Is the safety of our frontier,” Jackson asked, “to be jeopardised by the 
complaints of a few indians excited by would be indian agents, and indian treaty makers, 
who compose flowry talks of them and put words into their mouths they never” spoke?
29
  
After a brief time as governor, exhausted by laborious negotiations with 
multinational subjects and worried that the Florida heat was weakening his wife’s already 
deteriorating health, Jackson announced his plans to step down as governor by the end of 
1821. As one of his last acts, Jackson wrote a letter to his superiors advancing a radical 
reformulation of the relationship between the United States and its Indian neighbors. 
Jackson asserted that American officials held a moral obligation to do justice to their 
Indian neighbors, but disclaimed the legitimacy of treaty-making. Willing to only 
envision relationships with Indians governed by naked considerations of power, Jackson 
allowed that such negotiations had been a prudent exercise following independence, 
when the Indians were “numerous and hostile” and the federal government too weak to 
unilaterally enforce its will. In the present day, “when the arm of the government is 
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sufficiently strong” to enforce policies that did justice, however defined, to the southeast 
Indians, treaty-making, was “not only useless but absurd.” He launched an attack on the 
very principle of Indian sovereignty.
30
In his letter, Jackson staked out a position far more extreme than even the policies 
he pursued as president, during which Indian removal was achieved entirely through the 
use of treaties. Those were agreements governed by coercion, fraud, and the overt threat 
of violence, but they were agreements nonetheless. In proposing to curtail Indian consent, 
Jackson envisioned taking the least moral, most expeditious aspects of early republic 
Indian policy and recasting them as its central component. By implication, Jackson 
argued that with the demise of the southeast borderlands, white policymakers could 
dispense with the charade of Indian rights and instead impose their will on their new 
subjects. Whatever measures Washington, Jefferson, and others had authorized on the 
nation’s frontiers in the name of white settlement, they had publicly upheld Indian rights 
to property and self-government, however limited. Even their most draconian conditions 
had been ratified by treaty agreements which defined some measure of obligation upon 
the part of the United States. With the demise of the southeast borderlands having given 
Jackson the opportunity to deal with Indians without worrying about the ramifications 
with European imperial powers, he rejected the possibility of Indian sovereignty 
altogether.
The Conflicting Interests of Settlers, Indians, and Federal Officials 
Though Jackson began the process of integrating the Florida Territory into the 
United States, his successors would have to deal directly with the implications of its 
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incorporation. Several powerful influential local constituencies held an abiding interest in 
the fate of the Seminoles and fervently worked for their political and economic 
marginalization. United States officials would face an overriding question: could their 
nation legally and morally impose its policies on neighboring Indians or would it 
continue to prioritize assimilation as the primary element of its policies? Faced with 
constituencies with divergent interests, the disjuncture between early republic rhetoric 
and its reality, and conflicting orders from their federal superiors, numerous officials 
would find themselves defending Seminole rights to property and self-government even 
as they worked to undermine those principles.
In Jackson’s place, Monroe appointed William Pope Duval, a frontier lawyer
from Kentucky who had recently begun serving as one of Florida’s first federal judges. 
Duval, who would be reappointed by both John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson, was 
popular socially and, with deep roots in the Virginia gentry, one of the most influential 
people in the territory. Filling out the rest of the territorial government, Monroe named 
Gad Humphreys, a former major from New York, to serve as Indian agent to the 
Seminoles. The two men were faced with vague orders and uncertain priorities. Monroe 
and Calhoun made clear they desired the complete removal of the Seminoles from 
Florida but were unwilling to authorize it unilaterally. Even more unsettled was 
American policy toward the Black Seminoles. Though many American planters 
demanded the return of  hundreds of slaves for whom they held claims, the condition of 
the Black Seminoles - free or slave, American property or Seminole - had yet to be 
adjudicated by anyone in the federal government, nor could they predict how the 
Seminoles might react to any edict. Complicating the officials’ relationship with their 
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Florida constituents, many bellicose settlers soon began to call for the territory to take 
military action against the Seminoles, but the state militia was plainly not capable of an 
offensive. Obligated to three parties with conflicting interests - federal officials, Florida 
citizens, and the Seminoles themselves - Humphreys and Duval blazed separate paths.
31
  
The Seminoles made clear they would not consent to rejoin the Creeks. Too much 
blood had been shed, too much time had passed, and too few ties persisted for it to be 
viable. Though they were well aware of the relative power disparity between themselves 
and the United States, they would not meekly submit to American demands to emigrate. 
They knew their position was untenable.  The past decade of continual displacement had 
been devastating to Seminole quality of life. In the aftermath of the First Seminole War 
many bands suffered from severe privation, and most hesitated to plant crops or improve 
their land for fear that territorial officials might seize it without notice. One chief, 
remembering his peoples’ past prosperity, admitted, “when I walk about these woods, 
now so desolate, and remember the numerous herds that once ranged through them … 
tears come into my eyes.” Unfortunately, given the rapid turnover within the territorial 
government, the need for Congressional authorization, and the difficulty of 
communicating across large distances, American officials required preparation time to 
negotiate, forcing the Seminoles to request sustenance and supplies from the territorial 
government. It would take over two years for the United States to enter into treaty 
discussions.
32
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 In the interim, Duval did his best to placate federal officials, Florida settlers, and 
the Seminoles. As he was unwilling to allow the Seminoles to starve, he sought and 
received permission from Calhoun to supply the Seminoles. Fearful of renewed violence 
between Indians and settlers, Duval acted to quarantine the Indians from the onrushing 
white populace by forbidding unlicensed whites from trading with the Seminoles and 
discouraging whites from living in the vicinity of Seminole towns. While addressing the 
Seminoles’ immediate concerns, Duval advanced the long term interest of Florida settlers 
by recommending to his superiors that the Seminoles rejoin the Creeks in Georgia or, 
failing that, be sent west of the Mississippi. He warned that the Seminoles currently 
occupied “the richest and most valuable part of all Florida” and concluded that “there are 
no bodies of good land in East or West Florida but in that region of country.”
33
Faced with the opposition of both the Seminoles to removal and white Georgians 
to accept them as neighbors, Monroe and Calhoun opted instead to concentrate the 
Seminoles within southern Florida, away from both coasts in order to distance them from 
foreign agents, and south of Port Charlotte, where few whites had designs on land. 
Should the Seminoles reject the proposal, they enjoined their representatives to offer 
more land to the north, between Port Charlotte and Tampa Bay. The negotiation would be 
                                                          
33
 “Proclamation of the Governor of the Territory of Florida,” July 29, 1822, Territorial Papers, 22: 504; 
Duval to Calhoun, September 22, 1822, Territorial Papers, 22: 533. As the date of the meeting between 
the two sides approached, the disarray of the territorial government was so complete as to approach 
farce. Gad Humphreys, still attending to business to the north, had yet to report to his post. The acting 
subagent, Peter Pellham, fell ill and had to leave the territory as well. Then, two months before the 
November, 1822 meeting time, Duval abruptly left the territory as well, needing to tend to personal 
business back home in Kentucky and leaving Acting Governor George Walton to deal with the Seminoles. 
In his haste, Duval departed without leaving instructions for his substitute; Walton was entirely ignorant 
of the government’s priorities and even lacked funds to purchase food or presents for the arriving Indians. 
Panicking as the appointed day approached, Walton failed to make adequate arrangements, and, when 
the Seminoles arrived at the meeting place, found no representative present to greet them. Local army 
officers were left to beg the forgiveness of the Seminole chiefs and promised that the treaty negotiations 
would be resumed the following spring. John Mahon, History of the Second Seminole War (Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 1985), 37.
73
crucial. Authorizing their representatives in the immediate aftermath of the Johnson v. 
McIntosh decision, which ruled that only the federal government could acquire land from 
Indian nations, the deliberations would be their only means of opening Seminole territory 
to white settlement. To secure their objectives, they enlisted James Gadsden, a former 
officer who had served under Andrew Jackson. Gadsden was a southerner and his 
attachment to the institution of slavery deeply informed his mission. His primary fear that 
the Seminoles might ally “with another class of population which will inevitably 
predominate in Florida,” led Gadsden to believe Indian removal would most benefit the 
whites of Florida. If he could not achieve removal, he urged his superiors to install a 
military base next to the Seminole reservation, in order to “render them perfectly 
Subservient to the views of the Government.”
34
The two parties met at Moultrie Creek in September 1823 to negotiate the future 
of Florida. The Seminoles were at a crossroads. The political upheaval of the past two 
decades had left them without a unified leadership structure, even as circumstances 
forced them to make consequential collective decisions. The divides separating the 
Seminoles, between older chiefs and younger warriors, traditionalists and 
assimilationists, Mikasuki and Creek speakers, violent and pacifistic, Seminole and Black 
Seminole, stretched tribal institutions to their breaking points. Without the necessity of 
collective resistance against the United States, likely nothing would have held the 
Seminole coalition together. With their hold on command weak and facing the difficult 
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task of preserving their autonomy in the face of overwhelming United States’ arms and 
amid severe deprivations, Seminole leaders had few viable options.
35
Addressing about 75 chiefs and warriors, Gadsden began the proceedings not with 
a negotiating position but with a history lesson. He delivered a lengthy speech whose 
primary purpose appeared to be to renationalize the Indians gathered to hear him. 
Discoursing on the aggression of the Red Sticks and their natural place alongside the 
Creeks, he noted that, just a hundred years ago, the Seminoles, too, had been a part of the 
Creek nation. As by the estimation of most, the Red Sticks remained Creeks, he implied 
that the Seminoles were as well. He then abruptly closed with an implicit threat, 
demanding that the Seminoles turn over former Red Sticks. Few could have missed his 
meaning when he conjectured that the Seminoles were so weak that they resembled “the 
deer of the forest, that might be hunted to their destruction.” It was for nothing. Despite 
the past few years in which the Seminoles had prostrated themselves before their new 
neighbor, their leaders categorically refused Gadsden’s demand to return the Red Sticks 
to Georgia. The next day, Gadsden, apparently changing course on the fly, announced, 
“we are happy you have received as brothers those of the Creek nation among you … 
long may they continue so!”
36
Gadsden’s failure to resolve the dispute over the Red Sticks was emblematic of 
the Treaty of Moultrie Creek. Despite his overwhelming advantages, Gadsden secured 
none of his ostensible priorities. The Seminoles’ obstinacy toward removal west of the 
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Mississippi was so apparent that Gadsden decided not to propose it. They refused even to 
conduct a census of the number of Black Seminoles in their nation, let alone surrender 
them. Little wonder that when Gadsden formulated a formal offer to the Seminoles that 
would confine them between Ocala and Tampa Bay, establish a twenty-year annuity, bind 
them to return all fugitive slaves after its signing, recognize the autonomy of the Black 
Seminoles, and provide them farming equipment to facilitate their assimilation to 
sedentary agriculture, he reported that they signed the treaty “without hesitation.”
37
It was a curious result. When Gadsden summarized the process of the negotiations 
to Calhoun, he described the Indians as throwing themselves on the mercy of the United 
States and appealing to the compassion of the commissioners to end their plight. Yet the 
Seminoles not only convinced Gadsden to contravene his orders and offer land well north 
of Tampa Bay, but won the right to have Gadsden examine the land personally and, if it 
did not appear sufficiently habitable to support them, extend it further northward. This 
was not an idle promise: Gadsden would later personally lobby for just such an extension. 
Having given ground on nearly every vital point, Gadsden nevertheless avowed to 
Calhoun that, in his estimation, “the Indians would never have voluntarily assented to the 
terms had they not believed we have both the power and disposition to compel 
obedience.” It was, however, the Seminole chiefs who had clearly won the day. The 
treaty they struck was their best choice politically, in which they secured significant 
concessions from their adversary while leaving them content enough to refrain from the 
application of force.
  
In contrast to Gadsden’s characterization, the treaty was in the vein 
of the language of early republic Indian policy, not only recognizing but reinforcing tribal 
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sovereignty and making substantial concessions – a school, tillable land, support for 
chiefs amenable to American culture – designed to facilitate the assimilation of the 
Seminoles and support their continued residence in Florida.
38
Powerful constituencies within white Florida found the treaty lacking in important 
respects. Within a month of its signing, a group of influential Middle Florida planters 
petitioned Monroe, directly requesting he empower Duval to convene a tribunal to 
adjudicate conflicting white and Indian claims to the Black Seminoles. They were 
outraged at the terms of the treaty, which made no attempt to address their grievances, 
and they feared their former slaves had fled beyond their reach. Writing for the president, 
Calhoun informed the planters that he lacked legal standing to address their problems, 
seemingly leaving them without options. However, they gained a stroke of luck with the 
incoming Adams administration in 1825. John Quincy Adams’s new secretary of war, 
James Barbour, wrote to Acting Governor George Walton (Duval was briefly away from 
the territory) and, perhaps not realizing he was authoring a change in American policy, 
authorized Indian Agent Gad Humphreys to seize the slaves in question and hand them 
over to their American claimants should the claims appear valid. Interpreting Barbour’s 
words to suit his own preference, Walton discarded Calhoun’s strict legalism and went 
further, relaying to the Seminole chiefs that they were  not to “harbor runaway negroes 
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and … they will be required to give up such negroes as are now residing within their 
limits” regardless of their legal status, ignoring the language of the treaty.
39
Walton’s increasingly forceful demands reflected a situation that was spiraling out 
of control. Having emigrated to their new reservation, the Seminoles found it lacking 
arable land and healthy water. Already, Gadsden had tried to relieve them by extending 
their reservation an additional five miles to the north – he justified this by reporting to his 
superiors that it was done “without allocating to the Indians any larger body of good 
land” – and further concessions appeared unlikely. Lacking options, some Seminoles 
ranged onto white property and killed their cattle, angering their white neighbors. 
Exacerbating the situation, whites began to settle the lands immediately north of the 
reservation, constraining Seminole expansion and leading several planters to petition the 
war department to arm volunteers in anticipation of war. On the outskirts of a thinly 
populated territory, the physical capabilities of white settlers paled in comparison to that 
of the Seminoles. Instead and perhaps with forethought, the settlers found other means of 
achieving their goals, trapping the Seminoles in a vise. By agitating the territorial 
government to police the reservation’s borders, they ensured the Seminoles would 
continue to suffer from near-starvation. Then, with startling audacity, they turned around 
and petitioned the federal government to enforce the emigration of the Seminoles on the 
grounds that it would be a humanitarian act. After all, the Seminoles were starving on 
their land.
40
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Later that year in May 1826, Secretary of War Barbour met with a six-person 
Seminole delegation that included John Hicks, Neamathla, and Micanopy, with the Black 
Seminole Abraham serving as an interpreter. Barbour opened by informing the Seminoles 
that he would extend their territory to more habitable lands, provided they gave up all the 
fugitive slaves in their country and pledged not to raid white farms. In addition, he 
reminded them that the Treaty of Moultrie Creek provided funds for a school to teach 
Indian children reading, writing, and agriculture, which had yet to be built. He closed by 
telling them that Creek leaders, even as they spoke, were making plans to inspect lands 
west of the Mississippi  in preparation for removal and, should they also be interested, he 
would happily provide for their transportation.
41
Gently, but firmly, the Seminole delegation rebuffed every one of Barbour’s 
overtures. “The land we occupy,” began John Hicks, “we expect will be considered our 
own property, to remain as such for ever.” They had no desire to go west, Hicks told 
Barbour firmly, “we will not involve ourselves in the troubles of the Muscogees – we are 
a separate people and have nothing to do with them.” Once again, he pledged to return all 
slaves who had escaped to the Seminoles following the execution of the treaty to their 
white owners – indeed the process had already begun - but reminded Barbour that the 
Treaty of Moultrie Creek made no mention of fugitive slaves who had entered Seminole 
society prior to its signing. He closed by flatly rejecting Barbour’s offer to build a school 
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in the name of cultural preservation. It was a thorough reaffirmation of the Seminole right 
to live as a separate people in Florida, plainly rejecting both assimilation and removal.
42
In Florida, Duval found himself torn between his responsibilities as governor and 
Indian superintendant, his compassion for the Indians’ plight, the demands of his white 
constituents, and his own conflicting objectives of treating the Indians humanely while 
still facilitating the seizure of fugitive slaves. Frustrated with decentralized Seminole 
politics, he decided he could more easily impose his will upon the Seminoles if they 
recognized a single head chief of his choosing. Flouting the principle of self-
determination, Duval began with a show of force. Two companies from Fort Brooke led 
by Major Francis Dade were dispatched to Seminole territory. Hailing from an 
aristocratic Virginia family, Dade had yoked his career to that of Andrew Jackson, 
serving him faithfully in his Florida invasion. Now, Dade’s mission was simple -
intimidate the Seminoles into holding elections for a head chief. Faced with the size of 
his force, the Indians had little choice but to comply.
43
Quickly, two contenders for the title came to the fore. John Hicks, who had led 
the delegation to Washington and commanded the most populous Seminole bands, 
appeared the most likely candidate. His largest rival was Micanopy, the grandson of the 
former chief Payne and ally of the most influential young warriors in the nation. Though 
Duval desperately hoped for Hicks’s elevation, the difference between the two chiefs was 
essentially non-existent. Both shared a similar ideology; they had traveled together to 
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Washington and, though Hicks had spoken there, Micanopy had signed on to his message 
readily. In the end, Hicks won election over Micanopy as the head chief of the Seminoles, 
but it was all for naught. The Seminoles had humored Duval and Gadsden by electing a 
head chief, but Hicks’s new title did not grant him any practical authority over 
recalcitrant young warriors nor did it offer a solution to alleviate the Seminoles’ now 
persistent privations.
44
By the end of 1826, settler resentment of the Seminoles’ trespasses on white land 
brought the two sides to the brink of violence. For Duval, the Seminoles’ absolute 
obedience to the terms of the Treaty of Moultrie Creek now came with a deadline. He had 
scheduled a major land auction for January 1827, land upon which the Seminoles had 
built several villages. After consultation with Dade, the major recommended a solution: 
“absolute force” to drive the Indians off white land. Following an isolated Creek raid in 
southern Georgia, Duval seized upon the act as a provocation and dispatched Dade to 
round up any Indian party transgressing the bounds of Seminole territory.
45
Duval authorized two brigades, Dade’s battalion and one consisting of East 
Florida militia groups led by Richard Keith Call. Volunteers flocked to Call’s command, 
bringing with them dogs to flush the Indians from the wilderness. Despite their 
enthusiasm, the volunteers lacked sufficient training or supplies and were unable to 
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pierce the dense wildernesses of East Florida. They returned home, unharmed yet 
boastful of their service. Dade found much greater success. Displaying ruthless 
efficiency, the major led his men from one Seminole settlement to the next, burning each 
to the ground, and compelling the refugees to begin a long, bitter march south. With the 
outlying Seminole towns destroyed, the avowed perpetrators dead, and the vast bulk of 
the Seminoles confined back to their reservation, Dade’s campaign was, ostensibly, an 
unmitigated success.
Having succeeded in forcing the Seminoles to accede to the Treaty of Moultrie 
Creek, Duval had only to return the Black Seminoles to the white planters who claimed 
them. In the summer of 1828, Duval confronted a delegation of chiefs and threatened to 
hold back promised annuity payments until the Seminoles surrendered every runaway 
upon whom whites held a claim, acting as though he was not legally bound by the Treaty 
of Moultrie Creek. When Indian Agent Humphreys accused the governor of acting 
illegally and insisted on impartial adjudication of slave claims, Duval barraged 
Humphreys’s superiors in the Adams administration with nearly a dozen charges against 
the agent for professional misconduct. He was adamant: any honest, diligent Indian agent 
could coerce Indians into acceding to any agreement. In effect, the fact that the Seminoles 
were secure in their property and refused to turn over their slaves became proof of 
Humphreys’s corruption. Though Duval’s accusations failed to withstand minimal 
scrutiny and Adams’s subordinates rejected the accusations, the dispute further divided 
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Florida’s territorial government and marginalized Humphreys, one of the only territorial 
officials with regard for Seminole rights under the law.
46
Hicks rebuffed Duval as well and steadfastly insisted that all of the remaining 
Black Seminoles were the property of Indian owners. Summoning local army officers to a 
meeting, Hicks protested the conduct of the territorial officials and reaffirmed his 
expansive view of Seminole sovereignty. Hicks centered directly on slave claims, 
protesting that “when an Indian buys a black man, they come and take him away again, 
so that we have no money and negroes too,” all with the direct complicity of the president 
himself. The problem was no dry legal matter, Hicks made clear: “there is a negro girl at 
Charleston, that belongs to my daughter – her name is Patience. I want her restored to 
me. She has a husband here: she has a child about a year old … I want my big father to 
cause them to be sent to me.” He closed with a brief statement, six short sentences long. 
He was getting old, he said, and he intended to leave his bones in Florida. “We hurt 
nothing on this land,” he concluded.
47
Throughout John Quincy Adams’s presidency, events in Florida presented him 
with a choice between upholding the claims of the Seminoles and pleasing his territorial 
constituents. Humphreys represented the former choice as he diligently executed the 
terms of the Treaty of Moultrie Creek and pushed back against territorial officials who 
attempted to circumvent them. Duval represented the latter option, choosing to prioritize 
the wishes of his Florida constituents by working to seize the Black Seminoles at every 
opportunity. Faced with the opportunity to side with Duval and remove Humphreys from 
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office, in effect abrogating the Treaty of Moultrie Creek, Adams and his cabinet instead 
acted with regard for Seminole rights. They did not unilaterally seize Seminole land and 
property, instead making honest overtures to introduce “civilization” into their culture. 
They lobbied for the Seminoles to rejoin the Creeks in the west, but pointedly refrained 
from imposing their will against them. They, like the Seminoles, considered themselves 
bound by the terms of the Treaty of Moultrie Creek.
The Removal of Indian Sovereignty
The complex balance of power in Florida between Hicks, Micanopy, Humphreys, 
and Duval was upset by events beyond any of their control. One month before Hicks 
rejected Barbour’s overtures, United States voters overwhelmingly elected Andrew 
Jackson to the presidency. If the Seminoles had grown frustrated with John Quincy 
Adams, they nevertheless were all too well acquainted with Andrew Jackson and the 
medium of violence in which he dwelt. For all of Adams’s equivocations, he had 
consistently mediated his desire for national expansion with a respect for Indian rights. 
Duval, who had failed to persuade Adams to pursue a harsher line, could now appeal to a 
far more receptive authority. And, though he had largely not campaigned on Indian 
policy, Jackson made Indian removal the top priority of his administration. 
He did so by utilizing the language of Jeffersonian assimilation even as he wrote 
its epitaph. Addressing Congress for the first time as president, Jackson meditated on the 
terrible destiny of the Indian race and concluded that “philanthropy has been long busily 
employed in devising means to avert it, but its progress has never for a moment been 
arrested.” Nevertheless, Jackson claimed the time for philanthropy had not passed. Indian 
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removal would be, in his telling, “but a continuation of the same progressive change, by a 
milder process.” Where Jefferson had tried to remake Indians in the image of whites, 
Jackson would allow them the opportunity to tread the same paths as his own ancestors 
had, wrenched “from the land of their birth to seek new homes in distant lands.” This was 
not a tragic process, he argued, but an opportunity to be celebrated, the most humane of 
solutions to the problems of the coming decades. It was a stance utterly incompatible 
with Hicks’s quiet insistence that his bones would remain in Florida and with the precepts 
that had once publicly informed United States Indian policy. Jackson publicly cast 
removal as an alternative to Indian annihilation, not realizing that many Indian chiefs, 
especially among the Seminoles, equated the two.
48
The Indian Removal Act inspired passionate debate in Congress. Prominent 
Protestant leaders, in and out of Congress, campaigned fiercely against the bill, 
celebrating the economic and cultural evolution of Cherokees who had adopted 
Christianity and remade their economies in the image of their white neighbors. Led in 
part by leading Christian activist Jeremiah Evarts, reformer Catherine Beecher, and 
Senator Theodore Frelinghuysen, Christian leaders rallied anti-Jacksonian politicians to 
their cause, leading to passionate and memorable exchanges in the halls of Congress. 
Jacksonians wavered. Many of the president’s northern allies, citing treaty obligations 
and fearful of the bill’s price, defected during the initial rounds of voting. Jacksonians of 
the Deep South, though among the most fervent advocates for removal, rejected 
Jackson’s appeals to Indian welfare outright, declaring Indian civilization an oxymoron 
and assimilation impossible. The Cherokees, the Indians that had most publicly identified 
assimilation as the conscious goal of their people, lay at the center of the debate. To 
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northern Protestants, their removal would be a tragedy, undercutting the significant 
progress they had made toward a pious and enlightened society. Yet, to southern 
hardliners who viewed Cherokee land and resources covetously, the very principle of 
Indian autonomy threatened their designs. Mention of the Seminoles was notably absent. 
Their resistance to literacy, farming, and industry, left them outside the prevailing 
discourse.
Following the close passage of the bill, Jackson implemented the paternalistic and 
coercive policies he had laid out as governor of the Florida territory throughout the 
country. On his instructions, his agents freely violated legally binding treaties, bribed 
Choctaw leaders to betray the wishes of the majority of their people, froze annuity 
payments to the Cherokees, encouraged state legislatures to extend state sovereignty over 
tribal land, and made no effort to restrain rapacious white settlers from settling Indian 
land and seizing their property. When Superintendant of Indian Affairs Thomas 
McKenney, a conflicted advocate of removal, failed to move with the alacrity that the 
president expected, Jackson relieved him of his post. Gad Humphreys’s commitment to 
Jackson’s policies was similarly suspect and he, too, was removed from office.
49
It was, all in all, an efficient operation. Jackson directly and indirectly empowered 
intermediaries - corrupt Indian agents, land-starved settlers, merciless state legislatures, 
coercive military officials, and innumerable merchants, militia members, and outright 
criminals - to render Indian sovereignty untenable east of the Mississippi River. When 
Indians attempted to resist collectively, as Sauk and Fox under the command of their 
chief Black Hawk did in Illinois and Wisconsin, Jackson unleashed the full fury of settler 
rage, massacring Indian bands and condemning the survivors to near-starvation. 
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Following other Indians’ attempts at conciliation, Jackson cloaked himself in the  mantle 
of his forbears, offering peace, civilization, and sanctuary in the west, so long as the 
Indians surrendered their land, resources, and, in some cases, their very identity. It was 
alienation in the guise of assimilation, subjugation in place of civilization.
50
The Seminoles were somewhat protected by their unique circumstances. Florida 
remained on the outskirts of the nation, lacking the institutions and infrastructure 
necessary to organize well-functioning volunteer militia groups who might realistically 
threaten to seize Indian land as they did throughout the rest of the southeast. 
Nevertheless, as Jackson implemented his policies throughout the country, the people of 
Florida did not sit by idly. Leading planters bombarded Washington with several 
petitions, urging Congress to begin treaty negotiations with the Seminoles to remove 
them beyond the Mississippi. Well aware of the long history of cooperation between 
Seminoles and Florida’s African-American population, these leading regional 
slaveholders insisted that the Seminoles’ presence would hamper the development of 
slavery throughout the territory. For Florida to increase its population, expand its 
economy, and graduate to statehood, the Seminoles would have to be removed.
51
In January 1832, Jackson began treaty deliberations with the Seminoles. He sent 
the most qualified man in the country to lead his delegation - James Gadsden, who had 
negotiated the Treaty of Moultrie Creek and was an avowed advocate of removal. His 
parameters were simple: gain the Seminoles’ assent to move west where they would be 
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reconstituted within the Creeks, offer one year worth of supplies, and repay the 
Seminoles for the improvements they had made in Florida. Any outcome that did not 
result in the Seminoles rejoining the Creeks would not be permitted.
52
Gadsden met with the Seminoles at Payne’s Landing in the spring of 1832. No 
minutes exist from the meeting, and its events remain largely shrouded. Whatever the 
details, it concluded with the Treaty of Payne’s Landing, a document whose meaning was 
no less contested than the process by which it was reached. To Gadsden, the outcome of 
the treaty was clearly written into its first article, “the Seminole Indians relinquish to the 
United States, all claims to the lands they at present occupy in the Territory of Florida … 
and will be received as a constituent part of the Creek nation.” Though that eventuality 
was predicated upon the assent of a delegation of six chiefs who would travel to Arkansas 
to inspect the land and determine its suitability for habitation, Gadsden expressed little 
doubt that the chiefs would find everything satisfactory.
53
Viewed from the perspective of the Seminoles, however, the treaty’s terms were 
far less definitive. Micanopy took the lead in negotiations. Hicks, likely in failing health 
and never having enjoyed a secure base of power, remained in the background. At the 
outset, Micanopy enunciated a clear position. According to one observer, he “made but 
one answer, repeating again and again that the Indians had made one treaty, by which 
they were entitled to remain undisturbed in their country.” Gadsden replied with veiled 
threats. He warned that the government would not continue to feed the Seminoles and 
that if the Seminoles remained, the state legislature would almost certainly extend its 
jurisdiction to Seminole land. Unmentioned was the constant threat of military invasion, 
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as neither side could easily forget Dade’s invasion five years prior. In the face of 
Gadsden’s intransigence, Micanopy struck the most advantageous deal available to him. 
As it was predicated entirely on the finding of the delegation which would inspect the 
western lands, the treaty he signed had no legal force of its own. Micanopy effectively 
bought time. It would take at least a year for the delegation to be massed, preparations to 
be made, the land to be inspected, and the remaining Seminoles to vote on their findings. 
Time enough for a new president to be elected, or perhaps time for a small nation on the 
edge of a continent to prepare for war.
54
The treaty, however, was entirely opaque in its meaning. The preamble laying out 
the terms under which the delegation would inspect the western lands was unclear. 
Utilizing the pronoun “they” without a clear antecedent, the treaty ambiguously denoted 
either the delegation itself or the entire Seminole people as the designated body who 
would vote to determine the land’s suitability. Gadsden’s interpretation that the power lay 
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in the hands of the delegation proved expedient. Seven chiefs, after all, could be more 
easily coerced than a nation. In March 1833, after several months of inspection, the chiefs 
produced the Treaty of Fort Gibson, a document whose legitimacy was far more dubious 
even than that of the Treaty of Payne’s Landing. In it, the Seminole chiefs declared the 
land satisfactory, and agreed to subsume their people within the larger Creek nation. The 
treaty flew in the face of a century of Seminole culture and politics. It could not have 
been reached save by fraud.
55
The ways in which Andrew Jackson achieved the removal of the Seminoles 
differed markedly from those of his predecessors. Though they each followed a similar, 
broadly continuous pursuit of white settler expansion and Indian removal, Jackson, by 
closing out the possibility of Indian endurance in the southeast on any terms, 
fundamentally shifted the relationship between the United States and its Indian neighbors. 
The administration of John Quincy Adams had room for men such as Gad Humphreys 
who recognized, however dimly, Indian rights to property and impartiality under the law. 
Under Jackson, there was none. The difference was even starker throughout the rest of 
the nation. Once hailed as proof positive for the human capacity for progress, the 
Cherokees were cast aside as obstacles to progress themselves. Other Indians throughout 
the nation suffered similar fates. Even in its hypocrisy, early republic Indian policy had 
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recognized that whites and Indians were bound together in the future of North America, 
but for Jackson, Indian destiny lay far over the horizon.
Coercion and Resistance
Though Micanopy’s delaying tactics bought his nation significant breathing room, 
Andrew Jackson’s resounding victory in the election of 1832 cemented Indian removal as 
the official policy of the United States. As Jackson strengthened his hold on national 
politics, Micanopy gathered his strength as well. John Hicks passed away of natural 
causes near the end of 1833, making Micanopy the unrivaled leader of the Seminoles. As 
Micanopy expanded his authority, Americans began recording the presence of a new 
advisor at his side. Though he was not a hereditary chief, the young warrior, identified by 
whites as Osceola, was said to hold great sway with his chief. Eminently charismatic and 
physically imposing, Osceola almost uniformly struck whites with the force of his 
character. 
Against Micanopy, Osceola, and their allies, were arrayed an entirely new group 
of federal officials charged with the removal of the Seminoles. Duval, after 13 years of 
tireless advocacy, resigned his post to practice law. Secretary of War John Eaton, after 
having embroiled the Jackson’s administration in scandal over the social respectability of 
his young wife, Peggy Eaton, was exiled to Florida and appointed Duval’s replacement. 
Taking Eaton’s place in the war department was Lewis Cass, who had served as the 
governor of the Michigan territory for nearly two decades and fancied himself something 
of an Indian expert. Finally, discovering corruption in the dealings of Gad Humphreys’s 
replacement, Indian Agent John Phagan, Jackson removed him from office and replaced 
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him with General Wiley Thompson, a four-term Jacksonian in the House of 
Representatives from Georgia. He had served alongside Andrew Jackson in the Creek 
War and had earned the title of general from his service with the Georgia militia. They 
faced an urgent task. In the aftermath of Nat Turner’s revolt in Virginia and British 
abolition in the Caribbean, all agreed that the removal of the Seminoles and their 
destabilizing effect on Florida slavery was vital.
56
These personalities, inexperienced and volatile, collided with the Seminole 
leadership in October 1834. The Senate had passed the Treaty of Payne’s Landing several 
months before and, among whites, Seminole removal appeared a fait accompli. The 
Seminoles, though not entirely unified in their opposition, continued to disclaim the 
legitimacy of the Treaty of Payne’s Landing. With the time for payment of their annuity 
coming due, Thompson called a meeting with the Seminoles and made clear the 
government’s position. This would be the last payment they would receive in Florida, and 
all future payments would be contingent on their removal.
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According to Thompson’s report, the Seminoles then held a private council to 
formulate their response. There, Osceola opened the council by forcefully opposing 
emigration. He swore to resist all impositions on his autonomy and would consider any 
Indian who defied him an enemy. Though some chiefs demurred from Osceola’s tone, 
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when they met with Thompson, the Seminoles spoke with a unified voice. They argued 
that the execution of the Treaty of Payne’s Landing was predicated upon the adoption of 
the Treaty of Fort Gibson, which, having been reached by fraud, rendered the former 
worthless. Thompson bellowed, “don’t bring to me any more foolish talk … men do not 
listen to the talks of a child, and remember that the talk I gave you must and will stand.” 
The meeting closed portentously. Tired of the Seminoles’ intransigence, 
Thompson sketched out their future should they remain in Florida. Land adjacent to their 
reservation would be surveyed and sold to whites. The territorial government’s 
jurisdiction would be extended over their villages. Their laws would be nullified, their 
chiefs deprived of their authority. In turn, every Indian would be tried in court, some for 
murder, others for defaulting on their debt. One by one, whites would produce claims for 
their slaves, some legitimate, some not. Their cases would be decided by white men’s 
law, Indians would be prohibited from introducing evidence, and whites would testify 
against them falsely with impunity. Addressing Micanopy directly, Thompson offered a 
vision of his future. If he remained in Florida a few more years, Thompson assured the 
chief, “he would be reduced to hopeless poverty; and when urged by hunger to ask, 
perhaps of the man who would have thus ruined him … for a crust of bread, he might be 
called an Indian dog.” Thompson recorded that at this Osceola, seated next to Micanopy, 
urged the chief to stand firm. Following Osceola’s lead, Micanopy said simply he would 
not comply. Disgustedly, Thompson called an end to the meeting and pledged to report 
them to Jackson. Upon receipt, Jackson was satisfied with Thompson’s tactics and 
scribbled his orders on the back of his letter: “let a sufficient military force be forthwith 
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ordered to protect our citizens & remove & protect the Indians agreeable to the 
Stipulations of the Treaty.”
58
Jackson’s order to “remove and protect” the Seminoles was not cynical 
doublespeak. Settlers throughout the southeast were coercing Indians into giving up their 
land and abandoning their property with increasing frequency. To the north, land 
speculators and squatters had defrauded Creeks and Cherokees of their possessions, state 
legislatures had begun extending their jurisdiction over Indian territory, and across the 
region thousands of young men were forming volunteer militias to dispossess their Indian 
neighbors. With its lack of infrastructure and relatively weak institutional foundation, 
Florida did not move as quickly as had Georgia and Alabama to leverage its strength over 
its Indian nations, but Jackson well understood that the territory would do so soon 
enough. Unwilling to restrain rapacious settlers and corruptible territorial politicians, 
Jackson’s only option, if he intended to protect the southeast Indians from the worst 
ravages of settler violence, was to see removal to its conclusion.
The march toward war could not be abated. The young warriors and Black 
Seminoles who represented Micanopy’s base of support would not emigrate, no matter 
Thompson’s assurances. Pressure from his superiors and the planters of Florida boxed 
Thompson in as well. Whether voluntarily or by force, removal would begin in 1836. 
Micanopy could not bend and Jackson would not. The Treaty of Moultrie Creek was the 
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only basis for peace and, when Jackson declared it no longer binding, war was the only 
possible outcome.
59
Osceola and Wiley Thompson would meet twice more. In their first encounter, in 
June 1835, Osceola burst into Thompson’s office and, according to Thompson’s 
characterization of the event, insulted him “by some insolent remarks.” According to one 
account, Osceola called Thompson an intruder on his lands, mocked his authority, and 
pledged to drive him from Florida. Whatever his exact words, they were likely an 
extension of Osceola’s remarks at the annuity grounds, an expression of Indian 
peoplehood and a reclamation of Seminole control over their future in Florida. Osceola’s 
grievous “insults,” as crude as they may or may not have been, undermined the 
foundations of Thompson’s authority in their opposition to the physical strength of the 
United States. Thompson, understanding the rules which Osceola had set, saw that the 
time for implied threats had passed. He chained Osceola in irons for six days until the
warrior pledged to obey the Treaty of Payne’s Landing.
60
Soon after Osceola’s release, events further spiraled toward war. The United 
States continued to leverage Seminole privations to encourage removal. Indians and 
whites exchanged fire in Alachua Country. In August, a mail carrier was found murdered. 
In November, Osceola shot and killed Charley Emathla, the leading voice for emigration 
among the Seminoles. It was said that Osceola searched through the dead chief’s pockets, 
seized his American currency, and scattered the bills to the wind. With war seeming 
imminent, panicked Florida planters succeeded in getting 150 mounted horsemen 
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dispatched to the territory. In early December, a large body of Indians ambushed and 
hijacked a wagon train, engaging a militia company in pitched battle. When informed of 
the hostilities, an impatient Jackson demanded movement from the leading officer in the 
field, Duncan Clinch. And, on the morning of December 28, two white men miles apart 
left the safe confines of their forts. One, Major Francis Dade, led a battalion of 110 troops 
from Fort King. He remembered well the lessons of 1828. The Seminoles, he was sure, 
would scatter at his approach and meekly adhere to the Treaty of Payne’s Landing. Fifty 
miles to the north, Wiley Thompson and an officer left the walls of their fort to take an 
afternoon stroll. Concealed, Osceola and several other warriors followed. As Dade 
marched, overconfident and injudicious, he declined to send scouts to watch his flanks. 
Suddenly, 180 Indians surrounded his force on all sides. Most of the American troops fell 
in the first minutes. Only one made it back to camp alive. Thompson was not so lucky. 
They found his body riddled with 14 bullet holes, his scalp missing. Osceola had secured 
his revenge and the Second Seminole War had begun. 
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Chapter 2
“A Reckless Waste of Blood and Treasure”: 
Thomas Jesup, the Politics of Florida, and the State
In the fall of 1837, emissaries of General Thomas Jesup met with the great 
Seminole warrior Osceola under a white flag. At a prearranged signal, dozens of soldiers 
raised their guns and seized Osceola, an act that would tarnish Jesup’s reputation for 
decades. Even as Jesup put into place his duplicitous plans in Florida, hundreds of miles 
away another of his tactics to end the war unfolded during a face-to-face meeting in the 
War Department. In November, Captain John Rogers Vinton, a well-educated graduate of 
West Point and a trusted subordinate to Jesup on leave from Florida, received a letter 
from his commander, asking him to meet with Secretary of War Joel Poinsett. Needing 
some clarification of his orders, Jesup believed he sent an ideal messenger, as he assured 
his subordinate that he was “fully informed of my views in relation to our Indian policy.”
Dutifully, Vinton met with Poinsett, where he informed the Secretary of Jesup’s 
questions. Poinsett resolved Vinton’s confusion and, according to the officer, assured him 
“that by all the means now at [Jesup’s] disposal, and the blessing of God,” he hoped the 
war would soon end. Vinton, unfazed by the chain of command, disagreed. He defended 
Jesup’s efforts, but insisted that the contention that “we could consistently invoke the 
blessing of God on our effort, was more questionable.” This led to what Vinton termed 
“some little discussions,” and, he informed Jesup, he “had occasion to utter some truths 
that had not often met the Secy.’s ear.”
1
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Over the ensuing year, Jesup would openly flirt with the pacifistic impulses that 
Vinton articulated to Poinsett. When he was rebuffed, he would lose his political support 
and, with it, his command. The capture of Osceola was even more damaging to the 
general’s reputation. For the rest of his days, Jesup was dogged by charges of duplicity 
and deception. The two confrontations were linked by more than their effect on Jesup’s 
legacy. Though each arose from diametrically opposed impulses - the former a refutation 
of nonwhite rights during wartime, the latter manifesting a direct challenge to the ethos 
that justified that refutation - they represented the range of options made available to 
Jesup by the complex politics of Florida and the aggressive expansionism of his 
superiors. To win the war, Jesup could either zealously pursue removal, re-enslavement, 
and, possibly, extermination, or stand as a bulwark against the tide. Paradoxically, he did 
both.
This dilemma was not unique to Jesup. Though United States generals spent years 
devising ways to win the Second Seminole War, they struggled even more with the 
politics of antebellum Florida. They faced complications common to any extended 
campaign: mediating the orders of their superiors, the recommendations of their officers, 
the fervor of their volunteers, and the antipathy of their soldiers. In Florida, outside 
pressures were especially significant. As the Seminoles were protected by the vast 
fastnesses of the Florida wilderness, defeating them required not merely an understanding 
of their tactics and strategy but close study of Seminole culture and an appreciation of the 
complex relationship between the Indians and the Black Seminoles. Should generals 
attempt to leverage the cracks between the Seminoles and the Black Seminoles, a move 
which defied their orders to in no way conciliate with their nonwhite enemies, they faced 
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immediate and withering vituperation from local slaveholders committed to the total 
removal of the Seminoles and the re-enslavement of the Black Seminoles. And these 
slaveholders often curried greater favor from the Jackson and Van Buren administrations 
than any general. Commanding officers, then, had to navigate numerous organized 
factions in Florida, each with their own priorities and most of them conflicting. The first 
three commanders in Florida, Winfield Scott, Edmund Gaines, and Richard Keith Call, 
entered the territory bombastically and left soon after, having failed to advance their 
nation’s war aims. Thomas Jesup, the fourth, comprehended the complicated interplay of 
interests that comprised the Florida War, but he too failed, unable to conquer the 
Seminoles, unwilling to exterminate them, and incapable of moderating official American 
policy predicated on the absolute racial domination of Florida.
Jesup understood that the politics of the Second Seminole War pivoted around the 
co-existing and conflicting systems of slavery vying for control of East Florida. From the 
moment of Florida’s annexation to the United States, large plantation owners had 
streamed into the state, attracted to its fertile lands and warm climate. Though many 
prospered, they increasingly grew fearful of their Seminole neighbors who, in offering 
sanctuary to runaway slaves, threatened to destabilize Florida’s fragile slave regime. The 
Seminoles were slaveholders themselves, but of a different stripe. In Seminole society, 
most slaves enjoyed substantial autonomy, living in their own communities and retaining 
control of their own labor, though they still owed regular tribute to their Indian masters. 
As slaves in Florida and Georgia fled their homes in greater frequency and found 
sanctuary with the Seminoles, white slaveholders began to pressure the federal 
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government to enforce the terms of the Treaty of Payne’s Landing. They demanded that 
every Seminole be removed and every fugitive slave returned to their white owner.
2
When Secretary of War Lewis Cass dispatched Winfield Scott to Florida in 1836, 
he laid out clear orders that reflected slaveholder pressure. Scott was to force the 
complete subjugation of the Seminoles and recapture any fugitive slaves upon whom 
white owners had a plausible claim. He was to do this without negotiating with the 
enemy, and he could not offer concessions. His orders reflected not the exigencies of the 
conflict, but the underlying logic of Indian removal. Three years before, during the Black 
Hawk War in Illinois and Wisconsin, a war which began when the state militia opened 
fire upon a delegation of Sauk and Fox Indians intending to negotiate a truce, Cass 
himself had rushed to the scene to oversee the joint efforts of Illinois militia, federal 
troops, and allied Sioux Indians. The overpowering United States coalition routed Black 
Hawk’s warriors and, at the final battle of the war at Bad Axe, massacred hundreds of 
men, women, and children. Following his army’s strategic triumph, Cass secured an 
existential one as well. By displaying the captured Black Hawk across the country before 
curious onlookers, Cass’s War Department crafted a narrative that depicted white 
superiority over a savage enemy even as it overawed the captive chief with the immensity 
of the nation’s population. Having overwhelmed Black Hawk and his band so utterly, 
many Americans believed there would be no more frontier wars, that Indian fear of 
United States strength would silence their grievances with the nation’s conduct. The need 
to demonstrate American superiority, to make manifest the racial principles of the era in 
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Florida, was as much an element of Cass’s war plan as his orders regarding troop 
movements and supply depots.
3
The priorities of the Jackson administration made clear their intent to eradicate 
Seminole sovereignty. They did not cloak their orders with paeans to liberty or references 
to a glorious national destiny. Negotiations with nonwhites were counterproductive, an 
exercise in forfeiting national honor. African-Americans were to be re-interned into the 
slave system. Indian autonomy was to be crushed. In all cases, Jackson’s policy 
demanded the imposition of American authority onto the geographic space of Florida, the 
forced transformation of autonomous nonwhites into subjects of the state, and the 
appropriation of their resources to enrich members of the body politic.
Successive generals chafed against these orders. Winfield Scott explained they 
were without precedent, that to deprive a military officer the right to negotiate rendered 
his task nearly impossible. Edmund Gaines, who had the temerity to initiate peace talks 
with the Seminoles, found himself having to defend the very legitimacy of negotiating 
with nonwhite enemies. The largest transgressor of all, Richard Keith Call, onetime close 
friend of Andrew Jackson, violated his orders and retreated in the face of Seminole fire. 
Upon his return from the field, he was Andrew Jackson’s friend no longer. All three 
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generals foundered against the unyielding constraints of the American war effort: the 
only criterion by which the United States could win the war was the subjugation of the 
Seminoles, but exigencies of the climate and the unmapped wilderness shielded the 
enemy from the American war machine. Jesup arrived in Florida a naïve believer in his 
nation’s overwhelming might. Within a month, Jesup relayed an apology by way of the 
War Department, admitting if he had “at any time said aught in disparagement of the 
operations of others in Florida … knowing the country as I know it, I consider myself 
bound, as a man of honor, to solemnly retract it.” The problem was one of aggressive 
expansionism: “This is the first instance in our history in which we have attempted to 
transfer Indians from one wilderness to another – on all other occasions the white 
population has been pressing them and crowding them out, before we have attempted to 
remove them.” Having confronted the hopelessness of the military situation firsthand, 
Jesup began to appreciate the complex politics of Florida, a web of interests his 
predecessors had lacked both the time and the inclination to comprehend.
4
 Thomas Jesup realized that the disjuncture of interests between the Seminoles 
and the Black Seminoles represented an opportunity. Having alternatively escaped from 
American plantations, been purchased by Seminoles, or secured their emancipation from 
Spanish masters, the Black Seminoles were maroons, an identifier usually used to 
describe isolated and autonomous black communities in the New World. Correctly 
judging the divergent objectives of the Seminoles who fought to remain in Florida and 
the Black Seminoles who hoped to prevent their re-interment into the chattel slave system 
of the Deep South, Jesup utilized the difference to divide the two groups. If he could gain 
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the allegiance of the Black Seminoles, he would deal the Seminoles a double blow. The 
loss of their allies would hinder their ability to make war and provide subsistence for 
their remaining communities, while the Black Seminoles’ knowledge of Florida 
topography would be an incalculable boon to United States forces too often literally lost 
in the wilderness. He had to move cautiously, however, as any move to guarantee the 
freedom of African-Americans risked alienating the southern slaveholders who eyed their 
former slaves as a fortune in bonded human capital. After gaining the allegiance of the 
Black Seminoles, Jesup and other army officers would find themselves defending their 
new allies against slaveholder petitions, repelling prowling slavecatchers, and contending 
against slaveowner claims in court.
5
When even the aid of the Black Seminoles failed to end the war, Jesup launched 
two alternative efforts, each with opposite effects. In the first, Jesup lobbied the War 
Department to allow him to end the conflict through negotiation. Warning that the 
Seminoles were both resolute and unreachable in their wilderness fastnesses, Jesup urged 
a series of compromises to end the war. Could the United States, he asked, suffer to allow 
the Seminoles something akin to a reservation on the southern tip of Florida if they 
pledged not to attack frontier settlements or welcome fugitive slaves? If not that, then 
what if the Seminoles consented to live in Florida subject to state law? When his 
superiors received his suggestions with increasing hostility, Jesup offered alternatives. 
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Would the nation countenance the extermination of the Seminoles? Could he be 
authorized to import bloodhounds to track the Seminoles and, perhaps, tear them limb 
from limb?
Taken together, Jesup's correspondence represented a crossroads. In one direction 
lay a moralistic course that prioritized mediation with nonwhites and a recognition of 
their de facto sovereignty. The other presented an unfettered vision of racial domination 
and nonwhite subjugation. Jesup was a lonely advocate for the former. Hamstrung by an 
unwillingness or a disinclination to challenge slaveholder interests, politicians of both 
parties displayed no interest in moderating frontier policy. In pursuing racial domination, 
Jesup enjoyed the support of the vast majority of federal officials, thousands of elite 
slaveholders, and tens of thousands of settlers living along the nation's frontiers.
While much of the country was occupied elsewhere, Thomas Jesup grappled with 
the implications of the United States’ aggressive expansionism. He concretely weighed 
the value of United States dominance and ruminated on the relationship between national 
honor and compromise. He was not morally blameless: on balance he was as likely to 
intensify rather than moderate the violence of his nation’s war tactics. Absent the orders 
of his superiors, he likely would have cast aside moral qualms altogether and pursued 
outright extermination. Nevertheless, his actions reflected a conscious understanding of 
both American policy and its alternatives. In a time when few contextualized or 
comprehended the war effort, his decision to wrestle with the politics of Florida granted 
him real insight into antebellum political culture and the conflicting interests of 
slaveowners and the putative objectives of the war.
104
This chapter will detail the first several years of the war in Florida from the 
perspective of successive military commanders, Edmund Gaines, Winfield Scott, Richard 
Keith Call, and Thomas Jesup. The first three men wrestled with the meaning of victory 
and defeat in a context in which reaffirming racial dominance proved more important 
than military reality. Unable to vindicate white supremacy in the face of Seminole 
resistance, they left Florida in disgrace. Alone, Jesup challenged the morality of his 
orders and made a forceful case for allowing the Seminoles to remain in Florida, 
regardless of the imperatives of racial domination and aggressive expansionism.
The Physical and Metaphysical Defeats of the First Wave
The first two United States commanders of the Second Seminole War, Winfield 
Scott and Edmund Gaines, were as infamous for their mutual enmity as famous for their 
military accomplishments. Their failure in Florida, however, sprang from a common 
source - each took a martial rather than a political approach to the war. Believing that 
shows of force could quell any Indian rebellion, both men gravely underestimated the 
effectiveness of Seminole strategy and the strength of their arms. Gaines, always the 
more headstrong, barreled into Florida, fell into a Seminole ambush, and initiated 
unauthorized treaty negotiations, enraging his superiors. Scott fell into a different sort of 
trap. Believing that military precision could overcome any Indian force, he was oblivious 
to the ways in which the decentralized structure of Seminole society enabled his enemy to 
avoid his sweeping offensives. Neither came to grips with the overarching problem of 
their assignment: the Seminoles could not be beaten on the battlefield and their superiors 
would not let them win the war off of it. 
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The Second Seminole War began under the watch of President Andrew Jackson 
and Secretary of War Lewis Cass. Cass, the longtime governor of the Michigan Territory, 
had dealt with Indians for twenty years. As governor, he, like many of his generation, 
pragmatically dealt with frontier Indians as political actors and with the understanding 
that, as he said, “it is the part of true wisdom … to attach them to us through the medium 
of their affections and interests.” Throughout the 1820s, Cass wrestled with the justice of 
Indian removal until the end of the decade when, whether through sincere belief or 
craven ambition to rise in the nascent Democratic Party, he offered a full throated defense 
of removal. By 1835, content with the basic justness of the Treaty of Payne’s Landing, 
Cass refused to consider Seminole grievances with the agreement, certain that “nothing 
less than insanity, or an utter ignorance of their own position” would lead the Seminoles 
to revolt.
6
In his initial dispatch to Winfield Scott ordering him to Florida, Lewis Cass 
translated Jackson’s drive to consolidate United States control of the frontier into a 
military frame. He forbade Scott from pursuing pacification through any means until the 
Seminoles were “unconditionally subdued.” Not only did Cass forbid Scott from 
negotiating a peace until after the Seminoles had consented to emigrate, he ordered Scott 
to allow no terms to the Indians until every slave upon whom white owners held a 
plausible claim was given up. Scott could make no agreement with the Seminoles which 
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did not ensure the regional hegemony of the United States and not only re-secured but 
also reformed the bonds of slavery ruptured by the Seminoles’ presence on the frontier. 
These policies perfectly mirrored the council of prominent Florida slaveholders who 
wrote to Cass and warned that to end the war on any terms aside from the total 
subjugation of the Seminoles and their allies would be “a sacrifice of national dignity.”
7
Scott moved deliberately. He was, by nature, an organizer who endeavored to 
leave nothing to chance. Before the start of the war, for all of his growing prominence as 
a partisan figure and political opponent of Jackson, Scott remained a celebrated military 
figure, a national hero so lauded that guidebooks led tourists to the sites of his greatest 
victories. Though he would founder amidst the fastnesses of Florida, even The Globe, the 
Democratic Party’s preeminent organ, consistently wrote of the general in reverential 
tones, recalling his great victories even when describing his present failures in Florida.
8
Scott immediately set out for Florida and on the way issued a call for 3700 
volunteers from South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama. He spent a month setting his 
plans in motion, waiting for his troops to arrive, and sketching out a plan of attack. With 
his first orders to the newly arrived volunteers, he acknowledged their independent 
backgrounds and reminded them that in this campaign the science of warfare would be 
paramount, as “valor and patriotism are not sufficient … some tactical instruction and an 
exact obedience to commands” would be necessary. He planned a complicated attack, 
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comprising three troop columns that would sweep across Florida along different 
trajectories and converge upon the Withlacoochee River to force a general engagement 
with the enemy. However, Scott failed to understand that the nature of American warfare 
had shifted from that of his youth. In a protracted war in which the United States was the 
aggressor, if he could not find the enemy, he could not win.
9
As Scott tarried, General Edmund Pendleton Gaines heard word of the ambush of 
Dade’s command in New Orleans on January 15, and hurried to Florida. On his journey, 
he belatedly learned of Scott’s assignment, but chose to continue on regardless. In part, 
Gaines feared that if he turned back, he would deprive the territory of needed manpower, 
but he also allowed a deep animus toward Scott to motivate him, quite sure that his 
rival’s scientific tactics would succumb to the harsh climates of Florida. Weathered by 
countless nights on the frontier, Gaines was a gruff commander who prized combat 
experience and was known to dismiss his rival as “the vain-glorious Giant votary of 
science.” Despite their shared admiration for martial strength, Gaines and Andrew 
Jackson, too, had clashed in recent years. A quiet but avowed opponent of Indian 
removal, Gaines believed that the nation should foster “civilizing” programs in the 
southeast and rely on treaties to keep the peace between the two peoples.
10
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Where Scott planned the grand movement of three columns, Gaines outlined a 
simpler strategy: “To find the enemy, we must search for him; and when we find him we 
must take or destroy him.”  Arriving in Florida, Gaines blundered in the direction of the 
Withlacoochee River and found the river impassable. Trapped on its banks, he was beset 
by Indian warriors on all sides. His men quickly constructed a makeshift fort and watched 
as the Seminoles settled down for a lengthy siege. Gaines seized on the crisis as an 
opportunity and sent messengers to Brigadier General Duncan Clinch who was stationed 
nearby, urging him to rush to the Withlacoochee where he could attack the Indians’ flank. 
Upon the arrival of the messenger, Scott, however, held firm to his own plans and 
forbade Clinch from joining Gaines. Gaines regarded Scott’s decision as not just an 
attempt to “starve me and my command in my position on the Withlacoochee, but to 
starve me out of it.” Finally, after several days, Scott thought better of leaving Gaines 
bereft, and authorized Clinch to come to his aid.
11
Unbeknownst to his peers, Gaines had achieved a small measure of success. The 
Seminoles, unused to prolonged sieges and rightly assuming they had the advantage, 
offered to withdraw if the embattled Gaines would abrogate the Treaty of Payne’s 
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Landing. Through emissaries, Gaines admitted that he lacked the authority to do so, but 
promised to present their offer to his superiors. Before the Seminoles could respond, 
Clinch and his troops arrived, scattering the Seminoles. After their ordeal, Gaines and his 
men returned to Fort Drane. According to one observer, they resembled “emaciated 
skeletons.”
12
When word of Gaines’s campaign reached the rest of the nation, the news that 
Gaines had welcomed the Seminoles’ overture stunned many. In willingly receiving the 
Seminoles’ terms, Gaines had provided an implicit rebuke to Jacksonian Indian policy. 
He was not directly disobeying Cass’s instructions as Gaines had rushed to the frontier so 
quickly that he was likely ignorant of Scott’s precise orders, but the image of an 
American general suing for peace appeared to some to be a betrayal of national honor. 
Critics assailed Gaines for believing the Seminoles to be sincere in their promise to live 
in Florida peacefully and naïve for thinking anything aside from complete submission 
could end their threat.
13
Gaines forcefully stood against the tide. In the face of critics who, Gaines warned, 
tried to “forestall and mislead public opinion – to condemn my movements, and cover me 
with the vilest detraction,” he set forth his principles clearly. Gladly admitting that he 
“did not require my officers and men at the Withlacoochee to take from the enemy as 
many lives as they had, by their savage conduct, forfeited,” Gaines upheld “the bond, or 
the principle, of the laws of war, or of nations,” which compelled him to treat with the 
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Indians after they approached under the white flag. In Mobile, when thousands gathered 
to greet Gaines as a returning hero, the old general insisted he had left the field 
victorious, having satisfied “all the reasonable demands of justice, in accordance with the 
known laws of war, laws which ought to be extended alike to the weak and the strong –
to the Seminolean as to the Briton, the Frank or the Russian!" Gaines directly confronted 
the prevailing conquering ethos of the War Department and found it morally wanting.
14
When it came time for Scott to launch his attack, his overly complex campaign in 
which three wings of United States troops converged on a single point proved 
unworkable. Scott might have believed he required ambitious tactics to fulfill the 
administration's objectives. At Fort Drane, one soldier overheard Scott informing a group 
of allied Indians and an interpreter, “I am determined to carry on a war of extermination 
… I will shoot down every man." Depending on perfect coordination through unmapped 
wildernesses, Scott's plan crumbled as the three wings failed to intersect at the appointed 
times and, in their frustration, embittered volunteers rebelled against their assigned 
officers.
15
Over the final two months of his command in Florida, Scott flailed about 
hopelessly in search of an advantage. Thinking that he might force the Seminoles’ 
submission by destroying their settlements, he launched a total war. It failed. His troops 
fought no pitched battles, located few Seminole homesteads, and achieved nothing. One 
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Florida soldier recounted marching 31 days before actually encountering any Indians. On 
the 32
nd
 day, the soldier’s hopes shot up thinking he had found one, only to be 
disappointed when the rustling in the brush turned out to be a possum. Such was the 
activity that marked Scott’s time in Florida. In mid-April, Cass gave Scott permission to 
put down a Creek uprising in Alabama and, one month later, he left Florida.
16
In the years that followed, Scott defended his strategy by pointing out that his 
successors all enjoyed the “diplomatic faculty” that he lacked. As the Jackson 
administration had ordered him “to hold no parley, no negotiation,” they had prohibited 
him from even assuring the Seminoles kind treatment on their journey west. 
Nevertheless, observers criticized Scott not merely for his lack of success, but also for the 
ways in which he had failed. In light of his raids against Seminole homes directed at 
women and children, one New York writer called his actions a “disgrace” and disdained 
Scott’s copious laurels as newly tarnished.  His own officers criticized Scott for risking a 
summer campaign in the midst of Florida’s sickly season, one complaining that “I see no 
reason why hundreds of men should be sacrificed to heal General Scott’s wounded 
vanity.” Ordered to induce total submission, but lacking both logistical support and 
wholesale commitment from his men, Scott had no way of winning the war on the 
administration’s terms.
17
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With Scott gone, the Jackson administration searched for a successor. Richard 
Keith Call, the newly appointed governor of Florida, cannily ensured they would not 
have to look far. Panicked by the Seminoles’ success, Call, who had no experience 
commanding troops, begged for command against the Indians, writing no fewer than ten 
letters to Cass between the end of April and the second week of May. On May 12
th
, he 
wrote to Andrew Jackson as well, admitting that he had written to Cass almost every day 
since taking office, but did so only because the situation in Florida was so dire. Call had 
good reason to think Jackson might listen as the two had enjoyed a long and sincere 
friendship. Twenty years before, Call impressed Jackson when, as a volunteer officer in 
command of a Kentucky unit, he had been deserted by his troops after their enlistment 
had expired. Rather than return home, Call excoriated his men as mutineers and presented 
himself at Jackson’s tent, offering his service. Now Call offered a plan that piqued 
Jackson’s curiosity. Where Scott had meandered after the failure of his complex three-
column plan, Call planned to use boats to land troops near the cove of the Withlacoochee 
under the cover of night. There, his men would march speedily into the country and 
capture the Seminole warriors’ dependents, burn their corn, seize their cattle, and force 
the warriors to quit the field and tend to their homes. After reading Call’s proposal, 
Jackson scribbled on the letter that his plan would “redeem us from that disgrace which 
now hangs over us.”
18
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Jackson celebrated Call’s plan as much for its brazenness as its substance. Rather 
than negotiate, as Gaines had done, or tarry, as had Scott, Call planned a frontal assault 
against the enemy’s homes, destroying the Seminoles’ roots in Florida and compelling 
their emigration. Whether consciously or not, Call proposed the same strategy his patron 
had executed during the First Seminole War when he demolished dozens of Seminole 
settlements and facilitated the 1823 Treaty of Moultrie Creek, which greatly 
circumscribed the Seminoles’ territory.
19
  
To his chagrin, Call came to learn that Scott’s careful and cautious planning did 
have some benefit. Though he had initially planned to launch his attacks within three 
weeks of taking command, he had to wait several long months for further recruits to 
arrive and, as he waited, illness incapacitated a third of his idle troops. While they 
recuperated, the enlistments of most of his volunteers expired. By the time new volunteer 
companies from Tennessee had arrived, it was already September. When he hurriedly 
embarked, Call led 1350 men composed of Tennessee and Florida volunteers to the 
Withlacoochee. Upon arriving, he realized that in his haste he had forgotten to bring axes 
and was unable to construct rafts to ford the waters of the Withlacoochee. Contrary to his 
expectations, it was he who was trapped at the river’s edge under heavy fire. Starving and 
overburdened, his men butchered horses, burned saddles to relieve themselves of the 
weight, and pressed Call to return to their base. Extremely ill, Call decided to turn back, 
having failed to provoke a single large-scale engagement. Several weeks later, he would 
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launch a second campaign, this time with the aid of a brigade of allied Creek Indians, but 
would again have to turn back upon reaching an impassable swamp.
20
In Washington, as Call was in the field for a second time, a veteran of the first 
offensive arrived with distressing news, characterizing Call’s initial withdrawal from the 
Withlacoochee as a retrograde movement. Jackson listened with incredulity at the news 
that his longtime friend had marched on the Seminoles, only to retreat back to Fort 
Drane. This was an affront Jackson could not abide. Without waiting for Call’s official 
report, Jackson instructed Acting Secretary of War Benjamin Butler to write to Call 
immediately. Butler informed Call that Jackson was both “disappointed and surprised.” 
To suffer defeat, as Scott had, was bad enough. To willingly falter in the face of Indian 
gunfire and implicitly concede Indian superiority on the battlefield violated the tenets of 
white supremacy, unbridled expansion, and American’s bellicose stance toward the rest 
of the world, Indian or foreign. Jackson expected Indians across the country, impassioned 
by the Seminoles’ success, to flout American authority and foment uprisings across the 
continent. Butler used Call’s oft-feeble health as a pretext for his actions, but nonetheless 
                                                          
20
 For a description of Call’s campaign, see Mahon, History of the Second Seminole War 168-190. Richard 
Keith Call Journal, Florida State Archives, 408-412; Call to Cass, October 10, 1836, Senate Document 278, 
26
th
 Congress, 1
st
 Session, 86; Call to Cass October 19, 1836, Senate Document 278, 26
th
 Congress, 1
st
Session, 86-88. Tragedy cast a pall over Call’s second campaign before it began. Colonel John Foote Lane, 
a well regarded young officer, committed suicide in his tent just days after entering Florida. Lane was 
likely suffering from some form of mental illness. Just one year before, Lane, the son of Democratic 
Representative Amos Lane, had accosted one of his father’s political rivals on the streets of Washington 
and beaten him with a cane. Witnesses had described him as preternaturally calm. The commanding 
Indian officer of the Creeks was David Moniac, the first Indian to graduate from West Point. Moniac had 
enrolled at West Point under the terms of an old treaty that provided free education to a limited number 
of Creek Indian children. At West Point, John Quincy Adams once watched Moniac march and recalled 
hearing onlookers point exclaim, “Look there! There’s the Indian!” He would heroically risk wading the 
river and charging the Seminole position, but was cut down. No whites followed his lead. On Lane, see 
“Case of Lieutenant Lane,” Army and Navy Chronicle, Apr 16, 1835; 1.16, 121; “Lieut. Lane’s Case.,” Army 
and Navy Chronicle, Apr 23, 1835; 1.17, 129-130. On Moniac, see Benjamin Griffin, "Lt. David Moniac, 
Creek Indian: First Minority Graduate of West Point." Alabama Historical Quarterly 2 (Summer 1981), 99–
110; GW Patten, “The Fall of Moniac,” in Voices of the Border (New York: Hurd and Houghton, 1967), 299-
301. Sprague, The Florida War 166; Mahon, History of the Second Seminole War 185-187; Call to Butler, 
November 27, 1836, Senate Document 278, 26
th
 Congress, 1
st
 Session, 92-98.
115
closed the letter by bluntly removing Call from command. The politics of conquest had 
no room for retreat.
21
Gaines, Scott, and Call found that the Seminole position in Florida, protected by 
dense wilderness and well-armed warriors equipped with an encyclopedic knowledge of 
the geography, was nearly impregnable. Given that their orders necessitated the complete 
subjugation of the Seminoles, they were stalemated by the exigencies of the battlefield 
and the intransigence of their superiors. As Jackson’s vision of the nation held no room 
for Indian autonomy, his officers’ failure to author their subjugation left the president 
with only two options. He could moderate his orders or disgrace his generals. Gaines, 
Scott, and Call were disgraced in turn.
Jesup, Race, Honor, and the Politics of the Florida War
Following Scott’s departure from Florida in May 1836, Cass ordered him to 
Georgia to quell an uprising of Creek Indians. There, Scott anticipated an easier 
campaign, writing to a friend, “Thank God! here an enemy may be reached.” Once again, 
two major generals would occupy the same theater as Cass instructed Quartermaster 
General Thomas Jesup to go to Georgia to serve under Scott, but to act on his own 
recognizance to force the “unconditional submission of the Indians” as he awaited Scott’s 
arrival. Cass clearly envisioned a different form of war from the Florida conflict, omitting 
the explicit injunction against negotiation and urging Jesup to identify Creeks with 
friendly dispositions and to treat them with the kindest affection. Above all, he instructed 
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Jesup to isolate the Creeks from the Seminoles. Any alliance between hostile Creeks and 
the Seminoles would be a disaster.
22
Like Scott and Gaines, Thomas Jesup had risen through the ranks quickly during 
the War of 1812, serving with special distinction at Lundy’s Lane where Scott had won 
one of his first and finest victories. Like Scott, he had spent years studying military 
science, learning tactics, and gradually professionalizing and bureaucratizing the army 
into a modern institution. Unlike Scott, he was born on the Kentucky frontier and was 
well-acquainted with settler concerns, often prioritizing action over caution. Following 
the War of 1812, President James Monroe judiciously assigned the ambitious young 
officer to the Quartermaster’s Office, an ideal location where he could utilize his 
penchant for modernization while preventing him from indulging his brash ambitions. 
Unlike both Gaines and Scott, he was a close ally of the Jackson administration and the 
next door neighbor of Francis P. Blair, a member of Jackson’s Kitchen Cabinet and the 
editor of The Globe. Despite their political differences, Scott had often worked closely 
with Jesup and the two men regarded each other warmly.
23
In the field, however, Jesup bristled at Scott’s caution. Stationed at different 
points, Jesup lobbied Scott throughout the first weeks of June 1836 to launch an attack 
against the Indians. Arguing to Scott he was just miles from where “hostile Indians are 
committing the most cruel and distressing outrages” and with his supplies running low, 
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Jesup desperately urged an attack. As Scott hesitated, Jesup grew frustrated. In 
exasperation, he struck sharply at his friend, pointedly admitting that he had “none of the 
courage that would enable me to remain inactive, when women and children are daily 
falling beneath the blows of the savage.” Out of regard for their former friendship, he 
urged him to move quickly against the Creeks; otherwise, he declared, “you are lost.” 
However, Scott continued to wait anxiously for the arrival of guns and tents, not willing 
to go to battle half-stocked.
24
As Scott waited for the perfect moment to march, he received news that shocked 
him - Jesup had attacked. With astonishment, Scott wrote harshly to his subordinate. Like 
Gaines, a general had marched against orders, disrupting Scott’s careful planning and 
compromising his complex stratagems. It was, as Scott wrote to Jesup, “precisely General 
Gaines’s movement” all over again. Signing his letter “in grief,” Scott confessed he
found Jesup’s actions “infinitely strange, … the last thing in the world that was to be 
expected from you.” Jesup wrote back that with women and children suffering, he could 
not help but act and that he had complied with the spirit of Scott’s orders to protect the 
frontier. He stated his intention to attack again the following morning, fearing that should 
he tarry the enemy would escape. Accepting Jesup’s explanation, Scott wrote graciously 
to Jesup, praising his conduct and agreeing to lay aside their disagreement. Before Jesup 
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received this conciliatory letter, however, he dashed off one of his own on the dispute to 
his old neighbor, Francis Blair.
25
Shortly thereafter, Scott received word recalling him to the War Department.
Returning to Washington, he barged into the War Department, hoping to learn the details 
of his removal from command. The chief clerk obligingly handed Scott the relevant files 
where he read Jesup’s fateful letter to Blair. Jesup had begun alarmingly, warning that in 
Georgia, “we have the Florida scenes enacted again.” Enlarging his own contributions, 
Jesup took full and presumptuous credit for pacifying the frontier and warned that had he 
not acted, the white settlements would have erupted in flames. Informing Blair that he 
assumed Scott would imminently order his arrest, Jesup begged him to show the letter to 
the President before it was too late. Jesup cagily played upon Jackson’s dissatisfaction 
with Scott’s caution in the face of frontier warfare. Having lived on the frontier, Jackson 
well-remembered the constant panic that pervaded settlements in the midst of Indian war 
and Jesup’s warning that “Indians were plundering, murdering, and burning, in all 
directions” confirmed Jackson’s suspicions of Scott’s unfitness for frontier war. When he 
turned the letter over, Scott learned it had done its work. On its back, after having 
received it from Blair, Jackson had written that due to “the unaccountable delay in 
prosecuting the Creek war, and the failure of the campaign in Florida,” Scott was to be 
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recalled to Washington and Jesup anointed the commander of both the Creek and Florida 
Wars.
26
Jesup took over the war effort in December 1836. Benjamin Butler, the acting 
secretary of war, welcomed Jesup with thinly disguised contempt for his predecessor, 
Call. Butler’s casual assurance that the new commander had “become fully acquainted 
with the retrograde movements of Governor Call” served as both an instruction and a 
warning. Butler promised new brigades of volunteers from the Deep South and instructed 
Jesup to use them to ensure the total subjugation of the Seminoles. However, the 
reversals of the previous year had tempered the administration’s instructions. Whereas 
Cass had explicitly enjoined against seeking compromise, Butler allowed Jesup to utilize 
“sound discretion” in his dealings with the Seminoles. Butler omitted another of Scott’s 
instructions. Where returning runaway and captured slaves was Scott’s secondary 
objective, Jesup was given no similar order.
27
In part, the relative latitude given to Jesup reflected the differences between the 
two secretaries of war, Cass and Butler. Whereas Cass styled himself something of an 
expert on the frontier, Butler was a scholar of the law, a former partner in Martin Van 
Buren’s law firm, whom Jackson had tapped to replace Roger Taney as Attorney 
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General. With Cass’s plum October 1836 reassignment to the French ambassadorship, 
Jackson appointed Butler to temporarily head the War Department, placing an ally of the 
incoming president in the cabinet to facilitate the changeover.  Butler, despite his history 
with Van Buren, was a heterodox Democrat, deeply pious and heavily involved in reform 
movements. He had gone so far as to recently propose that any potential Indian 
confederacy in the west deserved representation in Congress. Butler, whose identification 
with the Democratic Party derived not from the idealized vision of individualized yeoman 
settlers but from theories of constitutional democracy, differed with Cass over the relative 
importance of subjugation and re-enslavement in Florida.
28
Jesup viewed the war through an altogether different prism from his predecessors. 
In his first letter back to Washington following his assumption of leadership in Florida, 
Jesup included a brief aside to his superiors. This “is a negro, not an Indian war,” wrote 
the general, “and if it be not speedily put down, the South will feel the effects of it on 
their slave population.” Already in Florida, the effects of a cross-racial and cross-cultural 
alliance between Indians and slaves, with the Black Seminoles as a conduit, were evident. 
Jesup informed a local militia leader that one of his former slaves, who had escaped to 
the Seminoles, was currently communicating with slaves in St. Augustine and had even 
procured supplies from a local free African-American. Writ large, the implications of 
such cross-cultural alliances were devastating. Lacking sufficient troops and all too aware 
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that the commissions of many of his volunteers would soon expire, Jesup hoped his 
racialized warnings would accelerate recruitments throughout Florida’s neighboring 
states. If participating in an endless war of attrition failed to attract volunteers, perhaps a 
threat that struck closer to home might.
29
Jesup’s warning had a strategic purpose as well. Jesup likely examined his orders 
and seized upon his discretion with the Black Seminoles. Under no circumstances could 
he satisfy the Seminoles’ key demand to stay in Florida, but he now had permission to 
offer the Black Seminoles what they most coveted, freedom in the eyes of the law. For 
the African-Americans whom the Seminoles had purchased directly from white 
merchants, their safety from chattel slavery was not in the balance. The Treaty of Payne’s 
Landing guaranteed the Seminoles’ right of property during removal, but these Black 
Seminoles did remain slaves of the Seminoles nonetheless. For the dozens of slaves who 
were either captured by the Seminoles, had found sanctuary with them, or were subject to 
disputed claims by Creek Indians and whites, their fate depended on the outcome of the 
war and was, therefore, a bargaining chip. 
Jesup attacked that vulnerability. In separate letters, Jesup reiterated three times 
that the negroes “rule the Indians,” implying that Indians submission could be brought 
about through settlement with their African-American allies. Jesup knew that his strategy 
would have to navigate treacherous waters. On one side, he would need to obviate or 
overcome the inevitable protests of Florida settlers who viewed the reclamation of their 
human property as of equal justification for the war as the removal of the Seminoles. On 
the other, he would have to gain the trust of the Black Seminoles while not disrupting 
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their relationship with the Indians to the point that, should the Black Seminoles ally with 
Jesup, the Seminoles might not listen to their former allies’ counsel.
30
Jesup pursued a two-track strategy. He followed Call’s general plan of erecting 
supply depots throughout the Florida wilderness and launching small parties to hunt 
down Indian bands near the Withlacoochee. At the same time, he released Seminole and 
Black Seminole prisoners back to their leaders with messages that he was willing to 
negotiate. Ideally, his offensives into Indian country would have enough success to lead 
to negotiations with the Black Seminoles and, through them, convince the Indians to 
emigrate to the West.
31
Once in the field, Jesup encountered many of the same problems as his 
predecessors. His 1000 man force relied heavily on volunteers, but their usefulness 
proved limited as several brigades’ commissions were expiring just as Jesup entered the 
field. Other companies insisted that organizers had defrauded them, deceiving them into 
signing year-long contracts when they had intended to stay only six months. Of the troops 
that remained, a great many were consigned to their sickbeds – of the 400 Alabama 
volunteers, 60 were ill or incapacitated and they were joined in their illness by an 
additional 54 Georgia volunteers. The Seminoles, however, were suffering worse. As had 
happened repeatedly in conflicts between whites and Indians in the New World, though 
they fended off initial American attacks, the burdens of a total war soon took a 
tremendous toll on Indian society. Having to migrate from their established settlements 
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and conceal themselves in squalid conditions, the Seminoles suffered from the same 
cycles of violence and deprivation that had beset Indians since the seventeenth century.
32
In late January, Jesup began hearing from prisoners that division wracked the 
Seminole leadership and several chiefs were open to emigration. Jesup traveled south to 
the Ocklawaha River where, venturing alone, Abraham, the most influential Black 
Seminole and personal advisor to the Seminole chief Micanopy, entered Jesup’s camp 
and reported that Ote Emathla and Halpatter Tustenuggee, two of the leading Seminole 
chiefs, wished to meet with him. At their meeting, Ote Emathla disclaimed responsibility 
for the war, blaming Indian bands outside of Seminole control for the violence along the 
frontier. “The Seminoles were desirous of peace,” Ote Emathla assured Jesup, “and 
wished to live on terms of friendship with the white people.”
33
Understanding that Ote Emathla evinced not a willingness to emigrate, but a 
desire to coexist in Florida in peace, Jesup insisted that peace could come only on the 
terms of the Treaty of Payne’s Landing. The Seminoles would be required to leave 
Florida and rejoin the Creeks, from whom they had splintered a century before.  Ensuring 
the Seminoles understood exactly the rigidity of his position, Jesup explained “the United 
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States had purchased the whole country,” and the Seminoles “had no right to any land 
except that which the United States had given them.” Ote Emathla protested, but Jesup 
was resolute and convinced him to gather the rest of the Seminole chiefs for a meeting at 
the end of the month.
34
Jesup may have seemed the very embodiment of American intractability to the 
Indians, but privately he expressed deep concerns over the administration’s policy. Four 
days after meeting with the Seminole chiefs, he sent separate letters to Tallahassee and 
Washington, DC. He sent his Tallahassee letter directly to Governor Call and enclosed a 
simple question: “would the people of your territory be willing to allow [the Seminoles] 
to remain in the country subject to your laws as citizens?” Without waiting for Call’s 
reply, in his first report to the War Department following the initial meeting with Ote 
Emathla, Jesup made the same request to his superiors, informing them that if the United 
States did not require emigration, a peace treaty could easily be reached. Searching for a 
different solution and likely aware that even following Worcester v. Georgia, in which 
the Supreme Court had declared that state law had no jurisdiction over Indian land, 
leading Cherokees nevertheless had been willing to remain in Georgia subject to the 
state’s jurisdiction, Jesup moved to transpose the proposal to Florida. Taking the prior 
history of United States civilizationist Indian policy literally, Jesup asserted that the 
Seminoles would lay down their arms if they could remain in Florida, to the point of 
becoming citizens under the law. Though Jesup offered no details on his plan, he likely 
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envisioned the Seminoles occupying a space in Florida society similar to free African-
Americans, somewhere in the hazy space between enslavement and equality.
35
Jesup received a reply from Call before hearing back from the secretary of war. 
Call assured the general that public opinion as well as his own “would be decidedly 
opposed to any measure short of a full and complete execution of the several treaties.” 
Too much had passed between the two peoples, too much blood spilt to reconcile. 
Undeterred by Floridian opposition and still not having heard from his superiors, Jesup 
sent a second letter to Washington with a more explicit request to moderate American 
policy. If the war recommenced, he warned, success was assured but the cost could be 
catastrophic, as the Seminoles’ desperate offensives would devastate Florida’s already 
unsteady development. Still prioritizing the protection of white settlers on the frontier, 
Jesup nevertheless confronted his superiors’ objectives by setting racial dominance and 
American expansion in direct opposition. His answer arrived several days after Martin 
Van Buren’s inauguration. When he opened the reply, Jesup found only warm wishes and 
gratitude from Butler, whose tenure as acting secretary of war was ending with Van 
Buren’s inauguration. His suggestions were ignored.
36
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 In the meantime, Jesup waited impatiently to meet with the Seminoles until, on 
March 5
th
, several Indian chiefs dutifully entered his camp. The general’s offer was 
simple. In return for the Seminoles’ pledge to emigrate, Jesup would allow them one 
month to prepare, guarantee their private property, offer them a fair price for their ponies 
and cattle, provide them with significant provisions, and, most important, allow for the 
free emigration of all Black Seminoles, regardless of any slaveowner claims upon them. 
For Ote Emathla, who spoke for Micanopy, this was enough and he agreed to send word 
to the dispersed Seminole bands that the war had ended. Anticipating his superiors’ 
concerns with his concessions, Jesup wrote to assure them that though he had “granted 
the Indians the most liberal terms,” his choice was dictated by “policy as well as sound 
economy. To have attempted the extraction of severe terms, might have led to a renewal 
of hostilities.”
37
Following the conclusion of the peace treaty, Jesup turned his eyes toward the last 
party who might prolong the war for their own purposes, unscrupulous whites on the 
frontier. Reports streamed in from army camps that whites were spreading rumors that all 
Indians who surrendered would be executed, not removed. Further, many officers 
steadfastly believed that other Florida whites had cravenly influenced the Seminoles to 
keep fighting even as they urged the government to remain steadfast, a plot to enrich 
merchants who soaked the army with hefty bills. Exacerbating the friction between the 
military and local civilians, townspeople derided the effectiveness of the army while 
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celebrating the aid of the volunteers, a serious slight given the animosity between the two 
groups.
38
Jesup’s primary antagonists among the whites, however, were slaveholders who 
viewed the massing Black Seminoles as their rightful property. Immediately after signing 
the treaty allowing the Black Seminoles free passage, Jesup received a letter from a local 
lawyer representing a large estate, demanding dozens of slaves as well as their children 
who had been born among the Seminoles. The legal request was only the most formal 
entreaty; Jesup personally received at least fifteen letters from slaveholders inquiring 
after their wayward human property. The intrusion of white slavecatchers into Seminole 
camps threatened the careful balance Jesup had struck between the Seminoles and the 
Black Seminoles. He warned slaveholders that their designs would endanger the peace 
process and soon after signing the Seminoles’ capitulation, Jesup issued a general order 
inveighing against “the interference of unprincipled white men with the negro property of 
the Seminole Indians” and forbade any white man not in the service of the United States 
from setting foot in Seminole country. Jesup, a slaveholder himself, admitted that he may 
“sympathize with … [their] afflictions and losses, but, responsible as I am for the peace 
of the country, I cannot … permit that peace to be jeopardized.”
39
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Even as Jesup warned against the encroachments of white settlers, he followed the 
orders of his superiors to re-enslave certain Black Seminoles who were claimed by white 
owners and began to identify them. Though the treaty had stipulated that all of the 
Indians and their “allies” were to be sent west unmolested, Jesup unilaterally decided that 
slaves captured during the conflict were not protected by the treaty, justifying his orders 
on the basis of an oral agreement with Coa Hadjo, a single Seminole chief. As the 
Seminoles came in to army camps, Jesup initiated the long process of identifying 
captured African-Americans, verifying their enslaved status, and setting into motion their 
return to slavery. The rolls which he ordered his troops to record - listing in order their 
name, gender, “tribe, town, or owner,” estimated age, and distinctive features - took on 
the appearance of a plantation owner’s ledger book, as he transformed the army into an 
outlet of Florida’s slave system, judging identities, transferring captives throughout the 
state, and notifying owners of the locations of their slaves.
40
With the war seemingly close to its end, Jesup grew increasingly frustrated with 
the compromises he had made. Trapped between the demands white southerners who 
wanted the army to return slaves upon whom they held claims and knowing that only 
more conciliatory measures could secure the surrender of his enemies, Jesup pursued 
strategies whose tactics conflicted directly. In effect, following the signing of his treaty, 
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Jesup began to disclaim any responsibility for obeying it. In regard to slaves who had 
joined the Seminoles during the war and remained at large, he was consistent, relaying 
word to Osceola that he intended to send out scouting parties searching for any Black 
Seminole rightfully claimed by a white slaveowner and, betraying his mounting 
frustration, that he was “sending to Cuba for bloodhounds to trail them and … to hang 
every one of them who does not come in.”
41
Soon after Jesup received the Seminoles’ capitulation, a group of Florida 
slaveholders sent a petition to Joel Poinsett. The men, all of whom had fled Florida and 
were residing in Charleston, vociferously protested Jesup’s protection of the Black 
Seminoles who had escaped prior to the beginning of the war. So fearful of the Seminole 
threat that they had left the territory altogether, they nevertheless insisted that unless the 
Seminoles restored their stolen property, the United States should forge ahead with the 
war. Rather than predicating their stance on the defense of property, the seven men 
played upon the insecurities that underlay the expansionistic effort. To end the war on 
these terms, they argued, “would be a sacrifice of the national dignity, and an absolute 
and clear triumph on the part of the Indians.”
42
Upon reading the memorial, Jesup tersely dismissed their concerns, mocking them 
for running from Florida at the first sign of trouble and then stating that he could “have 
no agency in converting the army into negro-catchers, particularly for the benefit of those 
who are evidently afraid to undertake the recapture of their property themselves.” Despite 
his evident frustrations with the slaveholders who had attempted to undermine him, Jesup 
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continued to do their bidding, quietly and largely unobserved. To one frustrated 
slaveowner, Jesup admitted that he had intended to imprison many of the slaves who had 
run away prior to the war, only to abandon his plan after prowling slave catchers had 
alarmed his captives. He dutifully sent messengers to inspect dozens of captured slaves in 
search of those claimed by Florida citizens and reported his findings back to the 
aggrieved slaveholders. After receiving a petition from citizens of St. Augustine 
complaining that he had forbade whites from entering Indian territory, Jesup modified his 
order and allowed whites to travel south to the Withlacoochee in search of lost cattle, a 
pretense given that many slaveholders had far more pressing issues to which to attend. 
For some in Florida, even this was not enough. One newspaper in Jacksonville disdained 
Jesup as worse than the abolitionist who “only seeks to dissolve the relationship between 
Master and Slave. Gen. Jesup … prohibits the owner from even making his claim!” With 
varying success, then, Jesup carefully modulated his actions. If he could recapture slaves 
without alarming the Seminoles or scaring off Black Seminoles, he did so. Otherwise, he 
left well-enough alone.
43
Even as Jesup gradually ensnared his black captives, Seminole bands trickled into 
army camps, preparing for removal. By the end of May 1837, almost all of the major 
chiefs had visited the camp and pledged to uphold the Treaty of Payne’s Landing and 
emigrate to Arkansas. On their arrival, their condition was very poor, many of them 
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nearly naked and desperate to trade for clothing. Worse, an outbreak of measles, certainly 
exacerbated by the exigencies of guerilla warfare, had erupted among the Seminoles. 
Nevertheless, with Micanopy, Ote Emathla, and Halpatter Tustenuggee in camp, Jesup 
allowed himself moments of optimism, reporting to his superiors that he expected that 
barring any unforeseen catastrophes, the war would soon be over. From a nearby outpost, 
Lieutenant William Harney reported that all of the Seminoles shared a similar sentiment: 
“We are once more happy. We are no longer afraid to show ourselves to a white man –
we are no longer compelled to run from one swamp to another, but when we see a white 
man now, we walk up to him straight (upright) and shake him by the hand.” Newspapers 
across the country trumpeted the glorious news that the war had, at long last, ended. Yet 
Jesup would not rest easy until the Seminoles boarded the boats assembled in Tampa Bay 
and privately admitted to Harney that he believed the agreement would crumble. On May 
31, he decided against ordering Harney to seize the massed Seminoles to forestall their 
escape, but affirmed that should the Seminoles abscond, “then we shall have no other 
course but to exterminate them.” He would see it through to the end.
44
On the night of June 1
st
, one of the allied Creeks reported a rumor that a large 
band of Seminole warriors planned to invade the camp and force the emigrating 
Seminoles back into the wilderness. Jesup stepped up patrols and attempted to infiltrate 
the Seminole camp. Throughout the afternoon on June 2
nd
, Jesup heard reports that 
unidentified Indians were in the area, but his spies failed to offer any useful information. 
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Jesup slept fretfully and awoke to learn that all of the Seminoles, some 750 of them, had 
left in the night. All of his careful negotiations had been for nothing.
45
Following the breakdown of Jesup’s agreement, both Jesup and the Seminoles 
offered different, though not conflicting, explanations for its collapse. At times, Jesup 
blamed the machinations of whites, thinking the presence of slave catchers had alarmed 
the Black Seminoles who had, in turn, convinced the Seminoles to run. More likely, 
Osceola, who had long argued to Seminole chiefs that the fate of their people and the 
Black Seminoles were intertwined, had learned of Jesup’s decision to imprison African-
Americans not protected by the treaty. Regardless, camp conditions had exacerbated the 
outbreak of measles and many Indians likely feared that their long journey to Arkansas 
would only worsen its effects.
46
Disheartened, Jesup decided to forfeit his command. In a series of letters, he 
attested to his superior, Secretary of War Joel Poinsett, that the war, as the administration 
had conceived it, was unwinnable. Having begun his campaign expecting a hard-fought 
but simple victory, Jesup now reflected that “at no former period of our history had [the 
United States] to contend with so formidable an enemy.” Had his superiors allowed him 
to negotiate with the Seminoles, “to have made a durable peace would have been an easy 
matter,” Jesup contended, “but the scheme of emigration I consider impractical.” He 
cautioned, “To rid this country of them you must exterminate them. Is the government 
prepared for such a measure? Will public opinion sustain it?” It was a measure too 
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extreme for Jesup to contemplate and he requested transfer back to the Quartermaster’s 
Office.
47
As he awaited word of who would replace him in command, Jesup ruminated in 
writing on the nature of warfare with the Seminoles, in the guise of offering advice to his 
successor. Given the Seminoles’ determination to remain in Florida and his superiors’ 
commensurate determination to remove them, Jesup kept returning to a single idea:  if the 
Seminole could not be convinced to leave, for the United States to win, every Seminole 
would have to be killed. He believed the Seminoles would not hold to their word, and 
even if the chiefs intended to do so, they could not restrain militant warriors who 
disdained soldiers as thieves, murderers, and enslavers. “Such a people you may destroy,” 
Jesup reflected, “but cannot readily conquer.” Tragically, Jesup came to understand that 
though the Seminoles wanted to live in Florida in isolation above all, it was on terms that 
the United States would not countenance.
48
At the brink of despair, Jesup received a letter that evidently caused him to 
broadly re-evaluate his assessment of the campaign. Samuel Vinton, who five months 
later would confront Secretary Poinsett in Washington, DC, wrote to one of Jesup’s aides 
and asked him to show the letter to his commander. Vinton seized on Jesup’s insecurities 
and urged him to confront his superiors boldly. To Vinton, the situation was simple. 
Success, if it could be achieved at all, would require millions of dollars and a minimum 
of 40,000 troops, all for a tract of land inhospitable to any white person. Instead, he 
proposed a new treaty that would allow the Seminoles to remain in south Florida. It 
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would not be charity. Referring to the Maroon War in Jamaica as evidence, Vinton 
described a workable truce. The United States should offer the Seminoles land in Florida 
in return for their service as enforcers of the Deep South slave system. Should any 
African-American escape from a Florida plantation, the government would rely on the 
Seminoles, bonded to service by this grant of land, to hunt down and return the fugitives. 
In a masterstroke, Vinton argued that only his plan could secure the approval of Florida 
slaveholders by tasking Seminoles with faithfully restoring “property to the master” and 
keeping the lower peninsula free from “negro banditti.” Moving beyond Florida politics, 
he understood something of the monomaniacal obsession with conquest that had 
consumed Washington as well. Rhetorically asking what would stand in the way of such 
a treaty, Vinton answered he knew all too well: “because the honor of our Government 
requires that we should consummate what we have undertaken – such is the ready answer 
of men who … regard conventional ‘honor’ more than moral right.”
49
The letter influenced Jesup. Just a few days after dispatching messages counseling 
extermination as the only policy with a chance of success, he sent a new letter to Poinsett 
that urged the adoption of a plan identical to Vinton’s in every specific. In a clear 
indication that he drew his inspiration from Vinton, Jesup referred directly to the 
Jamaican Maroon War as evidence for the strategy’s practicality. Although Jesup adopted 
Vinton’s content, he ignored his form. Jesup did not echo Vinton’s evocation of “moral 
right,” nor did he even fully endorse the plan. Rather, he closed by testifying that he 
merely offered these “hints” for his superiors’ consideration, “without pretending to offer 
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an opinion as to the propriety of adopting them.” Despite his declamations, subsequent 
events would prove that these were more than “hints.”
50
The Van Buren administration ignored Jesup’s proposal. Instead, Poinsett replied 
with a broad defense of Indian removal and of the importance of subduing the Seminoles, 
acting as though Jesup merely lacked motivation. Poinsett admitted that the Seminoles 
had proven to be able and courageous foes, but insisted that their bravery did not “alter 
the nature of the war, nor diminish our obligation to subdue them.” Poinsett warned that 
if the United States withdrew, it risked tarnishing the honor of its arms, unknowingly 
failing Vinton’s challenge to prioritize moral right over a vacuous notion of honor. 
Poinsett likely had other concerns as well. Just a month before, New York banks had 
begun to accept payment only in gold and silver coinage, sparking the Panic of 1837. 
With the nation facing a nearly unprecedented financial crisis, the Van Buren 
administration could ill afford a military humiliation as well. Poinsett urged Jesup to 
remain in command and craft a plan of action not dependent on extermination or 
moderation to achieve his goals. Weary of public criticism and still determined to find a 
way to end the war, Jesup took Poinsett’s offer.
51
After he recommitted to command, Jesup formulated a new strategy to defeat the 
Indians. If he could not force the Seminoles to surrender and would not exterminate them, 
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the only avenue left to him was deception. Lacking the troops to undertake long marches 
along the frontier during Florida’s harsh summer, Jesup began intermittent negotiations 
with the Seminoles with the sole object of forestalling their attacks until the coming 
autumn. The Seminoles, who had largely ceased raiding the frontier over the previous 
months, willingly remained south of the Withlacoochee River, content with an 
unacknowledged truce. Jesup responded in kind, implying through messengers that he 
might still revisit the Treaty of Payne’s Landing, even while he secretly plotted out 
another campaign. From his own troops, Jesup kept another secret. He was sending letters 
to Governor Call and to General Leigh Read of the Florida militia, informing them that 
he intended to exterminate the Seminoles and asking whether Florida citizens would 
countenance the importation of bloodhounds for the sole purpose of hunting down the 
Indians. Unaware of so many distant machinations, the Seminoles had largely ceased 
their depredations by October 1837.
52
While Jesup was presenting the Seminoles with a calm façade, he offered 
something else entirely to the Black Seminoles. Enraged over their refusal to submit to 
re-enslavement, Jesup dashed off instructions to his subordinates to summarily hang any 
runaway slaves whom they captured. After careful consideration of his options, however, 
Jesup countermanded his order. Faced with declining morale among his troops, Jesup 
offered the most readily available inducement, plunder in the form of captured slaves. 
Again utilizing Seminole treachery as a justification for his own moral transgressions, 
Jesup wrote to his subordinates that “there is now no obligation to spare the property of 
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the Indians – they have not spared that of the citizens.” To the Creek regiments, Jesup 
made the same promise. Such an order was unprecedented in the annals of American 
warfare. Commanders during the War of 1812 had brooked no such confiscation, nor had 
the commanders of Black Hawk’s War, nor had Scott, Gaines, and Call in Florida. One 
South Carolina newspaper mocked Jesup’s policy, insisting with his methods he intended 
to “produce a squaw-ly and niggar-dly campaign.” Jesup had placed so high a priority on 
recovering the Black Seminoles that he communicated to the Seminoles that all 
negotiations were to be cut off until they surrendered all of the African-Americans in 
their bands.
53
Jesup’s policy toward the Black Seminoles was entirely incoherent. Even as he 
held out the prospect of seizing runaway slaves as plunder to his troops, he continued his 
plans to separate the Black Seminoles from their Indian allies with the promise of 
freedom. And he was having success. As the majority of the Seminoles had expected to 
emigrate in the summer and fall, they had chosen not to plant full crop yields, leading to 
harsh deprivations throughout the summer. For some Black Seminoles, the prospect of 
freedom with the Americans, however tenuous, was more promising than starving in the 
Florida wilderness. There were other inducements as well. After Abraham, the most 
influential of the Black Seminoles, arrived in American camp, Jesup reported to his 
superiors that he trusted his new captive to cooperate not because he was faithful, but 
because the general had made the decision easy for him. If he proved genuine, Jesup had 
guaranteed him the freedom of his family. If he dissembled, Jesup had sworn to hang 
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him. Other threats need not be so overt. When one Black Seminole named John arrived at 
an American camp with his wife, he pledged his service to guarantee her freedom. His 
loyalty secured, John led American troops to Philip, the most powerful Indian chief 
captured by that point of the war. Once individual Black Seminoles aided the United 
States, there was no going back. Through sources Jesup learned, and made sure to inform 
Abraham as well, that Seminole chiefs had assigned no fewer than twenty warriors the 
task of finding and killing the Black Seminole leader.
54
For Jesup, himself at the crossroads, there was no going back as well. In October 
1837, with Seminole violence nearly abated, Jesup faced the same choice he had set out 
for himself months earlier: urge his superiors to moderate the objectives of the war or set 
aside moral boundaries and persist to the war’s bitter conclusion. True to his nature, 
Jesup did both. In a new letter, Jesup made a more forceful case for moderation than ever 
before. He laid out Vinton’s original plan to utilize Seminole warriors as auxiliaries to 
police southern plantations, assuring his superiors there could be no better safeguard for 
the nation’s security in the event of a British invasion from the West Indies. Yet, at the 
last moment, Jesup faltered again. Flirting with outright opposition to his superiors’ firm 
insistence on absolute removal, he instead took his pen and crossed out the offending 
passage, a giant X marking an entire page. Whether he truly thought better of taking such 
a bold stance - if he had second thoughts, surely he would have merely written another 
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letter - the effect was consistent with Jesup’s prior policy. The X dissociated him from his 
own advice, but was not nearly enough to prevent Poinsett from comprehending it. 
Whatever Jesup’s intention, Poinsett made no mention of his proposal.
55
Where Jesup pursued peace through half-measures, he cast off moral restraint 
whole-heartedly. By not launching a significant invasion, Jesup had effectively imposed 
peace upon the Florida frontier, but when he broke that peace, he assured that his 
reputation would be forever tarnished. Months before, Jesup had personally handed yards 
of white cloth to selected Indian prisoners, promising that should they approach 
American troops unarmed and flying their makeshift flags, they would be treated as 
noncombatants. Now, Jesup realized that the white flag might serve to invite Seminoles 
to a trap rather than a parley. He thought his intended victim an example of poetic justice 
- as Osceola had instigated the Second Seminole War through an ambush upon Indian 
Agent Wiley Thompson, Jesup planned to return the favor. More than justice was at 
stake. In subsequent letters, Jesup would admit that immediately following the 
Seminoles’ escape from his camp in June 1837, he had “resolved to take all who were 
concerned in the measure, whenever the opportunity might present.” His personal enmity 
for Osceola, especially, burned bright.
56
On October 27, 1837, Osceola and some of his fellow warriors met with one of 
Jesup’s officers. Before springing the trap, Jesup’s representative entered into a 
discussion with Osceola, who professed, in the words of the American officers, to have 
                                                          
55
 The letter was addressed to Poinsett, included in Jesup’s correspondence, sealed, and opened – by 
every indication, Poinsett received that specific copy. Jesup to Poinsett, October 17, 1837, Jesup Papers, 
Letters Sent. The letter was included in a published set of Congressional documents however the compiler 
respected Jesup’s edit and chose not to reprint the marked out passage. Poinsett to Jesup, October 13, 
1837, House Document 78, 25th Congress, 2nd Session, 187.
56
 “Statement by Major-General Jesup,” Daily Intelligencer, October 13, 1858.
140
“done nothing all summer, and wanted to make peace.” Having already rejected 
emigration months earlier, the Seminoles clearly expected that Jesup intended to offer a 
compromise that would allow them “liberty to walk about,” as Osceola put it. In response 
to their request, as Jesup had instructed, the American officer interrogated the Seminoles 
on their black allies. Were they ready to surrender them? Why had they not done so? 
Where were they? The Seminoles replied that the runaway slaves had scattered in the 
aftermath of the early spring negotiations, but they were now willing to deliver them in 
the name of peace. Following a series of further questions on the disposition of other 
Seminole leaders, Americans raised their guns and took Osceola and his fellow 
Seminoles into custody, violating the implicit promise of the white flag.
57
In the months that followed, the controversy over Osceola’s capture reverberated 
throughout the country. Renowned for his prowess in battle and celebrated for his 
success, Osceola inspired emotions approaching empathy from many thousands of 
Americans. For Jesup, the capture of Osceola was borne of a profound frustration with 
his failure to win the war on the battlefield. Attempting to redeem numerous minor 
military defeats, Jesup instead succumbed to a profound moral bankruptcy in the face of 
what must have appeared constant humiliation. For his conduct, Jesup faced withering 
criticism: even in 1858 he was still writing letters to newspaper editors, vigorously 
defending his actions. There was, however, something farcical in the debate over Jesup’s 
capture of Osceola, one act of deception among hundreds. Very few raised any outcry 
when Jesup offered captured slaves as plunder and fewer still cared when Jesup 
threatened Black Seminoles with death to assure their allegiance. Yet, Osceola 
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transcended the war in ways that others did not. Americans regretted Osceola’s capture 
not merely due to its treachery, but because Osceola himself appeared, somehow, 
American. Following Osceola’s death in February 1838, the Charleston Mercury
published a widely reprinted obituary. Its conclusion was bracing: Osceola was a self-
made man, a common Indian who had grown into a great warrior due only to his own 
talents – “From a vagabond child, he became the master spirit of a long and desperate 
war. He made himself; no man owed less to accident.” In celebrating Osceola, Americans 
celebrated themselves, their capacity for reinvention, and their strength of character in an 
indifferent world.
58
In July 1837, as the controversy over Osceola’s capture raged, John Sherburne, an 
emissary of Poinsett, approached Cherokee leader John Ross. Ross was in Washington 
resisting Indian removal through the political system, having forsworn violent resistance. 
From the perspective of Poinsett and Sherburne, Ross seemed the perfect mediator to end 
the Second Seminole War. Sherburne believed that Ross, a chief who had accepted the 
overwhelming superiority of American military power, might be able to succeed in re-
empowering Seminole factions sympathetic to emigration. For his part, Ross truly 
believed that the Seminoles best interests lay in peace. Located in the heart of the Deep 
South, the Cherokees had gained, through bitter experience, a far better understanding of 
American power than had the Seminoles, isolated in their Florida fastnesses. They were 
first-hand witnesses to removal and understood the all-consuming expansionist desire 
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which underlay American policy. The Seminoles were not ignorant. They had met 
Andrew Jackson on the battlefield two decades before and had maneuvered in the 
diminishing space among the Spanish, the English, and the Americans. Moreover, their 
allies, the Black Seminoles, certainly knew something of the nature of American 
domination. Nevertheless, they had never experienced the full weight of the American 
war machine. Ross hoped that his emissaries could explain something of that.
59
Jesup was less than thrilled to learn that his superiors had sent a delegation of 
Indians to influence the course of his campaign. Though Poinsett repeatedly advised that 
if he expected negotiations to delay his campaign he should send the Cherokees away, 
Jesup grudgingly accepted their help. According to the Cherokees, however, Jesup 
dismissed talks with the Seminoles as useless since “nothing but powder and ball could
effect any thing” with them. His anger over the events of the previous June still fresh in 
his mind, he grew even more hostile to the emissaries after reading their intended 
message to the Seminoles.
In his message, Ross spoke to the Seminoles of a third option besides removal and 
conflict. He reached back to the presidency of George Washington and reminded the 
Seminoles that the United States had always promised to “hold fast to the faith of treaties, 
which, by mutual consent, had been solemnly pledged between our nation and the United 
States.” As Jesup knew, this phrasing had ominous implications – the Seminoles did not 
consider the Treaty of Payne’s Landing to have been reached by mutual consent. Further, 
Ross informed the Seminoles, he had met with Joel Poinsett who, admitting too much, 
had informed Ross that the United States wanted peace but “could not take any steps in 
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your affair which may be interpreted into an act of weakness.” To act where their 
enemies would not, Ross urged the Seminoles to lay down their arms and surrender so 
that a treaty of peace could be negotiated between the two peoples. He offered no advice 
as to the content of the treaty, but implied that Poinsett had promised to compensate the 
Seminoles for any injuries dealt them by unscrupulous whites. To Jesup’s dismay, Ross 
said nothing of removal.
60
The Cherokee deputation convinced Micanopy and about a dozen sub-chiefs to 
meet with Jesup later in the week. Returning to Jesup, the Cherokees learned why he had 
accepted their aid. Described as “cold, and almost repulsive,” Jesup expressed no 
approbation for their service. Instead he probed them for information on the enemy about 
their location, numbers, and condition. When he finally asked the Cherokees of their 
opinion of the Seminoles’ disposition, they replied with the obvious answer - the 
Seminole were interested enough to meet with Jesup in person. With the offer of peace in 
one hand, Jesup violently explained his own lack of interest in the same. “The Georgia, 
Alabama, and Tennessee volunteers were on their way to join him,” Jesup thundered, 
“and it would be impossible to hold them back, and that his force was very great.”
61
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Upon meeting with Micanopy, Jesup made his position clear. The Seminoles 
would have to abide by their own agreement and emigrate immediately. In a move which 
the Cherokees believed “calculated to degrade” the Seminoles, Jesup demanded they 
bring in their families and surrender their arms before any negotiation could continue, 
terms the Seminoles could not accept. Immediately, Jesup acted, ordering his men to 
seize Micanopy, his band, and the rest of the Indians who had entered the fort under a 
white flag. Outraged, the Cherokees protested to Jesup, both due to moral revulsion and a 
fear that the Seminoles, who might one day be their neighbors in the west, would think 
them complicit. Ignoring their threats, Jesup declared that he would hold the Seminoles in 
captivity and, if any of the remaining warriors in the field spilled a single drop of white 
blood, he would hang the lot of them. He reported the deception to Poinsett in a single, 
dry sentence. In some quarters, Jesup’s actions were predictable enough that a Georgia 
newspaper had urged him to capture the Seminoles two days before he did so.
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 Throughout the fall of 1837, Jesup planned his final assault upon the Seminoles. 
Convinced by Poinsett that outright extermination was not viable, Jesup settled upon 
overwhelming force instead. The bulk of his troops, some 9000 men, he sent into the 
southern half of Florida. After years of service, many officers were weary of battle, 
wondering how many men had to be sacrificed to, as one officer put it, “the outrages and 
scandalous policy pursued by our government to the Seminoles.” Following Scott’s 
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template, Jesup planned to divide his men into seven columns, each of whom had orders 
to find and engage the Seminoles wherever they may be hiding.
63
On December 19, Jesup gave Colonel Zachary Taylor, newly arrived in Florida, 
permission to launch a campaign in search of the enemy. Leading over a thousand men, 
Taylor moved deep into southern Florida toward Lake Okeechobee. There, for the first 
time since the early months of the war, some 400 Seminoles offered a direct 
confrontation. They had chosen a location with decisive tactical advantages. Encamped in 
a densely tangled hammock with swamps in front of them and Lake Okeechobee behind, 
they believed their position impregnable. That day, waves of American troops struck at 
the Seminoles and faced heavy fire. After a series of withering exchanges, the Seminoles 
withdrew. The Americans had suffered the bulk of the casualties, 26 killed and 112 
wounded. For several days, Taylor’s troops took on the melancholy task of burying the 
dead, rounding up the wounded, treating them, and transporting them back to camp. 
Gaines, Scott, and Jesup had all bragged that the United States had never lost a single 
engagement with the Seminoles. Following Okeechobee, that could no longer be said.
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“Disastrous News from Florida,” read the headline of the Daily National 
Intelligencer. Though reporting that the Americans had “cut up” the Indians, news that 
the United States had suffered well over a hundred casualties stunned observers. Across 
the nation, newspapers reprinted the article with the same headline. Writers nearly 
unanimously agreed that the United States had suffered a significant setback. Though 
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Taylor and his officers conjectured that the Seminoles had suffered similar losses and 
disguised them by carrying off their dead, they had little proof aside from some scattered 
bloodstains. The tactical defeat was minor, 130 men gone from an army essentially 
limitless, but the defeat was more than physical. For years, army officers had held out the 
prospect of a European-style engagement as a talismanic guarantee of success. Yet 
having achieved it, their offensive had been decisively repulsed. As one writer admitted 
grimly, “It really seems as though Oceola’s words are to be made true, as to a five years 
war.” Another reporter joked that Taylor and his men had suffered through “Christmas 
and New Year a la Seminole.”
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Over the next month, Jesup’s forces and the Seminoles fought a series of 
inconclusive battles in which each side suffered minor casualties. “Enough,” said a series 
of Jesup’s officers. Tasked with marching through an impassable wilderness to secure 
land that appeared valueless, a succession of Jesup’s most trusted subordinates 
approached him and urged him to allow the Seminoles possession of a district in southern 
Florida, far south from any point in which any white would, or could, live. They reported 
to Jesup that “most, if not all” of the officers in the army agreed in their assessment. The 
logic of conquest had led them through the swamps of Florida for no purpose beyond the 
dictates of leaders who defined American honor strictly through a racialized spectrum of 
domination, consolidation, and force. Jesup, having taken their mission as his own, was 
now the one best positioned to moderate it. As one officer asserted, surrender may entail 
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“giving up the point, but better to do that, than prosecute as we have done, a war, to say 
the least, of doubtful policy and more doubtful justice.”
66
Most likely, Jesup would have ignored the entreaties of his subordinates, as 
Poinsett had pointedly ignored his two prior attempts to temper American policy, but in 
the aftermath of the Battle of Okeechobee, Jesup received a letter from Colonel John 
Sherburne in Washington, the officer who had organized the Cherokee deputation. His 
report was explosive. According to Sherburne, after Taylor’s loss at Okeechobee, there 
nearly was enough momentum in Congress to authorize Jesup to make peace and allow 
the Seminoles to remain. However, the Florida Territorial delegate, Charles Downing, 
being, in Sherburne’s words, “supported by certain nameless characters, high in office,
who are very fearful of your success,” quashed the proposal. Sherburne claimed he had 
directly lobbied Poinsett to end the war on Jesup’s terms. In response, Poinsett had 
maintained that he and Jackson had come too far to deviate. Nevertheless, Sherburne’s 
news motivated Jesup to make a last, desperate attempt for peace.
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On the morning of February 7, 1838, Jesup received a Seminole messenger and 
arranged a meeting with the hostile chiefs that evening. There, Halleck-Hajo, speaking 
for the Seminoles, expressed a desire for peace, provided they could remain in Florida. 
They would, he said, accept any territory, however small. Jesup then went back to his tent 
                                                          
66
 R Archer to Reverend D Goodwin, January 6, 1839, James David Glunt Collection, Special and Area 
Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida; Keiffer, 
Maligned General 202-204.
67
 H. Sherburne to Jesup, January 22, 1838, Jesup Papers, Letters Received from Officers. On the 
questionable merits of Sherburne’s assessment of the political situation, see chapter 4.
148
and penned a letter to Washington. One month later, after having received no answer, he 
wrote a second.
68
Taken together, Jesup’s letters provided a remarkable dissenting voice on the 
efforts to impose American rule on Florida. Jesup understood the intertwining of 
conquest and subjugation, in some ways better than anyone. Over the past months he had 
threatened, deceived, extorted, and brutalized. He had unleashed the full force of the 
American war machine. And, upon careful reflection, he rejected the logic that he had so 
zealously made manifest.
In Jesup’s first letter, he began by reiterating the argument he had made to no 
avail the previous year: removing Indians who were not hemmed in by white settlers was 
both pointless and inordinately difficult. Although he wholeheartedly supported the 
policy of Indian removal, he believed that Florida was not yet a mature enough society to 
carry it out. Where in the past, he had couched his opposition to the war as mere musings 
or blotted out his arguments with a large X, this time he went further, directly questioning 
whether “the object we are contending for would be worth the cost?” Proposing to weigh 
the monetary demands of the war against its object, Jesup concluded it would be far 
better to allow the Seminoles refuge in southern Florida, guarded by a military 
detachment and served by an American trading outpost. 
In Jesup’s second letter, he utilized the same discourse as his superiors to take 
direct aim at the pointlessness of the American effort: “It has been said that the national 
honor forbids any compromise with them … a band of naked savages, now beaten, 
broken, dispirited, and dispersed. I think those who believe so form a very low opinion of 
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national honor.” He characterized the war itself as a “reckless waste of blood and 
treasure” and asserted that if the United States allowed the Seminoles a few years on a 
miserable tract of land, they would soon request emigration themselves. All it would take 
would be for the War Department to not identify success solely with an unyielding drive 
to subjugate the Seminoles.
69
Poinsett responded to Jesup before receiving his second letter. He disclaimed all 
responsibility for setting Indian policy. The Van Buren administration was bound, he 
wrote, by the fair and lawful Treaty of Payne’s Landing as well as by legislation passed 
by both houses of Congress and signed by Andrew Jackson. The President, therefore, had 
a constitutional duty to fulfill the terms of both the law and the treaty and it was Jesup’s 
duty to carry out his orders. The matter was settled; indeed, according to Poinsett, it had 
been settled seven years ago with the passing of the Indian Removal Act. After receiving 
the letter, Jesup regretfully wrote to Zachary Taylor in a letter marked confidential, 
lamenting that we “have a war on our hands for the next ten years.
70
The Florida that Thomas Jesup envisioned, in which Seminoles and whites would 
live together as neighbors, was unworkable in reality. Though the Seminoles often 
evinced a willingness to remain in the southern tip of the territory, white Florida public 
opinion against the measure was uniform and violent. Slaveholding settlers would never 
feel secure in their property if their slaves had the opportunity to flee south and find 
sanctuary with the Seminoles. They would not have ceased lobbying the territorial and 
federal government. If Jesup had succeeded in extending the territorial government’s 
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jurisdiction over Indian territory as a compromise measure, the results of his armistice 
were easy to envision, whether Jesup realized it or not. State legislatures had made their 
intentions clear during the late 1820s: Indian government would be dissolved, their chiefs 
deprived of their authority. Individual Indians would be trapped by debt and thrown in 
prison. Whites would produce claims for the Seminoles’ slaves and forcibly reincorporate 
them into the slave society of the Deep South. The Seminoles’ victory would be short 
lived and pyrrhic. Yet, for all the impossibilities of his proposals, Jesup envisioned a 
future in which Indians, secure in their autonomy, could coexist alongside a strong 
American state. The impracticality of an idea does not invalidate its moral worth.
Unfortunately for Jesup, though his advice would go unheeded by the 
administration, his dissent would not go unnoticed. Francis Blair, Jesup’s putative friend 
and neighbor, opened the floodgates. Inverting all logic, Blair publicly accused the 
general of allowing the Seminoles to “conquer a peaceable possession of the land they 
had ceded,” obliterating the distinction between conquest and compromise. As the 
Seminoles would still offer a haven to runaway slaves and a foothold for a foreign 
invasion, he argued Jesup’s request was “inadmissible.” Other Democratic editors 
followed with combustible language: “This yielding of the palm of victory to the savages, 
this dastardly project to tarnish the fair fame of American arms.” “Shall we … 
acknowledge ourselves vanquished by a pitiful tribe of Indians?” “The war is to be ended 
– by the triumph of the Seminoles.” “MORAL TREASON.” Victory had become a moral 
imperative. The means by which it might be achieved were irrelevant. Any outcome 
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which offered all of the same benefits as victory was surrender. Only complete removal 
could suffice.
71
It was not a surprise, then, that one month later in early April, Poinsett ordered 
Jesup to return to Washington to resume his command of the Quartermaster’s Office. 
After settling his affairs, Jesup turned over the campaign to Brigadier General Zachary 
Taylor, who had earned promotion after the Battle of Okeechobee. Looking back over his 
campaign, Jesup contented himself with the knowledge that he had captured 2400 
Seminoles and African-Americans. As his final acts as commander, Jesup wrote out two 
statements, one guaranteeing freedom to Abraham should he prove faithful and a second 
cementing the emancipation of another Black Seminole who had aided his troops.
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When Jesup turned his command over to Zachary Taylor, he wrote him a personal 
letter describing the situation on the frontier, and closed with a wish: “hoping you may 
before the close of the season wind up this perplexing and harassing war to our own 
satisfaction, and wishing you health, fortune, and prosperity.” Jesup may have meant the 
final phrase, the entreaty to end this war “to our own satisfaction,” as a stock conclusion, 
a platitude over which he never lingered. Still, nothing could have better summarized his 
own hazy relationship to a command for which he hungered, but whose objectives he 
never embraced. For Jesup, ending the war on any terms would have satisfied him. 
Bloodhounds or peace treaties, extermination or emancipation - either path might have 
sufficed. If Jesup’s nearly pathological embrace of amorality irrevocably estranged him 
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from reformers who opposed the war as a defense of minority rights, it offered him a 
dispassionate vantage point from which to appreciate the distorted priorities of his 
superiors and their Democratic allies. To them, to remove Indians was to foster progress 
and equality, a goal so vital to the nation that compromise appeared equivalent to 
dishonor. It was a logical leap Jesup would not make. It was a paradoxical and tragic 
aspect of Jesup’s personality: the same impulses that led him to seize Osceola and 
blacken his name compelled him to put pen to paper and deride the war as a “reckless 
waste.” Regardless of the result, his critique of the expansionistic ethos of his superiors, 
no matter how hypocritical or tentative, was the most perceptive and public denunciation 
of American frontier policy between the passage of the Indian Removal Act and the 
annexation of Texas. An ineffectual and inconsistent voice of protest, Thomas Jesup 
protested nonetheless.
73
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Chapter 3
“You Will Gird on Your Swords”: Volunteers, Nationalism, and Violence
 during the Second Seminole War
The friction between Major Mark Anthony Cooper and General Winfield Scott 
came to a head in March 1836. A week earlier, Scott had promised Cooper that his 
battalion of Georgia volunteers would play an important role in the coming campaign 
against the Seminoles. However, when the day came, Scott left orders for Cooper and his 
men to remain behind as a reserve unit. Furious, Cooper marched after the general’s 
mounted retinue, reached him several days later, and demanded that his superior officer 
include him in his plans. Scott acquiesced, but only after taking notice of the battalion’s 
rations, five wagons filled with the finest Georgia bacon. Knowing that the coming 
campaign would stretch his army’s stocks to the limit, Scott ordered Cooper to hand over 
the bacon so it could be distributed to the rest of the troops. Not an unusual request from 
a commanding officer, but Cooper, whose later political career would distinguish him as 
a fervent believer in states-rights, refused to obey it. Scott demanded Cooper come to his 
tent. According to his own account, expecting to be arrested, Cooper coolly pulled aside 
two trusted officers and swore to them, “We will hold onto the bacon, come what may. 
You will gird on your swords and follow me … Do as I order and strike when I strike.” 
At their meeting, contrary to Cooper’s threatening words, the two men did come to 
something of an accord. Of the five wagons of bacon, Cooper and his volunteers would 
take three. The remaining two would feed the rest of the army. Cooper promptly returned 
to his battalion, ordered all of the bacon crammed into his three wagons, burned the 
empty two wagons earmarked for the rest of the soldiers, and marched to the front. Less 
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than three years after this, the second bacon’s rebellion, Georgia voters elected Cooper to 
the House of Representatives.
1
Mark Anthony Cooper, alongside thousands of Southern men who rushed to 
Florida, fervently believed in the Indian-hating ethos that they thought underlay the 
Second Seminole War. They came to Florida determined to “chastise” the Seminoles and 
eradicate the last bastions of nonwhite autonomy in the southeast, in the process 
incorporating Indian land into the plantation system of the Deep South. They had no 
interest in assimilation, even as it had been redefined by Jackson. Unlike settlers 
throughout the rest of the Deep South, they fought largely for abstract principles of white 
supremacy, masculine independence, and self-actualization rather than the personal 
acquisition of land. They crafted a chivalric narrative around themselves as knights in the 
service of their nation, sent to defend wailing widows and crying orphans against a 
savage threat. Their enemies were subhuman, bestial, the scourge of domestic tranquility. 
In subjugating their foes, if all went according to plan, they would pacify Florida, enrich 
themselves, and earn the laurels of a nation. Their conception of their identity and that of 
Jackson’s imagined nation coincided utterly. By forcing the Seminoles to submit to their 
country’s terms through the application of martial violence, they would realize their full 
potential as young masculine men. Simultaneously, their nation would prove itself a 
vigorous force on the world stage by actively repressing the last vestiges of its savage 
past. The thousands of volunteers in the Second Seminole War made manifest their 
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visions of manhood through cultural processes by which they linked their capacity for 
violence to the self-realization of both their nation and themselves.
2
The volunteers connected this process of violent self-realization, on some level, to 
the example of the Seminoles themselves. Though they were not consciously aware of the 
irony, the volunteers envied what they overtly disdained as the unconscionable savagery 
of their enemy. The Seminoles killed, raped, and pillaged; through Indian war, they had 
the chance to do so as well. Unbridled Indian killing, patterned after what they viewed as 
unprovoked massacres of whites, gave them the opportunity to legitimize themselves as 
autonomous young men in the service of their country. They fought not to remove the 
Seminoles, but to displace them.
3
The priorities of the volunteers necessarily lay in tension with the policies of their 
government. For all of the iniquities of federal Indian policy, few leading politicians ever 
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countenanced outright slaughter. Indian killing writ large would never be the nation’s 
official policy, every president from Washington until Nixon gestured toward 
assimilation as an ideal that might one day be reached. Yet Jackson recognized that the 
unrestrained brutality of the volunteers represented a fount of power that could be 
harnessed in the nation’s interest, even if their goals were not explicitly adopted. And, 
although extinction was outside the bounds of political discourse, subjugation was not.
When the volunteers failed, when their contracts ended and the war still raged –
when they lost – they rationalized away their ineffectiveness through the discourses with 
which they were so familiar. They mythologized their service and found others to blame 
for the inconsequence of their experience. They no longer spoke of the defenseless 
women and children who they had once held to be the true beneficiaries of their mission. 
National security no longer hung on the force of their arms. When all available evidence 
pointed to their failure, they instead found success within - their own dignity, their own 
reputation, and their own bravery. Failure lay without, in the federal government that 
restrained their violent energy, bound them within ossified military regimens, and 
prioritized not Indian subjugation, not Indian killing.
For the volunteers and the likeminded, this trapped them within a dilemma 
seemingly without a solution. They were nationalists distrustful of their government and 
ardent expansionists who were opposed to the intervention of the federal army, yet utterly 
dependent on its resources and logistical might. Their only answer lay in agitating for 
their government to give them free rein in expansive warfare, offer them logistical 
support on the nation’s frontiers, and then refrain from imposing any ideology of its own 
on foreign policy. In their unique position lay the roots of Southern Manifest Destiny and 
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the enduring myth that any limit, be it moral or legal, on individual experience was a 
restraint on their freedom. Consequently, beginning in the 1830s, popular southern 
arguments for aggressive expansion evolved separately from those of northern agitants, 
and paradoxically led to seemingly congruent arguments for national expansion with 
diametrically opposed visions of the nation’s future. Andrew Jackson and his ideological 
allies believed they had unleashed likeminded partisans into the field, but subjugation and 
annihilation were not identical impulses and the mythmaking of the volunteers could not 
be controlled.
The Volunteer Persuasion
The volunteers who flocked to Florida cared deeply about the outcome of the 
Second Seminole War. Their struggle against the Seminole Indians was more than a mere 
campaign to police the frontier. Rather, while they hunted the Seminoles through the 
Florida wilderness, they tested the racial and gender assumptions that undergirded their 
own identities. They believed the progress of the war was inextricably linked to their own 
demonstrations of masculinity and, when the war effort faltered, required them to explain 
away their defeats in language that nonetheless vindicated their own martial spirit. In the 
independent masculinity of the volunteers, Andrew Jackson and other leading Democrats 
identified their own vision of the ideal nation, but the patriotism of the volunteers was 
exceedingly circumscribed. Having identified the war effort with their own success, the 
volunteers were far more concerned with the personal, not the national, ramifications of 
the Second Seminole War.
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During the first weeks of the war, news of the Dade ambush spread from town to 
town throughout the South. Invariably following soon behind, published in newspapers 
and posted in public spaces, were calls for volunteers to march to Florida and aid those 
plagued by irredeemably savage forces. 
Authored by prominent citizens, the notices 
urged their neighbors to leave their farms and 
join militia groups en route to Florida. They 
were of a piece, conjoining nationalism to the 
defense of white supremacy in, as one article 
put it, the “patriotic duty of arresting the 
tomahawk, and the scalping knife, in their work of death and destruction,” for the benefit 
of “the helpless females and starving orphans, now houseless, wandering and 
unprotected.” Many calls, like the one shown here, made specific references to the 
defense of “our brethren,” explicitly invoking volunteer service in the name of racial 
solidarity. And volunteers answered, 23,530 of them within the first year of the war. With 
the exception of 67 from Washington, DC, all hailed from the Deep South and its 
immediate neighbors: South Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Tennessee. 
Aside from South Carolina in the wake of the nullification crisis, these states were the 
most loyally Democratic in the nation. The volunteers identified with and idolized 
Andrew Jackson, another man who had volunteered to march in the service of his country 
against the nation’s foes on the frontiers. In most states, prominent local citizens sent out 
calls for volunteers, governors authorized bounties to attract recruits, renowned Indian 
fighters took the command, ambitious sons of the gentry served as officers, and nonelite 
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Southerners made up the bulk of the forces. The volunteer groups rarely attracted men in 
charge of their households, the responsibility of tending to farms and providing for a 
family precluding a six month commitment. Once they arrived in Florida, the militia 
groups would serve alongside, though not intermingled with, army brigades and under the 
direct command of officers in the army.
4
The calls invariably emphasized the Seminoles’ assault on the domestic. 
References to the helpless women and children of Florida motivated thousands of 
volunteers, their selfless defense of the defenseless providing evidence of their own 
martial manhood. As one Georgia newspaper described it, though the duty they had 
chosen to undertake was arduous, they were men “animated by the feelings of 
Americans, who cannot stand and look on to see their countrymen and countrywomen, 
robbed, ravished, and murdered.” Commenting on the proposed mission, one New 
Orleans newspaper urged its readers to “remember our own countrymen invoke us – the 
flames of their dwellings rise to the heavens.” Presses reprinted massacre narratives from 
Florida, all implicitly asking the same questions that one stated explicitly: “Who can hear 
the bare recital of such a deed, and not feel horror stricken at the cold-blooded barbarity? 
Who can hear and not feel a thirst to revenge such outrage?”
5
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If the calls for volunteers crafted a mythology of disinterestedness and chivalry 
around the militia, the volunteers were all too happy to contribute as well. In books and 
articles detailing their motivation to volunteer, most men, naturally, emphasized their 
own bravery, chivalry, and selflessness. At every point they distinguished themselves 
from their enfeebled peers in the army. As one Tennessee writer explained, “they were 
volunteers, from among the first classes of our citizens; men vastly superior to the 
despicable and degrading impulses, which induce the mere mercenary rabble to enlist in 
the ranks of regular armies.” Their differences lay not in the fact of their service, but in 
their motivations for undertaking it. “We stood up manfully for our own rights,” one 
Charleston volunteer wrote, “we desired to assume the loveliest attitude of power, when 
it is seen to stoop to the weak and unprotected.” Numerous editorials across the South 
lauded the volunteers as heroes for risking their lives in aid of the defenseless. One young 
girl in Charleston wrote in her diary that she thanked God a volunteer group had turned 
her brother away, but still stole away to the Citadel and watched in awe of the young men 
drilling in preparation for their Florida expedition. From the pulpit, ministers mediated 
the necessity of bloodshed with the tenets of Christianity and praised the volunteers for 
placing country above their own lives, conjoining patriotism with Christian brotherhood. 
As the volunteers embarked, young ladies showered them with laurels, poets dedicated 
works to their honor, and families beamed with pride as they watched their sons depart.
6
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Faced with an overt assault against a space they considered sacred, the Southern 
volunteers viewed the Seminoles starkly, as absolute evil. To them, the Indians appeared 
agents of malevolence, corroding all they touched with no purpose save destruction. In 
recounting his first glimpse of the enemy, one South Carolina volunteer launched into 
telling hyperbole: “here were the red devils at last,” he wrote, “in legitimate red skins, 
body and bones.” Given the atmosphere surrounding the war, the reference to “red 
devils” was commonplace, as was the second clause, which reduced the Seminoles to 
collections of body parts and organs, stripping them of their soul. The war confirmed 
what the volunteers were certain they knew from history. Living in the southeast, they 
had come of age in the aftermath of the War of 1812 and were well aware of the 
devastation British-allied Indians had wreaked. They defined themselves as civilized, 
white, and Christian, all the better to differentiate themselves from the savage heathens of 
the wilderness. The Second Seminole War offered them a confrontation with the most 
iniquitous of their Indian neighbors. In the aftermath of the Dade ambush, it seemed as if 
the contrast between races had never been so stark, the triumph of white supremacy never 
so urgent.
7
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As they set off for Florida, the volunteers identified their commitment to white 
supremacy and forceful expansionism with the national interest. For them, there was no 
distinction between the two. Their passage to Florida was a responsibility, one they had 
inherited from their fathers at birth. The volunteers of New Orleans made the point 
explicitly, identifying with Jackson’s victory at the Battle of New Orleans. The 
recruitment committee announced “the spirit which pervaded New Orleans on the 23
rd
December, 1814 was awakened in this community … to meet, disperse and conquer the 
motley hordes of Seminoles and Negroes that are now spreading havoc, massacre and 
fire.” Senator Thomas Hart Benton praised the volunteers, asserting “courage was their 
birthright and inheritance.” This pride was national; Governor Richard Keith Call 
appealed to his fellow Floridians by reminding them that they were the “descendants of 
the war-worn patriots of ’76,” and that volunteering was their duty as much as their 
honor.
8
The size of the conflict may have appeared small, but its stakes were not. Not 
merely a defense against an Indian threat, this, as the New Orleans committee in charge 
of recruiting put it, was “the fiery trial of patriotism.” Invoking the recent Nullification 
Crisis, in Charleston, the corresponding committee modulated its message to attract 
states-rights South Carolinians, cautioning that “confusion seems to prevail both in the 
war and financial Departments of the Government at Washington” while much of Florida 
burned. Most distressingly of all, the committee warned “the negroes, in considerable 
numbers, are leagued with the Seminoles and to the horrors of an Indian war, will 
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probably be added those of a servile conflict.” According to one writer, the solution was 
simple: “these savage tribes in Florida must now be exterminated.”
9
In their service, the volunteers amalgamated wildly contradictory ideas to 
rationalize their mission. Though they penetrated wildernesses seldom seen by white 
eyes, they explicitly viewed Florida as their own land under assault by an alien force. It 
was this act of invasion, what one South Carolina writer described, in an unintentional 
echo of Andrew Jackson’s harangue against white intermediaries who had advised the 
Seminoles in 1821, as the Seminoles’ deliberate transgression by which they “invaded 
regions which they never pretended to posses,” that required defense. It was as though the 
Treaty of Payne’s Landing had rewritten reality itself – if the Seminoles had agreed to 
emigrate, their presence in Florida represented a violation of the natural order. According 
to Florida governor Richard Keith Call, in detailing his decision to raise the Florida 
militia, “the invasion of the country, and the murder of our citizens at their own threshold 
… while engaged in cultivating their fields,” necessarily demanded the strictest of 
responses, implicitly contrasting the ordered tranquility of white, Floridian domesticity 
with Indian anarchy. A Floridian, attempting to organize a volunteer group to defend his 
community wrote a breathless letter to his brother, explaining the dystopian reality that 
had set itself on Florida: “all of east and a large portion of Middle Florida is laid waste –
plantations abandoned – the women and children in black houses.” All of the women and 
children in black houses, a apocalyptic vision at once evoking both the empty frames of 
homes that Indians had burned to the ground and, perhaps, a world in which African-
Americans seized control of the frontier – were, to him, the epitome of the Seminole 
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threat.
  
One Tennessee volunteer, who left for the front just five days after the birth of his 
daughter, recalled in his memoirs, that though he was “endowed with an eminently 
amiable and domestic disposition,” he surrendered at once “the tenderest ties of family 
and home.” To honor those ties, to protect the Florida children who themselves faced 
violence and death, he chose to serve. In their own ways, the volunteers convinced 
themselves of their lofty purpose.
10
That noble dream legitimized war to the knife. In conceptualizing Florida as 
suffering the invasion of an alien race rather than the organized resistance of an Indian 
nation rooted in the territory, the volunteers transformed their mission from one of 
defense into one of eradication. In normalizing the condition of Florida into one that 
reflected the homogenous plantation-centered economy and culture of its neighbors, the 
volunteers disdained the rhetoric of assimilation and civilization. Florida would be as 
white as their own homes. 
The volunteers might have thought of the Seminoles as subhuman, but the Indians 
enraged and confounded them by unabashedly refusing to accept their subordinate 
position. The volunteers’ society had taught them clearly: Indians were as children to 
them, to be guided, shepherded, and overseen. Osceola’s stunning murder of Wiley 
Thompson broke that implicit contract. As if reciting a litany, several volunteer accounts 
referenced Ransom Clarke’s oft-reprinted narrative of the Dade ambush, the Seminoles’ 
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striking demonstration of autonomy, agency, and dominion, in their own letters and 
diaries. The Seminoles’ brazen act of violence against their enemies was, to them, as 
much a statement of principle as a military act. To the volunteers who marched against 
expressions of Indian sovereignty, it was another reason for the war’s urgency.
11
 In basing their service on the defense of white supremacy, the volunteers wholly 
associated their rationale for service with its moral underpinnings. As debates over Indian 
removal had shifted from Congress and the courts to everyday struggles between settlers 
and Indians over land, property, and legitimate authority, Southerners increasingly 
asserted justifications for violence against Indians in the name of civilization. They 
learned, as one observer of the Black Hawk War put it, of “the border feeling, which 
permits the destruction of an Indian upon the same principle that it does the wolf.” 
Andrew Jackson and other Democratic officials had used that incipient violence as a 
cudgel against Indians before, utilizing the rage of local settlers to cast Indian removal as 
a means of protection for the embattled Indians. In Florida, Jackson had the opportunity 
to utilize that fury more directly. This disparate compound of elements linking violence 
to white supremacy impelled the volunteers to Florida, offered them a basis for their 
actions, and justified the risk of their lives.
12
In their violation of the Southern domestic space and their violent affirmation of 
nonwhite autonomy, the Seminoles struck at the very core of many of the volunteers’
sense of identity. In response, the volunteers struck back, with all the savagery they could 
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muster. One veteran of the Florida volunteers recalled one afternoon in which he and his 
friends had discovered a lone Indian woman walking into a nearby white town. The men 
opened fire, killing her instantly, and, in the words of the volunteer, approached her body 
and “mutilated her shamefully.” In another instance, when one South Carolina brigade 
killed its first Indian, several volunteers seized the body, scalped it, stretched it naked 
onto a pole, and marched it into camp for all to see. Many gathered around to gaze at 
their fallen enemy, his body grisly proof of the force of their arms. One volunteer, though 
alienated by the proceedings, hesitantly gazed up at the body and saw it as an oblation, a 
reference to an offering from God often signifying the body and blood of Christ. Though 
obscure, it was a fitting reference. The volunteers had sacrificed their victim in the name 
of what to them was sacred, transforming their fallen enemy into an offering that 
reasserted what they viewed as the natural order of the frontier. They spoke in the 
language of the very violence they abhorred.
13
On the march, volunteers blithely committed acts of unrestrained barbarity. They 
likely freely scalped their enemies and executed helpless prisoners with offhanded 
disdain. During the first months of the war, long before Thomas Jesup set off a national 
firestorm by capturing Osceola under a white flag, Georgia volunteers recounted casually 
ignoring white flags and ambushing unsuspecting Indians. Of course, the men were not 
uniformly amoral. One volunteer admitted years later to often thinking of a captured 
squaw who, he remembered, “was mounted on a horse and compelled to lead the enemy 
of her people along the by-paths to their paces retreat for the purposes of having them 
slaughtered.” Putting himself in her place, he admitted to sympathizing with her having 
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to endure the terrible ordeal of being forced to betray her own people. But for most, the 
experience was like that of the Louisiana volunteers who, as one observer described 
them, “rushed in like so many wolves, disregarding every obstacle, and pursued the 
enemy to the banks of the river, following them by the blood which had flowed in 
streams.”
14
For many of the volunteers, war and slavery could not be disentangled. When the 
Missouri volunteers set off for Florida several years after the start of the war, they 
expected the government would allow them to keep any runway slaves that they might 
capture. Closer to home, one Florida woman suspected that volunteers went “entirely to 
speculate, in land, negroes, and horses and for all the property owned by the tribe.” 
Moreover, even if the volunteers did not personally carve a homestead out of Seminole 
land, the absorption of Florida and, with it, the expansion of slave markets, necessarily 
benefited them, however indirectly.
15
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The presence of the Black Seminoles sparked further anger and violence in 
defense of their region and culture, the presence of autonomous African-Americans 
directly linking Indian removal to slavery. One South Carolina volunteer, a planter, 
philosopher, and poet, rigidly opposed the nation’s removal policy. In his mind, to offer 
civilization to a savage with one hand while taking away their attachment to their 
homeland - domesticity being the most civilizing impulse of all - was counterproductive 
to the point of inanity. However, he believed that the Black Seminoles, who in battle 
were, in his words, “outvying their savage masters in hellish cruelty,” posed a special 
threat to American society, at least for the inveterate defender of slavery. With Nat 
Turner’s rebellion only a few years in the past, Southerners were well aware of the 
horrors of slave rebellion. The only extant, and therefore widely circulated, account of the 
Dade ambush made special note of the excessive cruelty of the Seminoles’ black allies, 
recounting how they personally went from wounded man to wounded man, looting the 
dead and executing those who clung to life. The apparent blood thirst of the Black 
Seminoles upset the volunteers’ conception of the natural order of society, even as it 
seemed to confirm the righteousness of white supremacy. While marching through 
Florida country, one South Carolina volunteer insisted that slaves had, “with but few, 
very few exceptions, rejected the overtures [of the Seminoles] and preferred the condition 
in which fate had placed them,” replicating the accepted trope of slaves who loved their 
masters and ignoring the several hundred slaves who ran away at the start of the war and 
made the opposite, far riskier, decision. Those who did consider the implications of the 
Seminole and Black Seminole alliance found they reinforced the necessity of the South’s 
169
slave system: freed from white coercion, African-Americans were liable to strike at the 
very people who had pledged themselves bound to both enslave and foster them.
16
They well understood the vulnerabilities of slave societies: fear of slave rebellion 
and racial conflagration had animated them since birth. For many of the volunteers, then, 
the primary purpose of their mission was to subjugate the masses of Indians before the 
Seminoles and their allies could liberate Florida’s slave population. Weeks after the Dade 
ambush, the first volunteers to reach Florida, a detachment of Charleston volunteers, 
marched not to the frontier, but to St. Augustine where anxious planters had transplanted 
hundreds of slaves, hoping to isolate them from the frontier contagion. They served to 
reinforce the city’s police force and forestall a possible slave uprising, not to repel an 
unlikely Indian assault on the fortified city. The experience of the plantation had taught 
them well of the need for intimidation to quell nonwhite agitation.
17
The slaveowning culture of the volunteers had practical implications for their 
service in Florida. Used to associating manual labor with slave work, many volunteers 
simply refused to undertake the drudgery that comprised the bulk of modern, organized 
warfare. The effect was not lost on many. General Thomas Jesup complained that though 
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he respected their fighting ability, “the Southern militia do not labor for themselves, and 
consequently cannot or will not labor for the public.” Another officer reported that 
volunteers consistently refused any request that they assist in fortifying, digging, or 
supplying as each explained he “did not come to work, but to fight.” As the volunteers 
seethed at the slow pace of the war, tension between army officers and their volunteers 
grew, hindering the war effort further.
18
The rivalry between the volunteers and regular soldiers was no narrow dispute 
lacking wider national import. During the flush times of the early 1830s, the nation had 
enjoyed its first sizable national surplus and arguments coursed through Congress over 
how to best utilize it. Several prominent politicians pointed toward the increasing tension 
with Britain and France and suggested that the government augment its army to guard 
against future attacks from European powers. Many in the South demurred. They echoed 
the Founding Fathers in their distrust of a standing army and instead suggested that the 
nation could rely on citizen soldiers in case of an emergency.
19
The volunteers, many of them ardent believers in states-rights, well understood 
themselves as points of evidence in the argument over the size of the federal army. 
Should the volunteers have triumphed, the Second Seminole War could have well have 
been seen as having proven the value of an armed citizen force. Where the militias could 
hardly match the army in terms of numbers, their supporters theorized they would exceed 
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their rivals in fighting spirit. It was not merely self-aggrandizement, they believed their 
service had deeper meaning: “experience teaches that large standing armies are fatal 
enemies to all Republics,” one volunteer wrote, “in all such governments the people must 
be the bulwark and palladium of their defense.”   Victory in Florida would weaken 
arguments for a standing army and therefore the power of the federal government, of 
whose fidelity to slavery the South always questioned. In fact, several writers in South 
Carolina bitterly recalled that prior to the Second Seminole War the last time the federal 
government threatened to mobilize it was aimed not at an enemy of the state, but at 
Nullifiers. The defeat of the Southern volunteers would not just leave them vulnerable to 
hostile Indians; worse, it would weaken their ideological position against the 
overwhelming might of the federal system.
20
Ideological tensions were ingrained into the relationship between the officers and 
the volunteers subordinate to them. While the volunteers rushed to Florida in service of 
their country, officers were deserting it at a record rate. Though the rate of resignation 
among the officer corps would skyrocket in 1837 after most of the volunteers had 
finished their terms, their apathy was apparent well earlier. Ever the most fervent 
supporters of the war, volunteers bristled at having to take orders from officers who 
appeared indifferent, if not hostile, to their avowed mission. It was a curious fact of life 
around army camps throughout Florida: army officers, men who had lost close colleagues 
and longtime friends, seldom vowed to revenge the Dade ambush. Instead, the volunteers, 
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who in December 1835 were safely ensconced on farmsteads hundreds of miles from the 
Withlacoochee, enthusiastically adopted the mantle of being the avengers of the fallen.
To the volunteers, the officers appeared scared. “We ought to have followed and 
destroyed them … but strange to tell our leader has detained us here,” wrote one 
Tennessee volunteer after a minor victory, his tone suggesting he could not comprehend 
the actions of his superior officer. Contrary to the officers they believed to be cowardly, 
in their letters, journals, and memoirs, the volunteers themselves never admitted to 
fearing death. A supreme confidence in their own fighting abilities along with an 
equivalent underestimation of the dangers of the Florida frontiers shielded them from 
confronting the risks they would eventually face. In his diary, one Tennessee volunteer 
recorded the details of one day’s action. The events were mundane: they had startled a 
small handful of Indians out a dense tangle of wilderness and fired upon them without 
facing any real danger from their foes. The volunteers outnumbered their foes at least ten-
to-one, but he insisted, “this whole affair was honorable to the men not on account of the 
number of Indians killed but the bold manner in which they charged.” The Second 
Seminole War offered ample opportunity to display one’s bravery, the extent of their 
courage not being determined by the risk of death, but by how one stood.
21
As a group, the volunteers were keenly aware of the mythology surrounding their 
service. They readily shaped the narrative of their adventures, contrasting themselves 
with the military professionals whom they scorned. In each state’s militia, many of the 
                                                          
21
 William Trousdale to Mary Trousdale, October 9, 1836, William Trousdale Papers, Tennessee Historical 
Society, Nashville, Tennessee. September 30, 1836, Josephus Conn Guild Diary, Tennessee State Library 
and Archives. Dickson Bruce argued that Southern martial spirit was largely a rhetorical illusion and that 
Southerners were hesitant to join future wars and usually advocated peace over violence in the national 
realm. However, during the Second Seminole War, numerous citizen committees reported turning away 
dozens, if not hundreds of volunteers. Dickson Bruce, Violence and Culture in the Antebellum South
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 165-180.
173
officers had political ambitions, believing, rightly, they would return home to the acclaim 
of their peers. In South Carolina, masses of avowed Nullifiers volunteered and argued, 
implicitly and explicitly, that their sacrifice proved their loyalty to their nation, if not to 
prevailing interpretations of the Constitution. The volunteers’ own accounts invariably 
stressed their gentility and disinterestedness, in the most admirable sense of the word. No 
less than three South Carolina volunteers wrote of their time in Florida and each 
described their group as well-bred, urbane, and worldly. One writer asserted that his 
fellows consisted entirely of chemists, philosophers, politicians, moralists, and 
philosophers, detailing endless nights in Florida spent arguing over philosophical 
questions on the nature of coercion and freedom under the Constitution of the United 
States.
22
In truth, the volunteers were not the idealistic lot they claimed to be. One recent 
emigrant to Florida who volunteered for service multiple times wrote to his sister, “You 
say that I am trying to get a name … I am and I will get it and I will get a grave – no. I 
came here to make money and to get fame.” He was dead within six months.  In 
Tennessee, the volunteers believed they had signed on to police the Creek frontier and, 
fearful of Florida’s harsh climate, rebelled against their officers at the news that they 
were headed to Florida. Only by manipulating their insecurities and reminding them that 
to desert would bring dishonor did the officers succeed in motivating their men to persist. 
In Louisiana, partisan politics stood in the way of the war effort as the state’s Whig 
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governor cast about in search of a reliable Whig to place in charge of an overwhelmingly 
Democratic state militia. Local politics influenced each brigade deeply. Amongst the 
South Carolinian militia, members debated whether Nullifiers or Jackson loyalists 
comprised the majority of the volunteers, while two feuding Tennessee officers 
confronted each other during the first weeks of the war months before they would 
compete for election to the House of Representatives. Serving in Florida allowed many 
young men to make powerful friends and pledge their allegiance to powerful patrons. 
David Campbell, the governor of Virginia, wrote often to his nephew William Bowen 
Campbell, a future governor of Tennessee, urging him to seek out powerful generals, earn 
the trust of his men, and cultivate a reputation for integrity, to aid his future political 
career. Florida, however, was not the place to safeguard one’s reputation.
23
Impartial observers tended to puncture their idealized image. Alabama 
newspapers trumpeted the refinement of their men, but reports from citizens in St. 
Augustine derided them as uncouth and only barely more civilized than the Seminoles. 
One army officer reported to his superior that the Alabama volunteers, after being 
momentarily questioned by one St. Augustine guard, seized his sentry box and threw it 
into the river, waited, and when the guard emerged, pelted him with mud. After a single 
look at the South Carolina volunteers, one soldier dismissed them as a group of weak and 
contemptible boys, most between the ages of 14 and 17. In a moment of honesty, one 
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South Carolina volunteer allowed that his fellows were not entirely patriotic heroes and 
instead were “mostly adventurers willing to fight Indians.” He went on to admit that the 
men who volunteered did “put a little money in their pockets,” but judged that given their 
military acumen, they were worth it. In fact, the volunteers tended to go out of their way 
to deny any mercenary motives, but bystanders often had suspicions. Alabama 
newspapers advertised volunteer service by prominently displaying the $50 salary, a 
decent amount for a month’s work, especially in winter months for farmers whose 
livelihood depended on the seasons. It was, for all concerned, a fortuitous convergence of 
material and idealistic interests.
24
As the volunteers stake in the war was much personal as national, they seldom 
identified with the war’s wider implications - that the United States had unleashed them 
in pursuit of the Seminoles was sufficient. Success was personal, not collective. Jackson 
Morton, an early leader of the Florida militia, refused federal requests to re-assemble his 
command and explained, “I have no wish to enter a field where no laurels are to be 
gotten, honor or glory to be won, which is not to be done in Florida hunting Indians.” The 
aforementioned Tennessee volunteers, who signed contracts assuming they would join 
the Second Creek War, threatened mutiny at the news that they were headed to Florida, 
preferring easier service closer to home. One volunteer described his fellows as being 
irate after hearing the news and writing in his journal that “the men became excited 
against their officers and cussed them and everything connected with it saying that they 
were not legally bound to go to Florida.” The obsession with legality and compulsion was 
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more akin to the concerns of an enlisted man than to the idealized image of a volunteer in 
the service of this country. The reality of the war - the months of searching for an enemy 
in vain, disease, and death – only exacerbated their dissociation from the war’s avowed 
aims.
25
Both Jackson and the volunteers themselves viewed their service as an extension 
of a basic mythology integral to their conception of the nation. Like their forefathers, the 
volunteers would happily risk their lives to advance the tide of civilization against the 
Seminoles, who represented their continent’s atavistic past. This image of dispassionate 
soldiery served them well. It reinforced their standing as individualized, masculine 
citizens dedicated to the future of their communities. That vision crumbled in Florida. 
They believed that their race and gender, as they understood them, would lead to victory, 
but instead their upbringing often hampered their success. Contrary to the example of 
Jackson’s own career, the systematic war against Indian autonomy could not be won by 
individualized citizens in the service of their country. It would take all of the resources of 
the state.
The Volunteers’ War against the Army
Following their service, when the volunteers came to grips with the reality of the 
Second Seminole War, they searched for reasons to explain their defeat. They had 
expected, as one senator had argued, that their presence would simply “overawe” the 
                                                          
25
 Jackson Morton to Leo Morton, July 19, 1836, Papers of the Related Morton and Dickinson Families of 
Orange and Carolina Counties, Va., 1727-1978, Accession #9755--9755-b, Special Collections, University of 
Virginia Library, Charlottesville, VA; John Preston Watts Brown Journal; John Erwin [alternatively Irwin in 
some accounts], Account of the Tennessee Volunteers in the Florida War [unpublished memoir], 
Tennessee State Archives, 4; William Campbell to David Campbell, December 4, 1836, Campbell Family 
Papers, Duke Special Collections; New York Spectator, August 8, 1836; Publicola, New Orleans 
Commercial-Bulletin, January 13, 1836.
177
Indians, their force of arms being so evident that the Seminoles would retreat rather than 
face them in battle. Once the Seminoles established that they could defeat American 
forces, launch widespread attacks on the Florida frontier, and frustrate the designs of 
three generals, volunteer enthusiasm for service dropped precipitously.  Consequently, 
the volunteers projected a curious stance: the more the country needed their help, the less 
interested they became in helping.
26
This left them with a quandary. Failure may have humbled the officers and 
generals of the regular army, but members of the army were professionals. They had 
signed a contract to serve their country to the best of their ability and had fulfilled their 
obligation on those terms. Though they had failed to win the war quickly and decisively, 
they characterized their failure as a tactical one of supply lines, cartography, and climate. 
When the army failed, it was a national problem with pragmatic solutions - the United 
States would either have to pour more resources into Florida or devise new strategies and 
tactics until they finally won. When the volunteers failed, it was necessarily personal. 
Their mythology of heroic sacrifice foreclosed rational evaluations of the difficulty of 
winning a guerilla war against a well-supplied enemy. If, as they had argued at the outset, 
bravery and sacrifice alone won wars, then a lack of resources could not explain their 
failure.
 In place of crediting the Seminoles with resisting their attacks, the volunteers 
settled on a nearly unanimous theory: military officers had held the volunteers in check, 
restraining their martial spirit and preventing them from engaging, and thereby defeating, 
the Seminoles. Their explanation had a basis in reality. Commanding officers tended not 
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to march as rapidly as the volunteers believed possible. When one volunteer complained 
in his diary, “Oh! It does sicken my very soul to have to remain inactive and feed upon 
my own thoughts,” one can easily imagine the vast amounts of logistical planning taking 
place while he glowered. Accustomed to a society in which public officials seldom 
regulated the use of violence, the volunteers often bristled at officers who enforced, what 
seemed to the Southern volunteers, unnecessary and ritualistic military discipline.
27
The errors of the army appeared omnipresent. It was army quartermasters who 
failed to fully stock expeditions. It was army tacticians who marched in circles and failed 
to confront the main body of the Seminole force. It was army officers who at times 
seemed to sympathize with the Seminoles’ plight rather than recognize their savagery. 
The volunteers returned home with their faith in their martial spirit and superiority over 
the Seminoles undiminished. In their struggles against an army ossified by rules and 
regulations, however, they believed they had had no defense. 
No conflict better exemplified the clash between the Southern volunteers and the 
regular army than that between Leigh Read and Winfield Scott. A budding public figure 
at the forefront of a Southern culture predicated on domination and violence, Read had 
already participated in several duels as a young man, both as primary and second. He 
married well and gradually earned the respect of his peers as an able leader and a wise 
businessman. When he learned of the Dade ambush, he immediately contacted his friend, 
Governor Richard Keith Call, and took the command of a volunteer battalion. There he 
reported directly to Winfield Scott, a man who stood for everything Read detested. 
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Where Read wanted to act, Scott tarried. Where Read tore at his bit, Scott carefully 
waited for his moment.
28
After several weeks of waiting, Scott ordered Read and his men to scout the 
Withlacoochee River, the Seminoles’ stronghold during the first months of the war. 
There, Scott intended for Read to measure the depth of the river to judge its feasibility as 
a supply line. At the Withlacoochee, however, Read found evidence that Indians had 
overrun a nearby fort and were setting siege to a detachment of soldiers up the river. At 
that point, Scott and Read’s accounts diverge. Read contended that Scott sent orders 
expressly forbidding him from deviating from his mission, forcing the subordinate officer 
to obediently return to camp. Read feared he had consigned dozens to death. One of 
Scott’s supporters contradicted Read’s claims in the press, insisting Scott allowed Read 
leeway to calculate the risks himself, and implying that Read’s own cowardice had left 
the men to their fate. Whatever the case, and whether he had authorization or not, Read 
soon returned to the Withlacoochee, reinforced with 98 men to relieve the fort.  They 
ascended the river in boats, rescued the men, and returned unobserved by the Seminoles 
in the area.
29
To the Florida populace, Read returned a hero for acting where Scott had faltered. 
Immediately upon his return, Leon County officials held a public dinner in honor of the 
men who, in their words, “stepped forward like Americans in defence of their rights, and 
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voluntarily immured themselves for the protection of our defenceless frontier.” Though 
some questioned whether volunteers who snuck past the enemy were  deserving of such 
lofty praise, Read’s supporters insisted to the contrary that “the enemy seems to have 
been astonished, and paralised by the audacity of the attempt,” transforming the Seminole 
failure to detect Read’s men into further evidence of his courage. Those rescued from the 
fort publicly thanked Read and heaped scorn upon Scott, who they believed had doomed 
them to a grisly fate. Over the next several years, Read enjoyed the cheers and toasts of 
his fellows in Florida: “A true defender of the democratic principles in Florida, and the 
lion of the South.” “The time is not so distant when Florida will call him to represent her 
in the Councils of Nation.”  “As every American says of the Father of his country, so 
should every Floridian say of him, ‘first in war, first in peace, first in the hearts of his 
countrymen.” The paeans to Read conflated his martial manhood with political judgment, 
as Read had proven able to kill Indians, he likewise would prove an able governor, 
perhaps even president.
30
Read himself distilled his adventure into a political message: Florida could no 
longer rely on the federal government to solve its problems. Surveying the situation on 
the embattled frontier, Read insisted that a thousand hardened Floridians could actively 
patrol the interior and postulated new war aims, transforming Indian killing into military 
strategy: “their towns must be burnt down, their provisions destroyed, their growing 
crops cut down, and lastly, their women and children must be sought and captured.” He 
hoped to adopt the tactics of slash-and-burn Seminole raids against the Indians 
themselves. He wanted the United States to demolish the very foundations of Seminole 
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autonomy, even in the domestic space. If his countrymen waited for federal support, he 
warned they may as well wait for a Seminole invasion, because the latter was far more 
likely to arrive than the former. If Florida failed to muster the necessary men, Read 
instead hoped they could recruit frontiersmen from the West, where, free from the 
influence of a corrupt federal government and full of verve to fight Indians, men might 
retain the necessary hardihood for savage warfare. Scott, he argued, was a dinosaur in the 
new era of conquest who tried to remain relevant by insulting either Read’s “own honor 
as a gentleman or his reputation as an officer.”
31
Read’s two-pronged approach to the crisis resonated with many concerned 
bystanders in the South. They identified with Read and believed him to be fighting for 
home and family – for him, defeat meant fire, rapine, and death. Scott seemed to treat the 
conflict dispassionately, willing to wait out the Seminoles, rather than sacrifice men and 
supplies in a risky attempt to drive them from the wilderness. To Read, such decisions 
smacked of cowardice: frontier war was not a matter of resources and supply lines. It was 
no time for attrition. 
Throughout Florida, volunteer companies bristled under the command of regular 
officers. Among the first militia groups to reach Florida was a brigade of 750 men from 
Alabama under the command of Colonel William Chisholm in March 1836. Their timing 
was fortuitous, as Winfield Scott had already formulated his complex strategy of sending 
three separate wings into the wilderness and converging on the Withlacoochee River with 
the hope of forcing a confrontation with the Seminoles. The Alabama volunteers were a 
necessary component of his strategy. They would comprise the majority of the strength of 
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the center wing, which would number only 1250 men. Marching north from Fort Brooke, 
they fought a series of small battles, erected a blockhouse closer to the Withlacoochee 
River, Fort Alabama, and returned to Fort Brooke following the failure of the three wings 
to converge at the appointed time and place. They marched for only fourteen days, but 
they were a tumultuous fourteen days.
32
The Alabama volunteers detested their commanding officer, Colonel William 
Lindsay. Their relationship began poorly. Upon setting out into the wilderness, Lindsay 
issued his men only four rounds of ammunition. The volunteers, ostensibly fearing they 
would be defenseless in the event of an ambush and, more pressingly, feeling 
disrespected, verged on mutiny. With tempers still running high several days later, an 
army officer stationed with the Alabama volunteers, Major Richard Sands, struck one of 
the volunteers with a small cane following a heated argument. Once word spread, a large 
group of volunteers went searching for Sands. The major locked himself away in a 
fortified building, but volunteers threatened to storm it until Sands desperately ordered 
cannons aimed through every porthole. Only the arrival of Colonel Lindsay momentarily 
calmed the situation, but even he could not enforce military discipline. In the aftermath of 
the skirmish, when one volunteer spoke impudently to Lindsay, the colonel placed the 
volunteer under arrest. Refusing to submit, the volunteer insisted he would only surrender 
if Lindsay could subdue him physically. After Lindsay backed off, the volunteer declared 
that rather than being aghast at his insubordination, “the crowd were greatly excited and 
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all applauded my conduct.” The men prized cocksure individualism far more than they 
mourned the breakdown of military discipline.
33
Over the coming days, Lindsay further alienated the volunteers by refusing them 
alcohol of any kind, even prohibiting a dying man from taking a last glass of wine on his 
death bed. This, wrote one Louisiana volunteer, was “carrying his ideas of temperance a 
little too far.” Days later, retroactively providing the justification for Lindsay’s initial 
stringency with ammunition, a group of volunteers haphazardly let lose a volley of fire 
upon a herd of passing deer and accidently wounded a volunteer in the crossfire. Looking 
for the guilty party, the mob seized an allied Indian as the culprit (he almost certainly had 
not fired a shot) and threatened to throw him in irons. Only the passionate defense of 
Lindsay kept the man out of the stocks, and the commander left the scene crying out “that 
it was a mob” arrayed against him. It was said that over the remaining week of the 
campaign, he surrounded himself with trusted men - de facto bodyguards - so greatly did 
he fear the volunteers’ ire.
34
Though intemperate, Lindsay’s characterization of his troops as a mob was not 
inaccurate. Always obstinate and often mutinous, the volunteers displayed no interest in 
military discipline throughout their service. When the last company of Alabama 
volunteers arrived in Florida a year later, they stunned Florida citizens with their base and 
uncouth behavior. Upon arriving outside St. Augustine, according to one denizen, the 
                                                          
33
 Lindsay’s relationship with the Alabama volunteers was not helped by the presence of Leigh Read. 
Commanding a battalion of 250 Florida volunteers, Read served under Lindsay alongside the Alabama 
volunteers and, like them, detested his superior officer. Within weeks, he refused to communicate with 
Lindsay altogether. Mahon, History of the Second Seminole War 153.
34
 Alexander B Meek, "The Journal of A. B. Meek and the Second Seminole War, 1836," ed., John K. 
Mahon, Florida Historical Quarterly, 38.4 (April 1960), 309, 312-313; Phillip E. Koerper and David T. 
Childress, "The Alabama Volunteers in the Second Seminole War, 1836," Alabama Review 37.1 (Jan 1984), 
3-12; John Clisby to Friend, February, 1884, Montgomery True Blues Collection, LPR54, Alabama Dept. of 
Archives and History; James Barr, A Correct and Authentic Narrative of the Indian War in Florida (New 
York: J Narine, 1836), 5-6.
184
men “committed almost every crime except murder … paraded in our streets, grossly 
insulted our females, and were otherwise extremely riotous in their conduct.” They 
treated their military service as a holiday, a means of burnishing one’s masculine 
credentials and experiencing the thrill of action on the frontier. For many volunteers, 
then, heroism was independent of advancing the war effort. When one of the Alabamians 
mistook some Florida volunteers for Indians, he proceeded to sound the alarm and let 
bullets fly at his friends. Rather than chastise him for his error, in the words of an 
observer, “everyone applauded [his] conduct. He did not leave his post when he fired, but 
reloaded and stood like a man.” Better poor judgment than weak nerves.
35
The Tennessee volunteers arrived in September 1836, to serve General Richard 
Keith Call’s ill-fated expedition. The campaign was disastrous, hamstrung by Call’s 
decision to prioritize rapid movement over securing his supply lines. The Tennessee 
volunteers comprised the bulk of Call’s force and they, along with the rest of the brigade, 
suffered through nearly ten days without rations following logistical miscommunications 
and were repulsed multiple times at the Withlacoochee. All agreed it was a miserable 
experience.
The Tennessee volunteers themselves were not blameless for the disasters that 
beset them. Before the arrival of the volunteers, Call had failed to gather adequate 
supplies during the summer months, but was forced to march by the impatient volunteers. 
Already reluctant to make the journey to Florida, the volunteers had grown further 
disenchanted with the Florida Territory. Arriving in Tallahassee, in the words of one 
volunteer, “big with expectation of being met by the Governor and staff and hailed with 
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exclamations of joy by a crowded populace,” they entered the city to empty streets, 
feeling “disappointment on penetrating the town and finding ourselves unnoticed!” As 
Call was both their commanding officer and the governor ostensibly responsible for 
receiving the volunteers in style, he began his command having already alienated a 
significant portion of his force. With the volunteers in such a state of unrest, Call likely 
decided that he had no choice but to march at the earliest opportunity before their 
frustrations could fester.
36
By the time they embarked, one of the men was already recording in his journal 
that Call “has treated the Tennessee Volunteers in an outrageous manner,” and their 
morale sank further at finding no rations at the expected posts. Though only four days by 
steamboat from the markets of New Orleans, the men were stranded with minimal rations 
for both them and their horses. Within a week, their packs contained only rotten beef, 
green in color, which one volunteer disdained as “unwholesome and pernicious to life.” 
Without feed, the horses wasted away to near-death. Disease swept through the ranks. 
The hyper-masculine culture of the brigade worsened the effects of sickness. One 
volunteer remembered how his diseased friend, a major, should have remained behind in 
the fort and rested, but bowed to pressure and marched the next day. He did not survive 
the following night. As early as the fourth day of their march, one volunteer predicted in 
his journal, “should we suffer much, the low but universal murmurs which now run 
through the whole crowd, will increase into a wave that will overwhelm [Call]. So he had 
better be on the lookout.” All of the pent-up aggression in the company demanded 
release, and Call was the closest target at hand. Another volunteer contrasted the 
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beginning of their journey, when the men spoke of Florida in reverent tones with their 
mindset after several days when they talked “of nothing but going home. Mutiny, burning 
in effigy, etc. etc.” They even began to lose faith in their own commander from 
Tennessee, General Robert Armstrong, for his steadfast loyalty to Call. 
Belatedly engaging the enemy failed to salve their fury. Engagements were 
alternatively inconclusive, illusory, and unproductive. Nevertheless, in the midst of their 
drudgery, they retained their romantic view of themselves. One volunteer, without a hint 
of irony, wrote of a charge against the enemy in which “we came down with all the 
fierceness of northern hoards. Baggage of every description was thrown heedlessly aside 
the only aim appeared to be for a fight. Much to my pride and gratification I this day 
commanded the brave Highland boys and I never in my life felt so completely certain of 
success.” His bombast described a descent onto a deserted Indian camp.
37
The relationship between Call and the volunteers deteriorated further as the 
campaign dragged on. According to one volunteer, during a later engagement Call 
appeared in the grips of insanity, ordering a cannon trained on a hammock where his 
troops still engaged in combat. After a volunteer informed him not all men had come out, 
Call paused and, according to the volunteer, ordered his men to fire. Only the timely 
appearance of some trusted lieutenants convinced him to stand down.  Another volunteer 
asserted that on another occasion, Call chose to keep three hundred volunteers out of an 
engagement to provide himself with personal protection in the event of an attack on his 
body, risking the lives of his men engaged in battle. And more discontent bubbled 
                                                          
37
 October 1, 1836, John Preston Watts Brown Journal, Tennessee State Archives; Henry Hollingsworth, 
“The Tennessee Volunteers in the Seminole Campaign of 1836: The Diary of Henry Hollingsworth,” edited 
by Stanley Horn, Tennessee Historical Quarterly 1.2 (Dec., 1943), 351, 359, 2.1 (Feb., 1944), 16; Erwin, 
Account of the Tennessee Volunteers 13, 17; September 28, 1836, Josephus Conn Guild Diary, Tennessee 
State Library and Archives.
187
underneath the surface. One volunteer, knowing his brigades’ horses would soon die of 
starvation, drew up a resolution urging his comrades to mutiny if Call forced the 
volunteers to march home on foot, an act he found degrading. The prospect of returning 
in tattered rags, exhausted from the march, was almost too awful to contemplate. Still 
another volunteer wrote the he was convinced that Call was a drunk and, if their own 
leader Robert Armstrong was sober, it was only for want of liquor. It was no surprise, 
then, that when one of their superior officers in the army, Lieutenant John Lane, 
committed suicide, no fewer than three volunteers doubted the official finding of 
temporary insanity. They theorized that, like them, Lane had reached the brink of despair 
over the decrepit conditions and poor organization of the campaign.
38
On the eve of the expirations of their terms of service, the Tennessee volunteers 
came full circle. Months before, General Armstrong had preyed on their insecurities and 
shamed them into serving in Florida rather than Georgia. With his men on the verge of 
leaving Florida, he again managed the same trick and convinced them to serve in Florida 
a few more days. Some volunteers saw through his pleas to remain rather than risk 
damaging their reputation, but nevertheless the men served out an extra two weeks before 
leaving. Once their term had finally expired in December 1836, Call and Armstrong lined 
up the men to shower them with praise. Call was effusive, praising their conduct even as 
he disclaimed responsibility for the deplorable conditions. He recalled the devastation of 
the frontier several months ago and praised the volunteers for restoring it to civilization. 
Listening to this, one volunteer characterized it as “pathetic.” When Call went on to 
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absolve himself of blame for the lack of supplies, he was no less successful. Not fooled 
by the general’s kind words, another volunteer dismissed his address as “a mere farce 
played off to still the voice of censure and to catch the approbation of the thoughtless and 
unsuspecting of the brigade.”
39
The Tennessee volunteers left Florida regretting not their failure to rescue Florida 
from the Seminole threat, but instead ruefully dreaming of the laurels they failed to seize 
for themselves.  As one volunteer explained, the villain was clear: “Governor Call, the 
curse of all honest light upon him … will ever be regarded by Tennesseans as the man 
who cast a blight upon the most alluring prospects and nipped their brightest hopes in the 
bud.”   Within the interior of the territory, the volunteers were alone with themselves and 
their worries - they had come to Florida certain of victory and left as abject failures. They 
dreaded their reception in Tennessee.
40
In the end, they worried for nothing. They returned to Tennessee as heroes, 
celebrated in public meetings across the state for their “unmurmuring constancy in every 
trial and privation to which they have been subjected in one of the most arduous 
campaigns ever performed by troops of the U. States since the days of our Revolution.” 
Their embattled general, Robert Armstrong, published a letter to his men that was 
reprinted in newspapers across the nation. After referring favorably to General Call, 
Armstrong assured him, “Tennessee was perfectly secure when she committed her 
military character to your keeping, and that the spirit which animated her sons on the 
plains of New Orleans still glows brightly in your bosoms.” The Tennessee volunteers’ 
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fondest wishes had come true, their names were associated with Washington, Lafayette, 
and Jackson in the annals of American military history. In the aftermath of their 
blundering travails in the wilderness, near-mutinies, and unfulfilled dreams, their 
reputation was assured. Over the next decade, the ranks of the Tennessee volunteers 
produced two governors, one failed gubernatorial candidate, and two congressmen, not a 
bad return for a brigade that had nearly mutinied.
41
  
Florida and Beyond
The volunteers were men who would not stop to question the morality of their 
actions. In an editorial calling for the formation of a New Orleans group, one newspaper 
explicitly cleaved judgments of the morality of the policy that had led to war from the 
war itself, promising “our citizens will not stop to discuss the rights of the Indian tribes 
… residing within the jurisdiction of Florida, nor will they procrastinate actions to debate 
the correctness or not, of measures from time to time adapted by the General 
Government… no, they will act, and act promptly.” Indian killing could not be arrested. 
“Let those false and hollow hearted Philanthropists,” one Georgia newspaper proclaimed, 
“contemplate and reflect on” the war while Georgia volunteers marched, burned, and 
murdered. The volunteers arrayed themselves as much against the philanthropic tradition 
as against the Seminoles themselves. They fought to make Indian killing obsolete.
42
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Against such a savage threat, what was required was not mere service, but what 
one Georgia volunteer characterized as “patriotism with vengeance.” They confronted 
Indians who infuriated them by scalping the bodies of fallen soldiers, motivating the 
volunteers to swear revenge using any means. Yet they also disdained Seminole tactics, 
labeling ambushes of unarmed volunteers as murder rather than legitimate acts of guerilla 
warfare. To one Tennessee volunteer, to fight as the Seminoles did, “a war of 
ambuscades and invisibilities, sudden attacks and retreats – a warfare in which resolution 
withered, perseverance became useless and valor almost contemptible,” removed all that 
made war a worthy endeavor. The volunteers, so obsessed with unbridled violence, 
resented the Seminoles for prioritizing strategy over destruction. They wanted to fight 
like the Seminoles, so they wanted the Seminoles to resemble them.
43
The fought an evil subtle, yet profound. One South Carolina volunteer wrote with 
disgust of a Seminole band who had retreated in haste, leaving a solitary ox tied to a tree 
at the base of a steep hill, dehydrated and nearly starving. Believing that the Indians 
should have liberated or killed it outright, the volunteer proudly cut the animal free and 
led him to water, an event he remembered as “no trifling pleasure,” for he had long 
“thought the incident worth recording, as holding up a light wherewith to peruse a 
passage in the volume of Indian character.”  Savages and, worse, poor husbandmen, the 
Seminoles well deserved their retribution. “We gladly cut him loose, and quickly let him 
roam where he will,” concluded the volunteer, proudly reliving the incident. That desire, 
to roam where one will, lay at the heart of the volunteers’ project, and it could only be 
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accomplished, they concluded, through the use of overwhelming, eradicating force, 
unrestrained by the bounds of military oversight.
44
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Chapter 4
The “War-Whoop in the Doors of Your Capitol”: 
The March of Empire in the Halls of Congress
In the halls of Congress, debates over the Second Seminole War were marked by 
ferocious arguments, fisticuffs, and a fatal duel. Yet, throughout the entire course of the 
war, a conflict in which the United States spent tens of millions of dollars over seven 
long years to appropriate Indian land and re-enslave their African-American allies, few 
politicians of either party articulated a full-throated denunciation of the war’s objectives. 
In marked contrast to the General Thomas Jesup’s ruminations, they seldom questioned 
the viability or the morality of removing the Seminoles, though only a few years before, 
Anti-Jacksonians had nearly defeated the passage of the Indian Removal Act. The war 
played an essential role in the Whig critique of Democratic rule, but their main 
contention was that Whigs themselves could remove the Seminoles more efficiently than 
their rivals. Of the subjugation of alien peoples and the seizure of their land, few 
protested. Rather than hold fast against Jackson’s crusade of conquest, they chose to 
criticize its most trivial aspects. 
The lack of opposition to the war was not without motive. In 1827, eight years 
before the war, Robert Trumbull published “The Crisis,” a pro-slavery polemic in 33 
parts, in the Charleston Mercury. He warned his readers that any discussion of slavery 
was so threatening, so hostile to the interests of their state, that he urged their leaders to 
assure that a “vote NEVER shall be taken in Congress, on any subject connected with 
slaves, without its being followed by an immediate dissolution of the Union.” By the end 
of 1835 and the beginning of the Second Seminole War, politicians across the nation 
faithfully followed his advice. Congress was silent. Gag rules in the House of 
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Representatives and the Senate outlawed the reading of antislavery petitions and choked 
off outright discussion of slavery. In contrast to 1830s England in which antislavery 
activists bombarded Parliament with abolitionist pamphlets to great effect, the 
Congressional elite of the United States effectively quarantined their chambers from 
abolitionist thought. When Joshua Giddings violated the House’s gag rule in 1841 with a 
condemnation of the Second Seminole War, he nearly incited a literal legislative riot.
1
Though the voluntary silence over slavery was not absolute - the disputes over the 
Nullification Crisis and the Creole Affair which bookended the decade were certainly 
consequential - it did preclude discussion over a series of less prominent incidents 
inextricably linked to slavery, in ways that scholars have missed. Too often, historians 
have read forward debates over Indian removal and assumed that the defense of Indian 
rights was an integral aspect of Whig ideology. In truth, their opposition did not extend 
far beyond the borders of the Cherokee nation. That evangelical reformers would 
sympathize with the plight of the “civilized” Indians like the Cherokees in 1831 was a 
natural outgrowth of their worldview, which privileged self-advancement and societal 
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progress. From that perspective, the debate over the Indian Removal Act was as much a 
debate over the place of reform movements in antebellum political culture as it was over 
Indian rights in the abstract. The Seminoles, who were entirely uninterested in cultural 
assimilation, attracted few defenders among the politicians who had recently so 
vociferously defended the Cherokees’ right to remain in Georgia. By 1839, despite their 
nation having wasted millions of dollars and sacrificed over a thousand lives in the 
Florida wilderness, few Whigs questioned the efficacy or the morality of Indian removal.
2
In some respects, the silence that enveloped the war was unremarkable. Certainly 
instances in which a political party declared itself on the side of Indians in the midst of a 
frontier war were quite rare. It was, however, a silence born entirely of that historical 
moment. Fifteen years earlier, Andrew Jackson’s first foray into Florida against the 
Seminoles and their black allies had engulfed the capital in controversy. Fifteen years 
later, debates over national expansion and the role of slavery on the frontier would bring 
the Union to the brink of dissolution. Yet in 1835, there was nothing.
This was not to say that these congressional debates were bereft of historical 
interest. Among Jacksonians, it was nearly unanimous - for the United States to win the 
war, the Indians had to be, as they put it, overawed, whipped, and chastened. They did 
not couch their words in lofty rhetoric, nor were there paeans to an expansive empire of 
liberty. They spoke plainly, and without obfuscation of racial dominance and unalloyed 
American power. They believed they learned a lesson through their long and bracing 
struggle with the Seminoles: the flaw of their policies was not the embrace of subjugation 
but their inability to pursue it with overwhelming force. 
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By the end of the war, leading Democrats did come to grips with the limits of 
American power and with the reality that the United States, as General Thomas Jesup had 
tried to make his superiors understand, could not impose its authority on its borders 
through force alone. In the latter stages of the war, Thomas Hart Benton solved Jesup’s 
conundrum by fully integrating the logic of unending national expansion into American 
policy through the medium of Democratic ideology. His Armed Occupation Act, a 
homestead policy that transformed common settlers into an organized, bureaucratized 
arm of expansionistic America, putatively marshaled the independence of the frontier 
settler as a means of geographic consolidation. Benton intended to utilize settlers’ 
boundless capacity for violence as a cudgel against the nation’s enemies, clearing the 
path for expansion.
3
This chapter details three significant aspects of antebellum congressional debate 
over the Second Seminole War. In the first section, it will contextualize the conflict 
within the wider political currents of the era, explain the implications of Democratic 
rhetoric, and identify the active collaboration of numerous Whig legislators. The second 
section examines the difficulty of three prominent Whigs in articulating coherent 
critiques of the war effort. Though each of the three had significant misgivings about the 
war, none could envision any alternative aside from the total removal of the Seminoles 
and the imposition of white authority over the whole of Florida. The final section argues 
that by the time of the1840 presidential election, Whigs and Democrats had largely 
converged on a single frontier policy in which the federal government would permit or 
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empower settlers to stamp out nonwhite autonomy on the nation’s frontiers in order to 
better integrate those regions into the rest of the nation.
Profound Insecurity and the Democratic Embrace of Conquest
In November 1835 as Major Dade gathered his forces in Florida, Andrew Jackson 
and Martin Van Buren likely gazed over Washington satisfied with theirs. Seven months 
earlier, Van Buren had won the Democratic nomination for the presidency unanimously, 
and, given his unparalleled command of contemporary politics, felt confident of his 
ultimate success. He faced a nascent Whig party too inchoate to hold a convention or 
unite behind a single candidate. Instead, a motley crew arrayed against him: the pro-
Jackson/anti-Van Buren Tennessee Senator Hugh Lawson White, the Massachusetts 
candidate Senator Daniel Webster, the token Nullifier for the South Carolina ballot Willie 
Mangum, and a newcomer, General William Henry Harrison. There were only two truly 
national politicians in the United States, and they were both Democratic.
4
Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren could count on a phalanx of legislators in 
the House of Representatives. Over the past year, the national economy had grown at a 
tremendous rate and, following Jackson’s successful war against the Bank of the United 
States, the Democratic Party had reaped the benefits. Following the 1834 elections, 
Jacksonians controlled 143 seats in the House and faced a coalition of 99 Anti-
Jacksonians, Anti-Masons, and Nullifiers. Among the 143 Democrats was a new breed of 
politician, less concerned with their social bearing than their predecessors, expressly 
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partisan, and deeply committed to advancing Democratic interests. Like Jackson, they 
tended to value the independence of white settlers and believed national expansion to be 
imperative for the nation’s future. Though Jacksonians ruled the House, they did not 
control the Senate. State legislatures, in whose elections Whigs had done very well in the 
early 1830s, still controlled the appointment of Senate seats. Consequently, Whigs and 
Nullifiers controlled a slim majority of the body, at least until four Jacksonians from 
newly minted western states took office in the fall and winter of 1836, a year into the 
Second Seminole War. Democratic rule, then, would not be entirely unchallenged during 
the final year of Jackson’s second term.
5
Following his war against the Bank of the United States and the successful 
passage of the Indian Removal Act, Jackson believed he had achieved considerable 
domestic success, but remained troubled by the nation’s precarious international position. 
The final years of his presidency were marked by a series of bitter disputes, incidents of 
brinksmanship, and nearly catastrophic wars. At the start of the Second Seminole War, 
the United States and France remained embroiled in a diplomatic stalemate over 
spoliation claims arising from the Napoleonic Wars thirty years prior. France had 
demanded a personal explanation from Jackson for his fire breathing rhetoric and rumors 
coursed through Washington that Jackson intended to ask for Congressional authorization 
to grant letters of reprisal against France. Similarly, a disagreement with Great Britain 
over the Maine/New Brunswick border had festered since the 1783 Treaty of Paris and 
much of New England anticipated a renewal of conflict with the nation’s oldest rival. The 
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South, only a few years removed from Nat Turner’s rebellion, remained ever vigilant 
against the prospect of an organized slave rebellion. Perhaps the greatest threat lay to the 
west. There, Americans perceived twinned threats from the burgeoning Mexican state 
with its bellicose leader Santa Anna and growing masses of Indians, their ranks swelling 
as a result of Indian removal. Worst of all, many suspected the British had designs on 
either Mexico or Texas, a prospect that, if realized, would constitute a national crisis. 
Though each of these conflicts ended without the involvement of the United States’ 
military, political leaders and everyday Americans had good reason to fear numerous 
enemies of the state, both foreign and domestic.
6
In late 1835, then, one could hardly fault politicians inside and outside the 
Jackson administration for ignoring the situation in Florida. Over the previous few years, 
Indian removal had proceeded smoothly throughout the southeast. The Choctaw, the 
Creeks, the Seminoles, and the Chickasaw had all signed treaties promising imminent 
relocation, and the Cherokees were on the verge of signing their own. Already, troops 
were marching to Georgia, Alabama, and Florida to escort Indian populations to their 
new lands in the West. In his 1835 report to the Secretary of War Lewis Cass, 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Elbert Herring evinced confidence in the process, writing 
that though there were “indications of a contumacious and hostile spirit on the part of the 
Seminoles,” a military force had intimidated the disaffected and calmed the impassioned. 
Thankfully, he informed Cass, the Seminoles had “seen their interest and obligation in a 
clear light,” and were faithfully preparing to emigrate. Accepting his commissioner’s 
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assessment, Secretary of War Lewis Cass expected the Seminoles to be gone within the 
year.
7
The administration’s plans were proceeding apace until more than a hundred 
soldiers led by Major Francis Dade were ambushed by Seminole warriors and killed on 
December 23, 1835. The reaction was swift and sure. Lewis Cass immediately requested 
an appropriation of $80,000 to place troops in Florida and, with reports that 1500 Indians 
were in the field against only a few hundred soldiers, members of Congress gladly 
assented. When Representative Samuel Vinton, an Ohio Whig, signaled his intention to 
make a motion that would bind the nation to the terms of the Treaty of Payne’s Landing, 
Churchill Cambreleng, a New York Democrat, urged him to keep silent and address the 
matter later. Fearful that the Jackson administration would use the money to circumvent 
congressional authority, John Quincy Adams slipped in an amendment to the 
appropriation dictating that it be spent by the secretary of war, “comfortably to law.” The 
House then agreed to the bill and laid it aside. Adams’s request, though subtle, was 
significant. A keen observer of political language, Adams hoped to establish in writing 
the principle that even in matters of internal expansion against Indian enemies, the rule of 
law would hold sway.
8
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The debate in the Senate occupied considerably less floor time. Daniel Webster, 
the great orator from Massachusetts, introduced the appropriation as a member of the 
Committee on Finance. His preeminent rival for leadership of the Anti-Jacksonians, 
Henry Clay, rose to speak and claimed that he was bewildered that a war “of most 
rancorous violence” had erupted, yet Congress was altogether uninformed as to both the 
cause of the war and whether Indians or settlers were at fault. Webster proffered his 
understanding that the war originated in a dispute over Indian removal and was not due to 
settler bellicosity. Further, it was of no significance, he explained, for “the war rages, the 
enemy is in force, the executive Government has asked for the means of suppressing 
these hostilities,” and therefore passing a bill was imperative. Missouri Democrat 
Thomas Hart Benton, advanced his own understanding of the war, based on his service 
on the Committee of Indian Affairs. The Seminoles, he explained, were “a bad race,” 
even among Indians. Worse, in the massacres of the past months, the Seminoles had the 
aid of fugitive slaves, people of merciless ferocity who “traversed the fields of the dead, 
and cut the throats of those who were expiring.” Benton remembered that just a few 
weeks before he had castigated abolitionists, whose agitation he was sure would cause the 
deaths of whites and blacks. Yet, compared to the depths of the current violence, their 
past agitation “was as a drop to the ocean, and as a grain of sand to the mountain.” The 
bill swiftly passed.
9
The first true legislative debate over the Second Seminole War began several 
weeks later over the treatment of whites rather than over Indian policy. During the first 
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month of the war, before General Edmund Gaines launched his brazen offensive, Joseph 
White, the nonvoting delegate from the Florida Territory, submitted a bill requesting 
federal support for displaced Florida families on the frontier. Politicians of both parties 
discussed its constitutional implications, but the debate shifted when Francis Granger, a 
New York Whig, rose and became the first man to openly criticize the administration’s 
handling of the war. From his perspective, Granger must have believed he stood on the 
verge of a great career. Though just 44 years old, he recently had scored his greatest 
political coup, securing the nomination to become William Henry Harrison’s running 
mate a month earlier. As one of the most powerful politicians in New York City and one 
of the nation’s most prominent Anti-Masons, Granger had deftly sized up the dynamics 
of Harrison’s candidacy and recognized no one was better suited than he to welcome the 
general into the North’s political sphere. Now, with the election looming, Granger 
brazenly tried to outflank Andrew Jackson on the question of who could kill Indians with 
more fanfare. He did not object to the war itself, instead he accused Jackson of not 
fighting it forcibly enough. Why had Jackson barreled to the precipice of a war with 
France, he wondered, yet now when “the tomahawk glitters in the sunbeam … every 
department of this administration is as dumb as the bleeding victims of this inglorious 
contest?” A Harrison presidency, he implied, would kill Indians with significantly greater 
alacrity.
10
In the ensuing debate, several Democrats reproached Granger for his calumny 
upon the administration. Amos Lane of Indiana pronounced himself shocked that anyone 
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would question the president’s commitment to the frontier, but allowed that the passions 
of partisan intrigue may have clouded Granger’s judgment. Thomas Glascock of Georgia, 
one of the nation’s most ardent supporters of Indian Removal, wondered whether 
Granger and his fellow Anti-Jacksonians were truly committed to protecting the country, 
but predicted the outcome of the vote would let him know for sure. A cavalcade of 
Democrats then urged immediate passage of the bill and castigated Granger for using the 
opportunity for partisan purposes. Their words were certainly effective. Whig James 
Harper closed down the discussion, declaiming, “he was astonished that anything like 
party discussion should have grown out of such a subject as this. He would not stop to 
inquire who was right or who was wrong.” In part, Harper, a prominent freemason in 
Pennsylvania was undercutting his Anti-Mason colleague Granger, but he was also 
supporting expedience over constitutionality in the current crisis. Harper predicted an 
immediate vote and unanimous passage. He was nearly correct. Only 14 Representatives 
opposed the measure, an unlikely combination of Whig and Democratic politicians 
concerned with constitutional procedure and Nullifiers. Granger voted for passage as 
well.
11
Over the coming months, as the Whigs obligingly assented to a series of 
appropriation bills for the war, the Jackson administration and its allies instituted a novel 
Indian policy. To them, the uncertain condition of the frontier reflected the fundamental 
inconsistency of Indian removal policy in the past. Previously, administration officials 
had assumed that Indians would voluntarily sign treaties and obey their terms. If they did 
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not, then certainly the martial strength of the United States could easily compel them to 
do so. If compulsion failed, however, and the United States lacked the resources to wage 
extended frontier wars while it safeguarded the eastern seaboard from the possibility of 
European invasion, the nation would need to deploy its military in novel ways. 
In the midst of the war, Lewis Cass identified a solution, declaring the military 
necessary for the purpose of, in his words, “overawing” the Indians. No longer would the 
army serve as the first line of defense. Instead, it would act as a preemptive force to 
discourage attack altogether. Reflecting the basic lacuna of Jacksonian Indian policy, 
Cass theorized that the Second Seminole War reflected that “the Indians are totally 
ignorant of their own relative strength and that of the United States” and that the United 
States need only “demonstrate” to the Indians their relative weakness to convince them to 
submit to American directives. It was a dubious conclusion given that the Seminoles were 
winning every battle. Nevertheless, Cass and the Jacksonians believed they had isolated 
the problem. The Seminoles had revolted not owing to the inconsistencies of the Treaty 
of Payne’s Landing, but because the United States had not enforced those inconsistencies 
with all of the violence at its command.
12
Cass’s pronouncement amounted to a declaration that nonwhite autonomy was a 
threat to national security. Writing in the aftermath of General Edmund Pendleton 
Gaines’s disastrous offensive against the Seminoles, Cass attempted to diagnose the flaws 
of the war well before it had reached a conclusion. In transforming the army into an 
invasive force designed to compel obedience from those excluded from the body politic, 
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he reformulated the basic relationship of the army to nonwhites on the frontier. The need 
to “overawe” Indians was paramount, the pursuit of American interests no longer 
sufficient. It was, for Cass and many other Democrats, an article of faith that victory over 
Indians was determined not by strategic success, but by the demonstration of American 
superiority. Success lay in crushing effective Indian sovereignty and representing to the 
Seminoles that they were dependent subjects of the American state, not apart from it.
13
The Democratic obsession with expressions of American power was rooted in 
equal parts nationalistic fervor and abject fear. Given the United States’ fraught position 
in relation to the rest of the world and the long history of collaboration between the 
nation’s enemies and nonwhites on the continent, they had good reason to eye Indians on 
the frontier suspiciously. As the Jackson administration had chosen to side with the 
priorities of boisterous settlers over the recognition of Indian property rights, they had 
foregone the possible of a conciliatory Indian policy that would bind Indians to the 
United States through affection rather than intimidation.
14
Representative Abijah Mann, a New York Democrat, took Cass’s proposals to 
their logical conclusion. Speaking in the aftermath of Winfield Scott’s initial, futile 
offensive against the Seminoles, Mann was deeply concerned that the rest of Congress 
had resolved to return an unprecedented federal surplus to the states, distributing the 
money directly to their constituents. He wondered how his fellow Congressmen could 
pass such a bill with a clear conscience when, at that very moment, he said “defenseless 
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women and children of our southern brethren were now suffering under the merciless 
tomahawk of savage war.” Responding to one of his colleague’s investigations into the 
causes of the war, Mann complained that his peers were choosing to “hesitate and debate 
about the causes of these Indian wars,” rather than move to overwhelm and conquer the 
Seminoles. Anyone privy to the workings of the human heart, Mann contended, could 
understand the roots of racial warfare - they were written into the very fabric of Indian-
white relations. While Representatives wasted their time fussing out the whys and 
wherefores, Indians were laying waste to the frontier.
15
 In his remarks, Mann connected the abstract logic of Cass’s position directly to 
national security. In his mind, the country faced a choice. On one hand, it could pursue 
the approaches of the past, the pursuit of Indian negotiations with the purpose of mutual 
accommodation along with a minimal standing army - in other words an idealized vision 
of early republic Indian policy. According to Mann, that path amounted to suicide and 
worse, to the Indians sounding their “thrilling war–whoop in the doors of your Capitol.” 
The other path, Cass’s path, institutionalized subjugation and expansion as the twin poles 
of United States frontier policy. Mann understood what Cass had not explained - that the 
initial failures of the Second Seminole War had devastating implications for national 
defense. It was not the Seminoles, but the United States which had grievously 
miscalculated its military strength. His speech revealed a deeply paranoid and despairing 
Democratic worldview, one in which, should his countrymen falter, miscalculate, or 
show weakness, the republic could fall.
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That paranoia infused Democratic talking points over the coming months as the 
debate over the size of the army expanded into one of the central disputes of the 
congressional term. At first, the debate surrounded the institutionalization of volunteer 
groups under executive direction. Generally made up of “hardened” frontier men in the 
popular imagination, volunteer groups were universally believed to be especially suited 
for frontier conflict. And with the Texas Revolution in progress, the frontier was far from 
pacific. Though most doubted Mexico would pose an immediate threat, frontier Indians 
were an entirely different matter. Albert Harrison, a Missouri Democrat, ably explained 
the root of their fears. Holding up a map of Missouri and Arkansas, he pointed to the 
numerous Indian nations living on the frontier and urged his colleagues to “see what your 
wretched policy has done to Florida” and imagine that fate befalling the western frontier 
should the nation not summon thousands of soldiers to defend it. To Harrison, it was a 
“disgrace” that United States leaders had failed to intimidate hostile Indians into 
“realizing” their subordinate status. As his fellow Democrat from Missouri, William 
Ashley, attested, there were likely over one thousand times more Indian warriors in the 
west than in the east, and preventing a widespread rebellion was vital to national 
security.
16
Francis Granger, Whig vice-presidential candidate, rose and agreed 
wholeheartedly.  Obsessed with the best method of “controlling” Indians who he believed 
treacherous by nature, Granger celebrated the use of volunteers who moved with alacrity, 
endorsing Jacksonian Indian policy in every important respect. Ransom Gillet, a New 
York Democrat, provided the capstone for the debate. Fully articulating the Jacksonian 
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conception of the frontier, he argued for overwhelming force as imperative because the 
nation’s “authority will not be respected, unless we exhibit before them a power which 
can chastise them into obedience.” He swore that no appropriation, not matter how large, 
could convince his constituents (who were a thousand miles away from the Florida 
frontier) that such a cause was not just. When he challenged Granger on his support of 
Indian Removal, an issue Gillet had thought settled, Granger claimed he had been 
misunderstood and that he offered no objection to the policy. During the course of the 
debate, only two Congressmen expressed real reservations. Both feared overreaching 
executive power, they did not object to the subjugation of enemy peoples.
17
The Indian policies that underlay the Second Seminole War sprung from a deep 
anxiety over the nation’s security. Representatives believed there was always another 
nemesis, somewhere waiting to strike. To them, the defeat of that enemy trumped any 
constraint on action, be it moral or constitutional. Consequently, Florida delegate Joseph 
White could express with exasperation that the members were “in this Hall called upon to 
decide whether ‘our quarrel be just,’” reject “misplaced and sickly sentiment,” and warn 
that “if we are to abandon this whole frontier and sea-coast to this miserable gang of 
desperadoes, there is not a power on earth that will not despise us for our impotence and 
pusillanimity” and remain entirely consistent with the prevailing discourse. The only just 
policy was a forcefully expansive one. It was pragmatic in that it would end the Seminole 
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threat, symbolic in that it would gain the respect of the rest of the world, and honorable in 
that women and children were suffering.
18
The Whigs and the Absence of Opposition
The Whigs fared better than they might have expected in the 1836 elections. 
Though their tactic of running a different candidate for president in each region of the 
country failed utterly, they did make significant gains in some respects. Part of their 
success was due to Martin Van Buren’s limitations as a political candidate compared to 
his predecessor, but it also reflected impressive achievements by Whig activists in 
transforming their loose coalition of interests into an institutional force, as they cut 
deeply into the Democratic majority in the House. Unfortunately for the Whigs, several 
years of Democratic triumphs on the state level finally allowed them to seize decisive 
control of the Senate, winning 11 of 17 elections. Martin Van Buren pledged to rule as 
his predecessor had, and he would enjoy the same advantages.
19
Members of the Whig Party returned to Washington with a dilemma. As itinerants 
warning against a tyrannical Jackson administration, their political philosophy was 
relatively simple. They castigated Democratic overreach and pledged themselves to 
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defend the institutional superstructure that would protect and extend liberty into the 
future. The election of 1836 and, as the term continued, the Panic of 1837, transformed 
the Whigs from a dissenting voice into a potent electoral force. Their success left them 
with a vital pragmatic question to address. What position would the party take on issues 
of expansion and Indian relations? They had made their most significant inroads against 
the Democrats in the South and the West, the two regions most invested in both issues. 
The bumbling of the Second Seminole War had likely contributed to their success, not 
due to their vocal opposition, but as an alternative to a Democratic administration that 
seemed incapable of defeating scattered bands of starving Indians in the Florida 
wildernesses.
The circumscribed nature of language concerning the war in the summer of 1836, 
after Winfield Scott’s reassignment and Richard Keith Call’s humiliation, must be 
contextualized in light of the information available. On June 6, at the request of the 
Committee on Indian Affairs, Lewis Cass’s War Department delivered a bundle of 
correspondence to the House of Representatives. It consisted of two hundred pages that 
promised to explain the “causes of hostilities of the Creek and Seminole Indians in 
Florida.” Though the quantity of information was massive, an attentive reader could 
easily have traced themes that clearly laid out the causes of the Second Seminole War. 
There were two primary motivations for war. First, as most politicians realized, factions 
in the Seminole nation were violently opposed to removal. With the deadline for 
emigration looming, they had ambushed Dade’s command rather than submit to the will 
of their enemy. The second motivation was far less prominent, but present throughout the 
assembled letters. Throughout the reams of correspondence, time and again, the doomed 
210
Indian Agent Wiley Thompson warned his superiors that the Black Seminoles, who 
Thompson believed enjoyed “a controlling influence” over their masters, were terrified of 
being seized by whites and condemned to a life of chattel slavery. Should the Black 
Seminoles have reason to fear enslavement, he warned, war would be the result. And the 
documents offered ample reasons for them to fear. Throughout the assembled 
correspondence, Florida slaveholders pressed Thompson to support dubious claims on 
Seminole slave property, the federal government flirted  with violating the Indian 
Intercourse Act of 1834 by allowing the Seminoles to sell their slaves to interested white 
buyers, and the Seminoles volubly protested settling adjacent to the Creeks, who 
themselves held tenuous claims on many of the Black Seminoles. Reading the 
correspondence with a modicum of empathy for the Seminoles revealed an Indian nation 
with real suspicions of slaveholder designs on their own slaves and a federal government 
that consistently justified their apprehensions.
20
These letters were only the most immediate evidence of slaveholder culpability 
for the onset of war. Careful readers would have found complaints from Florida and 
Georgia slaveholders that the Seminoles offered a sanctuary to runaway slaves and 
hysterical warnings of an island where bands of Indians and fugitive slaves hid from 
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white justice, robbing and murdering whites on the mainland with impunity. They would 
have found that Andrew Jackson, after reading the pleas of Alachua County slaveholders, 
demanded the War Department investigate their charges and, should they prove correct, 
immediately take steps to carry out the long-delayed Treaty of Payne’s Landing and 
remove the Seminoles. Should anyone have grown even more suspicious of the links 
between the origins of the war and the interests of slaveholders, the War Department 
itself held a treasure trove of documents describing the events leading up to the treaty. 
They would have read of Indian Agent Gad Humphrey’s desperate attempts to protect 
Seminole slaves from white slave catchers and the ensuing outcry in which those same 
slaveholders complained to the Jackson administration of the Seminoles’ willingness to 
protect fugitive slaves. Horace Everett, a Vermont Whig, used many of those documents 
to cast imputations upon the origins of the war in Congress in early 1836, though his 
arguments were muted since, in the words of Joshua Giddings, “he was careful to say 
nothing exceptionable to the slave interest.” Though few followed in his tracks, for the 
interested, the true origins of the Second Seminole War were evident.
21
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The most vocal Whigs, again with the exception of a handful of antislavery 
reformers, instead pursued three lines of attack against the war. The largest faction 
followed the example of Francis Granger and attacked not the war itself, but Martin Van 
Buren’s handling of it. Doing so implicitly supported the nascent yet powerful 
Democratic obsession with conquest and effectively argued that Martin Van Buren was a 
bad president because he was not a capable enough subjugator of nonwhites. A second 
contention, usually enunciated by politicians such as Henry Clay who identified with the 
ideals of the early republic tradition, offered an alternate vision of relations with Indians 
which recalled a past era in which Americans made a real commitment to offer Indians 
the “fruits” of civilization. In the context of the late 1830s as a bulwark against removals 
which had already occurred, such rhetoric was no more than a mirage. Aside from the 
Seminoles and factions of obstinate Cherokees, forced emigration was already a reality. 
In practice, given their focus on the plight of the Cherokees, the objection to Indian 
removal on the basis of assimilation was merely a debate over the legitimacy of the 
Treaty of New Echota, a vitally important subject for thousands of Cherokees, but only a 
glancing blow against the Democratic project of conquest and subjugation. The third 
approach was that of antislavery leaders such as John Quincy Adams and Joshua 
Giddings, who linked expansion to oppression, oppression to slavery, and slavery to 
tyranny. It was a lonely position.
22
The myth of the vanishing Indian greatly circumscribed the language that Whigs 
used in describing the war. For decades, amateur anthropologists among the American 
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elite had, using all of the clunky and arbitrary analyses at their disposal, contended that 
the trajectory of the globe’s history portended certain doom for Native Americans. They 
found evidence in the world outside their windows, ignoring centuries of appropriation 
and instead seizing on the diminished population of Indians east of the Mississippi River. 
The myth’s implications for United States Indian policy were especially pernicious. Any 
argument against expansive war would be extremely constricted if the Indians’ only 
alternative was death by another means. Consequently, Whigs constrained their opinions 
on the war to Democratic conduct and wastefulness. Nothing more.
23
In late 1836, Senator Henry Clay, as the guest of honor, addressed the Woodford 
Festival in his home state of Kentucky. He spoke about two hours and one newspaper 
reported he was “fervent, solemn, sometimes pathetic, sometimes playful.” The election 
of 1836 was imminent and he, though resentful of Harrison’s nomination, feared a 
continuation of Jackson’s presidency. So he spoke at length, addressing the promise of 
America’s present state and closing with a denunciation of Democratic Indian policy. 
Having been raised in frontier Kentucky, Clay had long held a dim view of Indian 
character and, like most, believed their extinction to be inevitable. Nonetheless, Clay 
spoke against the Treaty of New Echota, arguing that the mass of Cherokee people had 
risen against it, and declared himself opposed to Indian removal, against which he had 
campaigned in 1832. Now, however, with the Indians long since removed, he offered no 
prescription for the future. Clay closed with the Second Seminole War, then entering its 
ninth month with Richard Keith Call in command and floundering even to organize his 
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campaign. Clay railed against the administration’s military failures, wondering at their 
causes. In his words, the Second Seminole War was a “disgrace,” as “four or five 
hundred wretched outcast Indian warriors had baffled the skill of three of four Major 
Generals.” Nevertheless, Clay had a solution. For the past month, he had discussed the 
possibility of “offering to the administration to contract, in behalf of the State of 
Kentucky, to capture and deliver West of the Mississippi every Seminole Indian.”  For 
over a million dollars less than the government had already paid, Clay believed he could 
win the war in a matter of months. He did not enunciate a noble vision of justice, but 
rather a plan to remove Indians in a more cost effective way.
24
Other Whigs imitated Clay’s pragmatism, but channeled it more directly against 
the war effort. Few received more criticism for their opposition than Whig Representative 
Henry Wise of Virginia. A Southerner to his very core, Wise had defeated his original 
opponent for Congress twice, once in an election and once in a duel. He famously spent 
hours haranguing abolitionists on church steps in his home district and was one of the 
leading proponents of the gag rule. Differentiating himself from Horace Everett and the 
rest, he loudly averred that “I am myself a southern man … and I have much the same 
feelings toward the black or the red skin” as any other person from the region. Yet, he 
feared that the war was materially harming the interests of the United States. Looking 
west, he imagined there was already “more than one Oceola beyond the Mississippi,” 
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leaders who might unite the disparate nations against the United States. Speaking in the 
fall of 1837  in the aftermath of Jesup’s deceptive capture of Osceola, Wise found the war 
both ineptly managed and “morally wrong.” He vowed not to appropriate another dollar 
unless Congress approved a full-scale investigation into both its origins and the root 
causes of American failures. Going further, he attacked the foundations of the conflict 
and urged the Floridians to allow the Seminoles, “a people who have forced us to respect 
them,” to remain there, in peace.
25
Though emphatic, Wise’s opposition to the war in Florida was, at best, nominal. 
As with Clay, his greatest concerns were over the conduct of the war, specifically 
whether corrupt government officials had wasted taxpayer money, inept generals had 
bungled the operation, or unprincipled officers had acted to tarnish the honor of the 
United States. Wise did urge Florida citizens to allow the Seminoles to remain, but not 
out of any concern for Indian rights or opposition to national expansion. Instead, Wise 
referred to the Indians of Virginia who the Commonwealth had long allowed to remain 
on their land. Today, according to Wise, they were just a remnant of a once great people. 
Should the Floridians leave the Indians in peace, he assured them “they will gradually 
molt away and disappear before the white population.” He did not, as Washington and 
Jefferson had, imagine the southeastern Indians blending as one people with their white 
neighbors nor did he defend Indian sovereignty. Instead, he argued for the use of racial 
destiny in place of military might. For all of his laudable rhetoric, Wise, like Clay, was 
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merely offering another avenue to forward expansion, a more efficient means of 
removal.
26
Wise envisioned, though hazily, a means of replicating the early republic 
approach to dealing with hostile Indians, in essence defeating them not with bullets but 
with reason, progress, and peace. In yoking the early republic rhetoric of progress with 
overt calls for expansion, Wise manifested significantly more empathy for the Seminoles’ 
struggle than the vast majority of his peers, but merely echoed the form if not the 
substance of Jacksonian expansion. Moreover, in reserving the nation’s mercy - he quite 
clearly found the Seminoles’ situation unique rather than universal among Indians - for a 
nation as steadfast as the Seminoles, he highlighted the failure of the army to sufficiently 
“overawe” them, in the Democratic parlance. Less martial Indian nations remained, in 
Wise’s view, victims waiting to be swept aside by history.
27
For all of his equivocating, Wise faced intense criticism. He shook off accusations 
of excessive partisanship. It was within the bounds of debate when an Ohio newspaper 
accused Wise of belonging to a “vile and violent faction” who will “harass and oppose” 
any administration policy. Accusations of abolitionism, however, were risible. Following 
Wise’s speech, Florida delegate Charles Downing accused Wise of sympathizing with the 
Seminoles and wondered if his feelings extended all the way to the abolitionists who 
vocally defended them. Francis Blair, the editor of The Globe, compared Wise’s position 
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to that of Horace Everett and found little daylight between the two as both urged the 
government to leave the Seminoles in Florida. That Wise imagined Seminole extinction 
to be the culmination of his policy whereas Everett envisioned revitalization was lost on 
the editor. Finally, Jonathan Cilley, a Democratic Representative of Maine, openly 
pondered on “this sympathy for the dark red man which seemed to be akin to that 
expressed in some quarters for the man of yet a darker hue.” This comment, Wise did not 
forget. Exactly one month later, after an escalating series of accusations, slights, 
misunderstandings, and affirmations of honor, Wise faithfully stood second as 
Congressman William Graves of Kentucky, on the third exchange of shots, fatally felled 
Cilley in a duel in Bladensburg, Maryland.
28
Of all the members of Congress, few were as linked to the passage of the Indian 
Removal Act as Representative John Bell of Tennessee, who had authored a parallel bill 
and helped shepherd the original to passage. However, following disputes with the 
Jackson administration over patronage appointments and banking policy, Bell fell out 
with the Democratic Party and migrated to the Whigs who welcomed him with open 
arms. On June 1, 1838, having heard that Bell had offhandedly excoriated the conflict as 
“inglorious” in a Hartford speech, his Tennessee colleague, Democrat Hopkins Turney, 
inquired about the basis of Bell’s criticism on the floor of the House. Seeing as how Bell 
had authored the very law the army was then enforcing and had faithfully voted for 
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several appropriations on the war, Turney concluded Bell must secretly hold antislavery 
views, as only an abolitionist could oppose the war given, he said, that it gave “strength 
and importance to the slaveholding interest of the Union.” Outraged at the accusation, 
Bell dismissed Turney as a “mere instrument of other men’s malice – a tool of tools.” 
Turney turned and confronted Bell. In response, Bell struck Turney in the face, bringing 
chaos to the House. Henry Wise, no stranger to political violence, calmed the participants 
and urged the Speaker to resume the proceedings, calmly and with dignity. After a spell, 
Bell resumed his defense and declared the war inglorious not for its aims, but for the 
mismanagement of the Van Buren administration. Such was the prevailing argument of 
the Whigs: violently partisan and exceedingly circumscribed.
29
That these two incidents, the Cilley/Wise dispute and the Turney/Bell rivalry, led 
to physical violence was unusual, though not unique in the antebellum congress. More 
notable was the utter vacuity of their references to abolition. Neither Cilley nor Turney 
offered the slightest justification for the association of their enemies with antislavery, 
only that both abolitionists and their political opponents alike denounced the war 
sufficiently justified their comparison. At no point did anyone in the debate allude to 
fugitive slave sanctuaries or disputed claims on the Black Seminoles. The closest anyone 
came to linking slavery to the war was Turney’s brief speculation that abolitionists 
opposed the war in hopes that should another slave rebellion erupt, the Seminoles might 
remain in Florida to assist. In all other respects, the connection was unspoken. Cilley and 
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Turney brandished the prospect of abolitionism as a weapon, using it as a means to 
intimidate their enemies into silence.
30
Of the diehard foes of Indian removal remaining in Congress, the most faithful to 
the tradition of the early republic was Whig Representative Caleb Cushing of 
Massachusetts. Unlike many of his colleagues, Cushing acknowledged what should have 
been a cause for despair: due to relentless public and institutional pressure, Indian 
Removal was a reality and, worse, he said, “we know, we must know, that the process of 
removal cannot be arrested.” What, then, remained of the old dream of civilizing and 
assimilating Indians? Cushing concluded that it was the mission of the Whigs to protect 
and redeem the Indians in the West. To forestall an inevitable war on that frontier, it was 
imperative to formulate another message to the Indian nations there. Where Jackson and 
his subordinates spoke to the Indians through the language of domination, he hoped a 
Whig administration would not just “speak to them only as conquerors …, but conjoin 
the justice that shall command respect, and the clemency that shall conciliate affection.”
31
Cushing’s opposition to the war went further than that of Wise and Clay. Where 
the two southern Whigs assumed the establishment of white supremacy in Florida to be 
inevitable and desirous, Cushing dismissed Florida as a “desert tract of country, utterly 
useless to any but” the Seminoles. Nevertheless, in following old ideals blindly, Cushing 
found himself lost in the contradictions of the Florida War. Though he believed deeply in 
the values of the civilizing project, Cushing concluded that the policies had failed. 
Unwilling to declare that whites had proven unfaithful in their promises, Cushing 
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tortuously concluded the fault lay with the Indians to whom, he asserted, “the Word was 
preached, … civilization was offered; they refused it, and they died in their unbelief.” 
Logically, then, he proceeded to denounce the war as “a rotten point; a blot, a shame on 
the national reputation,” while at the same time, without contradiction, disclaiming the 
millions spent on assimilating Indians as “water spilled on the ground.” As Cushing 
believed that Indians had failed to match Jefferson’s lofty ideals, he would not stand in 
the way of their conquest. By the summer of 1839, Cushing was defending removal as an 
outright benefit for both northern and southern farmers and ignoring its effects on Indian 
nations. Cushing would attack Van Buren’s conduct; he would not defend the 
Seminoles.
32
Cushing’s inability and eventual disinclination to articulate a coherent critique of 
the Second Seminole War pointed to the bind in which northern Whigs had placed 
themselves. If they would not or could not popularize and criticize the role of slaveholder 
interests in causing the war or argue in defense of Seminole autonomy, they closed off 
any means by which they might have attacked its underpinnings. That Cushing could not 
marshal early republic language to enunciate a policy that might replace Indian removal, 
pointed toward their intellectual bankruptcy. Instead, the great bulk of Whigs chose not to 
protest at all. Doing so would not have required an embrace of abolition. But it would 
have required a concerted effort to reorient the priorities of a misshapen republic.
Convergence and the Election of 1840
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The presidential election of 1840 pitted the man who had mismanaged the Second 
Seminole War against a man who steadfastly refused to address it. One represented a 
party committed to subjugation and conquest with no prescription for how to achieve 
them, and the other represented a party with no official position on the war altogether. 
Defeat did not chasten the Democrats. As the election neared, Van Buren’s political ally, 
Thomas Hart Benton, offered a new approach to frontier warfare, proposing a break from 
the failures of the first years of the conflict, while still fulfilling fundamental Democratic 
priorities. Where Van Buren trumpeted a new frontier strategy, in the brief time left to 
him, William Henry Harrison seldom addressed the war. However his past, his choice of 
cabinet, and a single, rich lecture on Indians delivered in 1839, offered clues that he, too, 
intended to enforce the complete submission of the Seminoles.
The Democratic Party entered 1839 reeling from its first electoral catastrophe. 
The Panic of 1837 had animated Whigs critiques of Jacksonian economic policy and 
propelled them to near parity in the House of Representatives in 1838. Moreover, the 
Whigs enjoyed a massive upsurge in voter enthusiasm as turnout rose during the midterm 
election, compared even to the presidential election two years earlier. Given Martin Van 
Buren’s failure to effectively address the Panic of 1837, the high costs of the Second 
Seminole War threatened to reinforce the already prevalent narrative of the Democrats’ 
fiscal inanity.
33
Looking south from Washington in late 1838, the war’s prospects appeared 
increasingly bleak. Thomas Jesup had been reassigned. The capture of Osceola had 
changed little. Even successful alliances with the Black Seminoles had weakened, but not 
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ended, the Seminole threat. In his annual message to Congress, Secretary of War Joel 
Poinsett admitted that negotiations with the scattered bands of Seminole warriors were 
impracticable and unreliable; the only remaining option was a long, drawn out war 
against the remnants of an Indian nation that was proving ever more resolute as its 
numbers dwindled. He offered a plan, however. Poinsett ordered Zachary Taylor to invite 
displaced settlers to return to their homes on the frontier, help them surround their houses 
with stout pickets, organize defensive battalions, and prepare them to provide the nation’s 
first line of defense. Though Poinsett doubted the settlers would be a sufficient deterrent, 
he announced he would request that Congress pass legislation to authorize the War 
Department to offer free land and supplies to any settlers who pledged to defend their 
homestead against all enemies of the state. The army had failed. There remained but one 
hope left and, providentially, it was the Democracy’s greatest weapon, the people.
34
Poinsett’s proposal dovetailed with Thomas Hart Benton’s priorities. Deeply 
engaged with frontier issues, Benton adroitly judged the efficacy of using settlers to 
transform, pacify, and consolidate the nation’s borders. Over the past forty years, settlers 
throughout the South had tirelessly improved the land, forcibly ejected Indians, and 
formed a makeshift, yet homogenously nationalistic front on the nation’s borderlands. 
Throughout the 1820s, as the market revolution further integrated their frontier 
communities into the national fabric, white Americans on the frontier imagined 
themselves arrayed against rebellious slaves and savage Indians intent on choking off 
their paths to prosperity. An avowed expansionist yet deeply suspicious of internal 
improvements, Benton had long championed the distribution of public lands to settlers as 
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a means of benefitting his constituents and furthering territorial expansion. In this 
instance, Benton envisioned that internal expansion, through the appropriation of land 
and resources, would lead to the gradual subordination and removal of Indians. A cheaper 
means of expansion, his proposal offered an ideologically consistent and effectively 
practical means for resolving the conflict.
35
As Benton conceived it, removing the Seminoles from their intractable positions 
in the wilderness was a task for which the army was ill suited, but, he argued, “unarmed 
occupation and settlement of the territory is the true way of expelling the Indians.” 
Having long urged the sale of public lands at discount prices, Benton applied the policy 
to Florida and suggested withdrawing the army and offering 320 acres of land free to 
settlers on the frontier. According to Benton, the settlers would bloodlessly expel Indians 
by gradually transforming the untamed wilderness into the site of a yeoman community 
of free white men and women. Settlers would be under only three obligations: to live, to 
cultivate, and to defend their lands. Offensive expeditions would be strictly optional. 
Benton rooted his policy in his sense of history, and his certainty that generation after 
generation of European settlers had gradually, yet irrevocably, removed Indians through 
the invisible workings of progress. Americans would do the same.
36
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In wedding early republic ideals to unapologetic conquest, Benton accomplished 
what others could not. A Neo-Jeffersonian of sorts, Benton trusted the capacity of 
independent whites to extend the path of liberty beyond the nation’s frontiers. Though he 
replicated Jefferson’s logic of independent settlement, Benton marshaled his language in 
ways that directly conflicted with Jefferson’s own vision. In reiterating that conquest 
would be bloodless, Benton consciously ignored the past few decades of white-Indian 
relations, whose violence gave lie to his assertion. Throughout the South, and with great 
fanfare, settlers had deceived, robbed, assaulted, and murdered neighboring Indians 
whenever they had the opportunity. Given that settler violence had touched off 
monumental Supreme Court Cases and numerous political controversies, Benton was 
hardly unaware of the consequences of his bill. By proposing the government utilize 
settlers as an armed front, then, Benton stripped early republic ideals of their ideological 
meaning and transformed independent freeholders into mercenaries in the service of the 
federal government. For all of his promises that his bill was a novel solution to the 
problems of expansion, he simply offered domination and subjugation through other 
means. 
Though Benton’s proposal retained the war’s original goals, his proposal did 
significantly shift the nation’s priorities. By 1839, the Van Buren administration had 
abandoned almost all of the objectives that Lewis Cass had laid out for Winfield Scott 
three years earlier to re-enslave the Black Seminoles and force the complete submission 
of the Indians. With the Black Seminoles largely out of the reach of covetous 
slaveholders and the domination of the Seminoles no longer assured, Democratic 
legislators were willing to settle for other, ostensibly gentler, means of expansion. By his 
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own logic, Benton’s proposal would not ensure the subjugation of the Seminoles for 
years, if not decades. It was a formulation to which Benton would cling. Five years later, 
in the debate over the annexation of Texas, Benton and other diehard Van Burenites 
would oppose any treaty that did not recognize Mexican rights and a careful definition of 
national boundaries, to the consternation of ardent southern expansionists such as James 
K. Polk and John Calhoun. In Mexico, as in Florida, Benton prioritized orderly progress 
over the goals of maximal expansion.
37
Benton’s bill faced opposition from two factions in the Senate. The first, led by 
Henry Clay, objected to the expense of the plan. Clay argued that few settlers would be 
reckless enough to flock to the Florida frontier given the alarming reports emanating 
weekly from the frontier, and that enticing families would cost many millions of dollars. 
Inching toward a more comprehensive critique of the war, Clay went further, reasoning 
that since Congress had been so willing to pass every bill the administration requested, 
any neglect of duty on the part of Congress had been in its readiness to “grant all the 
means asked for by the Executive, … without any investigation into the causes or 
conduct of this inglorious War.” The second faction speaking out against Benton was a 
faction of one, Thomas Morris. An Ohio Democrat, Morris had grown increasingly 
critical of the influence of slavery on the Union and frustrated by the veil protecting it in 
the Senate. By 1836, he had become an early critic of the gag rule and the popularizer of 
the term, “the Slave Power.” A lame duck in 1839 having lost renomination to his seat, 
he chose to be silent no more and attacked Benton’s plan as designed to lure slaveholders 
to Florida, furthering slave interests and risking a repeat of the ravages of the Haitian 
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Revolution. The efforts of Morris and Clay were for naught as the bill passed the Senate 
25-18. Ironically, four days after his speech against Benton’s bill, Morris gave his most 
famous oration, excoriating Henry Clay for his prominent anti-abolition views.
38
The Armed Occupation Act, however, was defeated in the House. The final vote 
against the bill was not recorded, though an earlier vote on whether to table the bill 
offered a window into the cause of its defeat. For the most part, the House voted along 
party lines, with the exception of a number of southern Representatives of both parties 
who broke ranks. Likely, several southern Democrats voted against the bill in hopes of 
preserving the land for friendly speculators and facilitating the implementation of a large 
plantation-style economy in East Florida. Conversely, several southern Whigs from 
frontier areas likely voted for the bill, hoping to please their constituents, ambitious 
yeoman farmers desiring land for themselves.
39
One year later in January 1840, Benton offered his bill again. He offered the same 
set of rationalizations: “It is a good plan; I may call it a master plan … It is a plan which 
REVERSES the position of the parties in Florida – which makes US the possessors of the 
country, and leaves it to THEM to expel US.” In his final defense of the bill, Benton 
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reiterated his belief in the effectiveness of settlers as a means of removal. Responding to 
accusations in the abolitionist press that he merely hoped to cement Florida as a slave 
state, he pointed to the large number of free-state Democrats supporting the bill. He 
concluded that any argument against the bill arose not from actual disagreement, but from 
Whig fears that admitting Florida to the Union would inaugurate a reliably Democratic 
state, nothing more.
40
Once again, the bill passed the Senate on a nearly party line vote. Nevertheless, the 
bill died in the House, likely because slaveholders wished to retain the land for 
themselves. The future strategy of the Seminole War, then, would hinge on the election 
of 1840. If the Democrats could increase their margin in the House by a few seats, 
Benton’s bill would pass. If they did not, the war policy would devolve back to the 
president. The choice would be Benton’s land policy or whatever William Henry 
Harrison might propose. 
To a certain extent, historians have over-emphasized Harrison’s silence during the 
election of 1840. Throughout the campaign, he clarified his stance on Masonry in an aim 
to shore up his anti-Masonic credentials and pronounced his support for Clay’s American 
System of national banks, tariffs, and internal improvements loudly, though occasionally 
with muddled clarity. Harrison’s preferred frontier policies, however, were a complete 
mystery. Though he offered few hints as to his current stance on national expansion and 
Indian removal, Harrison’s past was littered with clues. As the governor of Indiana thirty 
years before, Harrison had faithfully executed the will of his white constituents and used 
all of the resources at his command to coerce neighboring Indians into giving up their 
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land. He was, as all knew, the hero of Tippecanoe and the conqueror of Tecumseh. Few 
believed that Harrison might pursue a more moderate Indian policy than his opponents.
41
In early 1838, however, Harrison did offer a small glimpse into his views on Indian 
removal. In a widely reprinted speech to the Historical Society of Ohio, Harrison 
presented A Discourse on the Aborigines of the Ohio Valley, a brief treatise detailing the 
conquests of the Iroquois nation in the seventeenth century. As a history it was at times 
subpar - imagining that the Aztecs had once settled Ohio centuries before - and at times 
insightful - correctly casting doubt on the extent of Iroquois control in the Ohio valley 
prior to the French and Indian War. Most of all, this history had a clear, if convoluted, 
ideological bent. Primarily, Harrison hoped to explain how his own history as an Indian 
remover could be distinguished from Jackson’s relentless, institutionalized directives. To 
do so, Harrison relied on two arguments. In the first, Harrison noted his presence at the 
1795 Treaty of Greenville and explained, through his long historical narrative, that he had 
acted to deprive the Northwest Indian nations of land which was theirs only by conquest, 
rather than by right. Second, he enunciated a more traditional view of early republic 
Indian policy, arguing that the treaties to which he was a party always required the United 
States to act as “sole protectors” of the Indians and, if the country failed to honor its 
obligations, it was the fault of local agents acting independently of their superiors. 
Harrison, who had defeated Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh, signaled himself to be an 
Indian sympathizer, the last true believer in the dreams of his predecessors. Nevertheless, 
                                                          
41
 For an examination of Harrison’s silences, see Robert Gunderson, The Log-Cabin Campaign (Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1957). For a divergent view see Holt, Rise and Fall of the Whig Party 89-121; 
Norma Peterson, The Presidencies of William Henry Harrison and John Tyler (Lawrence: University of 
Kansas Press, 1989). For his career in Indiana and his involvement in the most exploitative aspects of 
Jefferson’s Indian policy, see Robert M. Owens, Mr. Jefferson's Hammer: William Henry Harrison and the 
Origins of American Indian Policy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007).
229
though he regretted that the Indians had their land and mourned their eventual extinction, 
he felt no guilt for his own actions. The appropriation of Indian lands and the subjugation 
of Indian peoples were a perpetual fact of North American history. He was not the man to 
reverse that trajectory.
42
According to Harrison, there once lived in the valley an Indian people with whom 
his audience would have identified. They were “numerous,” living in “considerable 
cities,” “agricultural,” and in “possession of domestic animals.” These peaceful Indians 
lived happily, in Harrison’s words, “in the full enjoyment of all that peace and liberty can 
give,” until the arrival of the Iroquois nation. In the face of overwhelming force, the 
villagers of the valley resisted bravely and left no plunder for the conquering Iroquois, 
but perished nonetheless. After establishing their claims to the valley, the Iroquois 
sporadically allied with the British against the nascent American state, until their decisive 
loss at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. He ended with a paean to Indian character and by 
reminding his listeners that the United States may have defaulted on some of its promises 
to its Indian neighbors, but any misrepresentation was not the fault of Jefferson, Madison, 
or Monroe, but that of Indian agents on the ground.
43
By implication, Harrison offered a truly hands-off federal Indian policy. His final 
affirmation of Indian character had the air, not of a commendation but of a eulogy. He 
imagined a continent best by cycles of invasion and appropriation. As the Iroquois had 
displaced the peaceful, civilized Indian nations of the Ohio valley, the United States 
would do the same. As it was common knowledge that the Seminoles had arrived in 
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Florida a century before, the implication of Harrison’s speech was that their hold on to 
Florida land was no more legitimate than that of the Iroquois on Ohio. American 
appropriation was natural and just. Taken as a whole, Harrison’s history served as tacit 
approval for Jackson’s policies and foreshadowed that he would not, indeed by his telling 
could not, arrest the march of aggressive expansion.
Following Whig success in the statewide elections of early 1840, Harrison’s victory 
appeared increasingly assured and his campaign took on the appearance of a victory 
march. Perhaps the greatest celebration took place at the old Tippecanoe battleground. 
There, 10,000 Harrison supporters gathered to celebrate their candidate. In his honor, 
delegations from across Indiana and neighboring states crafted elaborate floats and 
performed a lengthy parade. According to one report, the most elaborate of the group was 
a float from Cambridge City, Indiana. On one side, it displayed a beautiful landscape 
with an eagle holding in its beak the names of the Whig ticket. On the other side, it 
displayed Martin Van Buren and a Seminole chief, Van Buren begging and begging for 
peace on any terms, but being rebuffed by the intransigent chief. In the foreground, 
bloodhounds lay bleeding and castigated Van Buren for his failure of leadership. This 
was not the float of a campaign intent on conciliation. Numerous newspaper articles 
compared the records of William Henry Harrison and Martin Van Buren as Indian killers, 
finding, as one might expect, Harrison’s credentials far outpaced those of Van Buren. 
Even Florida’s delegate to the House, necessarily the biggest war hawk in Congress, 
switched his allegiance from Van Buren to Harrison. The general had earned his fame at 
Tippecanoe and proudly bore that legacy. It was in that spirit that William Henry 
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Harrison won the election of 1840.
44
As Harrison took office, the political fault lines of the Second Seminole War were 
set. With a few exceptions, Democrats had coalesced around Benton’s proposal, finding 
it an efficient means of winning the war and seizing Florida. They did not turn their backs 
on conquest - the Second Seminole War remained predicated on appropriating Seminole 
land and consolidating United States authority - they seized upon the use of settlers as 
another means of achieving it. All of the nation’s most influential Whigs save John 
Quincy Adams, including Harrison, Clay, Webster, Granger, Cushing, Wise, and Bell, 
had come out in favor of incorporating Florida into national fabric under the aegis of 
white expansionism. In Washington, the only avowed opponents of Indian expansion 
were a diverse group of reformers and abolitionists who connected the consolidation of 
Florida with the expansion of slavery. A fringe group, they nonetheless utilized the 
Second Seminole War as justification to oppose national expansion and support a federal 
government predicated on moral rectitude in place of the language of force. They toiled 
largely in obscurity until the last years of the war.
Prior to the rise of war-inspired antislavery, the interregnum between Harrison’s 
election and the fateful day of his inauguration was a quiet one. The newly crowned 
leader of his party, the general consolidated the support of his allies in Congress and cast 
his gaze forward, to the next four years as the leader of his nation. In Florida, the army 
entered a waiting game, months of dull, monotonous service as soldiers awaited action 
from the Seminoles or commands from their new commander in chief. Across the 
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country, representatives of both political parties made vital decisions. For his part, 
Harrison offered the first clue of his Indian policy. For his cabinet he chose John Bell, the 
author of the Indian Removal Act, to lead the War Department and oversee his 
relationship with dozens of Indian nations.
45
Throughout the first four years of the war, many Americans dissented from the war 
policies of Jackson and Van Buren. The Democratic insistence on the obliteration of 
nonwhite sovereignty and the re-enslavement of the Black Seminoles was, in some 
circles, highly contentious.  Generals attempted to conciliate with their enemies absent 
orders, officers requested reassignment away from the front and resigned their 
commissions, and antislavery writers railed against the injustice of the war. In the 
Congress of the 1830s, at the dawn of the highly partisan second party system, the air was 
comparatively still. Nearly every member considered Seminole removal, whether by 
violence or through more passive means, necessary and welcome. Five years before, 
prominent politicians had castigated Jackson for repudiating the idealism of early 
republic Indian policy, but confronted with those actions in practice, they refrained from 
criticism. In the face of the slave power, the most influential Whigs in the country 
remained silent. In 1830, Henry Clay had declared his predecessors’ pledge that the 
Indians were secure in owning the land upon which they lived a “solemn annunciation” 
of principle. In 1836, he, and many others, faithfully endorsed the underlying principles 
of Jackson’s Second Seminole War.
46
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Chapter 5
“The Very Obscurest of the Obscure”: 
The Second Seminole War and the Future of Antislavery in the United States
In 1858, sitting Representative Joshua Giddings of Ohio decided to write a 
history. A newly minted Republican, he had served for twenty years and outlived three of 
the political parties to which he had once belonged, the Whigs, the Free Soilers, and the 
Opposition Party. As one of the nation’s most prominent antislavery voices, he had 
weathered the decades with few political allies and countless foes. Now, after the 
Mexican-American War, after the enactment of the fugitive slave law, after Bleeding 
Kansas, after Dred Scott, his supporters were legion. It was fortunate, for recent events 
filled Giddings with dread. Filibusterers with southern ties had conquered Nicaragua, 
recent Democratic administrations had launched wars against both Mormons in Utah and 
Seminoles in Florida, and proslavery partisans had recently succeeded in passing their 
Lecompton Constitution in Kansas to the applause of the president himself. The 
boundaries of slavery’s empire appeared to stretch far over the horizon. When Giddings 
wrote his history, then, he chose the Second Seminole War as his subject for good reason. 
Identifying a persistent and perfidious plot to re-enslave the Black Seminoles twenty 
years before, Giddings warned his readers that “many of the scenes which were enacted 
in Florida, will most likely be again presented on our southwestern frontier … and the 
same effects will be likely to follow.” The roots, and the wounds, of the proslavery 
empire were deep.
1
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Two decades before, Giddings was not alone in opposing the Second Seminole 
War. Other antislavery activists, ranging from members of Congress like John Quincy 
Adams to outsiders like William Lloyd Garrison, had made the same logical leap as 
Giddings, connecting Indian removal to national expansion and, inexorably, to the 
extension of slavery. Together they crafted an alternate account of the Second Seminole 
War, their critique the only coherent and truly oppositional narrative emphasizing and 
condemning the conflict’s roots in the appropriation of Indian territory and the re-
enslavement of African-Americans. Though many of these leading antislavery reformers 
were Whigs, unlike the vast majority of their colleagues and allies, they did not criticize 
Democratic handling of the war, but instead imagined an America that did not fight wars 
of expansion at all. Seemingly astray in the wilderness in the 1830s – Waddy Thompson, 
a Whig representative from South Carolina, dismissed Giddings and his allies during 
debates over the Second Seminole War as “the very obscurest of the obscure members of 
the Whig party” - there they first perceived the links between expansion, slavery, and 
their nation’s destiny. And, just seven years after Giddings publicly launched the most 
intense attack on the war yet heard in 1841, a denunciation of slavery so vigorous 
Giddings’ fellow representatives censured him, Democratic congressmen proposed the 
Wilmot Proviso, abolishing slavery in all lands seized during the Mexican-American 
War. Though David Wilmot and Joshua Giddings had precious little in common in 
manner or ideology, the Wilmot Proviso would have been unthinkable without the 
tireless agitation of antislavery activists throughout the 1830s. In forcefully 
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demonstrating the inextricable connection between the expansion of slavery and the 
expansion of the nation, reformers made possible the widespread adoption of all manner 
of antislavery positions, from free soil to abolition.
2
The Second Seminole War united disparate activists by recasting the terms of the 
slavery debate as an appeal to Northerners’ self-interest rather than their empathy for the 
enslaved. Instead of debating the most effective means of uprooting slavery, reformers 
criticized what they identified as the maneuverings of the Slave Power and the allocation 
of Northern resources for Southern priorities. In criticizing the Second Seminole War, 
reformers drastically constricted their attacks on the immorality of American society, but 
concomitantly presented goals more palatable to a wider populace by connecting the 
reach of slavery to concrete government policies that imperiled them. Though they 
evoked a chimera - a nefarious cabal of slaveholders subverting the democratic 
institutions of their nation - some reformers glimpsed a more terrifying truth: government 
officials had so internalized the interests of slaveholders that there was no distinction 
between the two. The government was itself the Slave Power.
3
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The United States was on the precipice, of this, many abolitionists were sure. 
History, from the Romans to the Spanish, tinged with their own evangelical perspective, 
led them to fear the general curve
of the nation’s destiny. They 
understood the impulses behind 
Thomas Cole’s opus of the mid 
1830s, The Course of Empire, a 
five-part series of paintings 
depicting the rise of a great civilization from the pastoral landscape and its eventual ruin. 
Similarly, they reflected William Apess’ subversive 1836 re-interpretation of King 
Philip’s War, Eulogy for King Philip, in which the Indian writer transformed the British 
into vandals and Philip into George Washington himself. Only in his telling, this 
Washington died on the Delaware. From the perspective of many abolitionists, in its 
aggression, the United States faced those two dire fates: a moral reckoning with the 
almighty over the curse of slavery or corrupted prosperity, only further proving Apess’s 
aspersions correct.
4
An examination of the abolitionist response to the Second Seminole War reveals 
that by the late 1830s, their critique of Indian removal was deeply ingrained into their 
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ideology. Their opposition to the Second Seminole War was inseparable from their 
opposition to slavery, not merely parallel to it. As William Jay argued in writing for the 
American Anti-Slavery Society in 1839, “the Seminoles have been goaded into their 
extraordinary and desperate resistance, by the frauds and robberies of slaveholders,”
American aggression on the frontier serving as further proof of the iniquity of the Slave 
Power. For antislavery activists, the extent to which slaveholders, in and out of the 
federal government, pursued the destruction of the Seminoles provided one of their first 
warnings of the strength, organization, and immorality of their foe. These tidings, fearful 
in their implication, united antislavery congressmen in the fight against the repressive gag 
rule that stifled debate over slavery in Congress, agitated countless antislavery activists 
against the prospect of further expansive war, and prepared them to recognize and combat 
the excesses of Manifest Destiny.
5
Reformers identified Indian removal with slavery so easily because, in the case of
the Seminoles, the connection was readily apparent. Northern reformers came to know 
the texture of Seminole culture, especially the relative integration of enslaved African-
Americans into Seminole families and society. Those versed in history (and abolitionists, 
if nothing else, memorized their history), knew of the Negro Fort and the American 
expedition that had crushed the last vestige of independent black autonomy in the 
southeast. They read of the survivors and their descendants, along with the dozens of 
runaway slaves and hundreds of slaves whom the Seminoles had purchased legally, and 
knew they represented an African-American community largely isolated from the rigid 
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racialization of the Deep South of the 1830s. When the war began, they, like most white 
Americans, considered the climate south of St. Augustine to be so inhospitable as to 
approach noxiousness. If the land itself was worthless, they concluded, the government 
had launched the war at the behest of slaveholders with the intention of re-enslaving 
hundreds of Black Seminoles, potential fomenters of rebellion and themselves worth a 
fortune in human capital.
6
Glimpses and Conjectures
Antislavery reformers cared deeply about the fate of Florida as it stood alone 
among United States territories as a potential slave state. Following Arkansas’ entrance 
into the Union in 1836, the rigid logic of the Missouri Compromise was clear. Based of 
the current boundaries of the United States if, if, the nation did not expand further, then 
the only territories eligible to enter the Union as slaves states would be Florida and 
Oklahoma. The latter, given its status as an Indian territory and lack of institutional 
organization, was unlikely to apply for statehood in the near future. Consequently, 
abolitionists in the 1830s offered a litmus test to politicians based on three criteria -
outlawing the interstate commerce of slavery and abolition in both the District of 
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Columbia and Florida. The Second Seminole War represented the frontlines in the war to 
expand or contain slavery’s reach.
7
Throughout the late 1830s and early 1840s, the Second Seminole War was one of 
a number of events that inspired the nascent anti-expansionism of the movement. With 
the legal termination of the international slave trade, they understood, as did their 
opponents, that the future of the institution lay beyond its present borders. Consequently, 
as early as 1837, abolitionist William Ellery Channing’s writings took the form of 
jeremiads, warning national leaders that “the annexation of Texas … would be more than 
rashness; it would be madness” and imagining a dark future in which his country would 
“enter on a career of encroachment, war, and crime” against its neighbors.
8
By the beginning of the war, antislavery reformers worried that all had already 
been lost. On May 25th, 1836, John Quincy Adams took his customary seat in the House 
of Representatives. He was an old man, but at the age of 68 he still retained vestiges of 
his youthful vigor. That day, he spoke for an hour, and without notes. Ostensibly he 
commented on a resolution offering aid to displaced settlers during the ongoing Creek 
War, yet as he spoke, Adams wandered back to topics that had long troubled him, topics 
deeply enmeshed with the growing chaos on the nation’s frontiers. He touched upon the 
importance of the war powers of Congress and crafted a logical proof necessarily linking 
them to the regulation of slavery. He wondered at the insecurity of mass bondage as the 
nation waged Indian wars throughout the southeast. He worried that, even as he spoke, 
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chauvinistic Anglo-Saxons were pressuring his nation into war with Mexico, a war that 
would further intertwine the interests of the nation with the interests of slavery. He 
recalled earlier in the same session of Congress, when he had joined in the rush for 
national expansion by voting along with the majority to appropriate nearly one hundred 
thousand dollars to enlarge the standing army and recruit tens of thousands of volunteers 
to fight the Seminoles. He remembered his own role in the annexation of Florida and a
brief conversation nearly twenty years ago with Andrew Jackson, then a brash young 
general with many glories in front of him, in which both agreed it was in the nation’s 
interest to annex Florida. He remembered an even earlier time and an earlier frontier
policy in which Washington and Jefferson dealt with Indians fairly, through a system of 
treaties and laws, and had sincerely offered land to the displaced, civilization to the 
savage, and peace to the war torn. Now, he saw only land hunger, disregard for the law, 
and the unrelenting use of force. Taking it all together, the slave in chains, the Indian at 
war, and a country with a greedy eye on every border, Adams wondered how the 
cacophonous regions of the country could possibly unite as one to support, what he 
termed, a “nation starting upon a crusade of conquest.”
9
Adams stood alone. With the removal of the Cherokees nearly assured, most 
reformers were rapidly losing interest in defending the concept of Indian sovereignty in 
the abstract. Compounding their withdrawal, the great voices of opposition to Indian 
removal had themselves been silenced. Jeremiah Evarts, the nation’s most prominent 
advocate for Christian republicanism who had agitated tirelessly in defense of the 
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Cherokees, had passed away five years before. Former Senator Frederick Frelinghuysen, 
the evangelical who had unremittingly led the parliamentary fight against the Indian 
Removal Act, left the Senate nine months before the start of the Second Seminole War. 
As for their colleagues, most had predicated their opposition to removal explicitly on the 
basis of assimilation. If the Cherokees adopted enough of the conceits of American 
culture, they argued, their removal would be inimical to American values. In that 
discourse, there was no space to defend the rights of the Seminoles, who were manifestly 
uninterested in adopting either Southern culture rooted in chattel slavery or converting to 
Christianity in any form. Catherine Beecher, for example, defended the Cherokees 
because individual members of the nation had the potential to be bright, brave, honorable, 
and, above all, Christian. Some Seminoles, by her lights, would have been honorable and 
many brave, but few would be considered bright and none Christian.
10
Despite the differences between Seminole and Cherokee culture, some reformers 
did oppose the Second Seminole War on the same grounds as they had in the past. In that 
vein, a writer for the Providence Journal proposed that the nation undertake in place of 
physical violence, “Quaker fighting,” and use all the money wasted in the war to civilize, 
educate, and elevate the Seminoles, an strategy he believed would be both cheaper and 
more humane than warfare. It was in that spirit that Representative Horace Everett, a 
Whig from Vermont, uttered the first full-throated condemnation of the war in the halls 
of Congress. Everett, one of the leading defenders of Cherokee claims in Georgia, 
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recapitulated the arguments others had mustered against the 1830 Indian Removal Act, 
transposing his previous support for the Cherokees to the Seminoles.
11
In his speech, Everett questioned not whether the Seminoles should be removed, 
but the means used to compel them to do so. If the Seminoles were party to a freely 
negotiated treaty, he claimed he would happily assent to their removal, but, given the 
numerous inconsistencies surrounding the Treaty of Payne’s Landing, he could not do so. 
Everett admitted that in the past he had assumed the majority of the members of Congress 
agreed with him, but recent debates had disabused him of that notion. To his 
astonishment, it seemed to him that the majority of his peers assumed “we cannot, 
consistently with our national honor, hold treaties, or even attempt a pacification of 
hostile Indians.” With disgust, he repeated his colleagues’ new enunciation of principle: 
“they must be whipped before they can be removed.” In light of the pathetic progress of 
the war effort, Everett countered that it seemed his opponents believed their nation would 
find more honor in military defeat than a negotiated victory. 
Given the ways in which government agents had compelled, prodded, deceived, 
and coerced the Seminoles into signing away their land, Everett wondered why the 
United States had gone to so much trouble to defraud the Seminoles out of a swamp-
filled and disease-ridden peninsula. Everett provided two reasons. First, and most 
conspicuously, whites desired Seminole land. Second, Everett hypothesized that 
Southerners eyed more than just land; they wanted the Black Seminoles as well. Everett 
argued that given the land hunger of settlers on the frontier, the avarice of slaveholders, 
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and the resulting hostility of both Seminoles and Black Seminoles, the chances of a war 
of conquest approached inevitability.
12
This crushing fear of the future, of a war machine that might prove unrelenting, 
animated many abolitionists. David Lee Child, a Massachusetts lawyer, and his wife 
Lydia Maria Child, wrote extensively on the evils of slavery and the threat of its 
imminent amalgamation with national expansion. Recoiling against news that Edmund 
Pendleton Gaines had called forth volunteers from the Deep South to march against 
Mexican Indians, Child wondered at the morality of a country that so casually would 
invade a friendly nation. No, Child concluded, “this nation has grown too familiar with 
unlawful violence and unpunished usurpations.” As proof, Child referred to the Second 
Seminole War and to an unnamed northern senator who had proposed an appropriation of 
half a million dollars for, as Child put it, “slaughtering the persecuted and helpless 
children of the forest.” When the senator was asked of the cause of the war, he replied 
“that really he did not know what was the cause of the war – but he knew that war existed 
and must be prosecuted!”
13
If Northern politicians would not question the origins of the war, it would fall to 
others. Child and other abolitionists uncovered a series of reports that, taken together, 
expanded on Everett’s initial contention that slavery lay at the root of the Second 
Seminole War. Child himself asserted that the war originated from “an order from the 
President to kidnap Indian babes and make slaves of them.” The New York Journal of 
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Commerce, the newspaper of the famed abolitionist Arthur Tappan, relayed the story of 
Econchattimico, an Indian chief allied with white settlers in northern Florida. 
Econchattimico had dutifully ordered his warriors to aid the Americans against the 
Seminoles and, after raising the ire of his white allies, had freely surrendered his own 
firearms. That presented white ruffians from Georgia with an opportunity. After floating 
down the Chattahoochee River, they accosted the chief and seized his slaves, claiming 
they were fulfilling the orders of the president. Having already surrendered his arms, 
Econchattimico had no choice but to surrender his slaves in turn. Abolitionists argued 
that word of such slave-kidnapping had spread throughout Florida prior to the war, 
convincing many wavering Seminoles that to lay down their arms would be tantamount 
to forfeiting their property.
14
At the start of 1837, their rhetorical attacks intensified following reports of a more 
prominent Indian victim. In the aftermath of the Battle of the Withlacoochee, Osceola 
had already distinguished himself as one of the most capable military commanders on the 
continent. By 1837, his fame had spread to the point that an editor of a horse racing 
digest declared he would no longer register horses as “Oseola,” the name being already 
so prevalent that it made distinguishing between its owners impossible. Always 
considered, rightly or wrongly, the leading military commander among the Seminoles, 
Osceola was likely the most famous living Indian in the country.
15
And he was a wronged Indian. Many newspapers had taken to reprinting a brief 
excerpt concerning Osceola from Meyer Cohen’s recently published narrative of the war. 
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To the excerpt a number of abolitionist papers appended a short note relating an 
extraordinary story: Osceola’s wife had been born the daughter of a runaway mixed reace 
slave and, a year before the outbreak of the war, had been claimed as the property of her 
mother’s former owner. Osceola 
raged at the slaveowner and, as the 
note stated, tried to free her by 
force. In his rage, he was restrained 
and imprisoned by federal Indian 
agent Wiley Thompson, indirectly 
causing the war. By the end of 1838, the event had entered accepted abolitionist lore, 
earning a prominent place in the American Anti-Slavery Almanac. There, under a heading 
reading “the nation robbing an Indian chief of his wife,” was a lithograph depicting 
Osceola chained to a log watching helplessly as slave catchers dragged his wife away. 
His daughter clung to him fearfully as another Indian woman in the distance raised her 
arm in distress. Osceola’s expression was one of helplessness and pain, not vengeance. 
The caption of the engraving asked rhetorically, “what marvel that an Indian Chief, as he 
looked on his little daughter and thought of his stolen wife, vowed vengeance on the 
robbers?”
16
Though the veracity of the account remains highly suspect, one can hardly blame 
abolitionists for endorsing it. Antislavery newspapers had widely circulated the truthful 
story of Econchattimico, making Osceola’s plight seem all the more realistic. Moreover, 
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abolitionists needed little imagination to believe stories of slaveowner cruelly cleaving 
families in two and restraining enraged parents at the point of a gun. Such scenes 
occurred with regularity throughout the Americas. Given the numerous intermarriages 
between Seminoles and Black Seminoles, the very real possibility that Osceola himself 
had a black wife, and the evident interest of dozens of powerful slaveowners throughout 
the Deep South in the Seminoles’ black allies, if the story of Osceola’s wife was a 
misattribution or an outright fabrication, it was false only in that it was not the original 
sin of the Florida War. Certainly, slaveowners had committed dozens of similar crimes 
and far worse along the Florida frontier. The story of Osceola’s daughter represented a 
host of crimes, real yet unrecorded, shrouded yet consequential.
17
The focus on the forced dissolution of Indian-black families especially resonated 
with female reformers, who often highlighted slavery’s destructive effect on slave 
families in their discourse. Throughout the duration of the war, female anti-slavery 
societies inundated Congress with scores of anti-slavery petitions, all of which were 
suppressed by the longstanding gag rule which forbade the discussion of slavery within 
the chamber. In contrast, their public voices only rose in volume. When she addressed the 
Massachusetts State Legislature in 1838 and became the first woman in the history of the 
United States to address a legislative body, Angelina Grimke moved her male audience 
through an allusion to the Second Seminole War, urging them to picture a family with an 
Indian father and a fugitive slave mother. Then, she told them, imagine a slaveholder 
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coming to the Indian’s home and demanding possession of the Indian’s wife. Then, after 
receiving payment for the wife, the planter returned, this time demanding possession of 
her children. “Do you blame the Indian, that he keenly felt this cruelty and wrong?,” 
Grimke asked, momentarily forsaking her commitment to pacifism. “Do you wonder that, 
rather than yield his children to the slaveholder, he dug up the hatchet and stood forth to 
die!” Writing in gendered terms, an observer reported that in the faces of the men in 
attendance, a sudden glow entered their face, “a flush of mingled shame and enthusiasm; 
the eyes of gray-haired men filled with unwonted tears.” The crimes of the Second 
Seminole War were not abstract; they were of a piece with an evil some in the North 
knew all too well.
18
In her 1837 book, Society in America, Harriet Martineau became the first reformer 
to fully grasp the implications of United States expansion policy by aligning the Second 
Seminole War with the Louisiana Purchase and the ongoing Texan Revolution. Though 
others, such as David Lee Child with his theory that slaveholder ambition to seize mixed-
race babies instigated the war, had connected the Florida War to slavery, Martineau 
prominently offered a more coherent connection between slavery, nationalism, and 
expansion. A social theorist from England, Martineau was a prolific writer whose best 
work, in the eyes of many, stands behind only De Tocqueville among travelers’ accounts 
of American society. During her travels, Martineau had befriended several likeminded 
abolitionists, attended the Boston Ladies’ Anti-Slavery Society in 1835, and financially 
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supported William Lloyd Garrison’s work. Her evaluation of the Second Seminole War, 
broke new ground by grasping the implications of Indian warfare and indentifying how 
Southern slaveholders had wed white supremacy to nationalism.
19
Martineau expanded on Child’s offhand remark that the war originated in 
slaveholder claims over mixed-race children of Seminole fathers and runaway slave 
mothers. According to Martineau, the Seminoles’ refusal to surrender their children, 
along with the fear of Deep South slaveholders that Seminole territory in Florida offered 
a sanctuary to runaway slaves, explained a war in which “many fine young men have 
gone down into Florida, and lost their lives in battle, without being aware that they were 
fighting for oppressors against the oppressed.” She regretted that “in the eyes of those of 
the people who do not yet see the whole case,” rather than blame slaveowners they 
instead “breathe an intense hatred against the Seminole Indians” and subsist on a 
“perpetual boast” that celebrated national expansion.
20
To Martineau, the Florida War represented the second of three violent expansions 
that would come to redefine the United States, each subsequent event more unjust than 
the last. First the peaceful purchase of Louisiana and, with it, acres of virgin soil for 
slavery. Second, a war launched against Indians to protect and extend slavery. Third, a 
future grand campaign against Mexico that would seize Texas and deliver new land to 
slaveholders, further cementing their hold on the United States Congress through 
increased representation. She detected a clear pattern. White settlers would set their eyes 
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on nonwhite property, United States leaders would extinguish sovereign nations to 
acquire it, and the victims would be absorbed into the nation as subordinate members.
In a similar manner, William Jay, son of John Jay and one of the most prominent 
and conservative abolitionists of the 1830s, painstakingly connected the Florida War to 
the desperate maneuvers of the Slave Power. Jay seized on Thomas Jesup’s admission 
that the United Sates had “committed the error of attempting to remove [the Seminoles] 
when their lands were not required for agricultural purposes; whey they were not in the 
way of the white inhabitants, and when the greater portion of their country was an 
unexplored wilderness.” To Jay, only slavery could explain the paradox of a nation 
declaring war on an isolated group of Indians to possess the backwaters of a continent. 
Jay mined the letters of public officials, marking down every slaveholder petition that 
urged the consolidation of American control over the frontier, every slave catcher who 
agitated the Seminoles, every attempt to pressure Indians into selling their slaves. He 
concluded that the Florida War resulted from the will of a slave empire made manifest.
21
Ideologically, Jay had inherited the Federalism of his father and it led him to 
believe in federal institutions as the engines of social progress so long as citizens were 
willing to sacrifice their personal interest for the good of their nation. Slavery, due to the 
penumbra of legal protections necessary to safeguard it and the physical force necessary 
to enforce it, violated that equilibrium by subsuming the interests of the nation beneath 
the priorities of a subset of its citizens. Though his beliefs derived from an entirely 
antiquated political tradition, they helped Jay explicate the sectional tensions inherent in 
the Second Seminole War. In the introduction to his book, A View of the Actions of the 
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Federal Government on Behalf of Slavery, Jay warned that should antislavery reformers 
falter, Texas, then the Mississippi Valley, then finally the Atlantic states, in turn would 
fall to slavery’s dominion. The Second Seminole War impacted the North, not merely 
because its citizens were dying in the Florida wilderness, but because, as the war 
expanded the reach of slavery, it furthered the agenda of slaveholders intent on 
undermining free-state culture. A writer for Tappan’s The Emancipator simplified his 
contentions, wondering, “will the people of the North any longer consent to such an 
unrighteous war, for the avowed benefit of southern slavery?”
22
Jay opposed the Second Seminole War out of a belief it clashed with Northern 
moral values. He ignored Indian rights altogether, ironically aside from their right not to 
be defrauded out of their slaves. Indeed, the best thing Jay had to say of the Seminoles 
was that they were kinder masters than their white neighbors. In attacking the Second 
Seminole War, Jay articulated rationales aside from the attempts at moral suasion that 
dotted traditional reformer critiques of Cherokee removal. By identifying the actions the 
federal government had undertaken in defense of slavery, Jay dispassionately pointed out 
the practical effects of slaveholder control over the federal government. He understood 
the power of what Martineau had labeled the “intense hatred” of the Seminoles to 
transform racial enmity into a nationalistic policy that prioritized slaveowner interests. By 
disassociating expansion from nationalism and rejecting the Second Seminole War as a 
plot of the Deep South, Jay made a persuasive case against the war.  
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Through the army’s use of bloodhounds in Florida, a number of reformers found 
another medium through which to cast doubt on the character of national expansion. 
Bloodhounds, who many Americans already associated with violence against slaves 
following the maroon wars of the Caribbean, provided a clear linkage between the 
violence of a war against Indians and the violence inherent within America’s slave 
system. The use of the dogs offered the abolitionists a simple morality tale: slaveholders 
had begun the war in perfidy, and now the federal government would go to any length to 
win it. In dismay, a writer for The Liberator cursed that “enlightened, republican, 
christian America” had now imported bloodhounds “to measure out destruction to a 
people whose crime is, that their chief sought to regain his stolen wife.” James Birney’s 
Philanthropist connected the dots: “the proposition to use bloodhounds against the 
Indians, could never have originated in a country where it was not rather a common 
practice to use them, for hunting down slaves.” Activists inundated Congress with 
petitions, 162 by one historian’s count, remonstrating against the use of the hounds. 
Primed by four years of conflict to view the war through the prism of slavery, reformers 
argued that the bloodhounds further demonstrated the entanglement of federal Indian 
policy and slavery.
23
Abolitionist attacks on the bloodhounds repeatedly invoked the use of the dogs by 
the Spanish against Indians in the distant past. Notoriously, Spanish conquistadores had 
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loosed ferocious dogs of war against the Aztecs in Mexico during the conquest of 
Tenochtitlan in the sixteenth century. Bartolomé de Las Casas, the first and most 
prominent critic of Spanish imperialism, had himself decried the terrible beasts who had 
torn their enemies to pieces. The use of the bloodhounds, together with stories of Indian 
enslavement, massacre, and torture, had convinced Anglos and Americans to view the 
Spanish empire as one of domination and subordination, one that sunk to lower depths 
than England’s own slave empire. References to Spain offered an incisive commentary 
on the moral bearing of the United States. In that vein, The Emancipator wryly suggested 
that “if our slaveholding republic is in such hot haste to exclude itself from the 
communion of civilized nations … perhaps the best thing they could do would be to 
emulate the cruelty of Cortez and the early Spaniards.” A poem for the Philadelphia 
paper The North American made the comparison even more explicitly: “Rise up old 
Spain! and send thy warning voice / Across the waves. To save a nation rise, / (Who 
young in years but old in tyranny / Steps in the bloody foot-prints left by thee,).”
24
To abolitionists, the Florida War revealed an empire in decline. Setbacks marked 
the declension of American morals. For northern reformers, most of whom were devout 
Christians, every defeat served as further proof that the United States traveled an ominous 
path. The importation of the bloodhounds, a barefaced act of both desperation and 
immorality, further confirmed their fears. Thus, when the New-Yorker complained that “it 
would not seem that the aboriginal Floridians are not to be destroyed without leaving a 
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blot and a stigma upon our national character,” or Nathaniel Southard, an abolitionist 
editor, printed a lithograph depicting the bloodhounds’ bloody assault upon defenseless 
Indians, they reflected as much on the decrepit state of the nation’s conscience as on the 
war effort. Antislavery critics thought themselves to be under no delusions. They fully 
believed that the Seminoles’ extermination, though unjust, was imminent. They were sure 
that the bloodhounds, by all accounts ferocious beasts, would make short work of their 
prey. The true national dilemma lay in the future – if the people of the United States 
further countenanced the institution of slavery, they would surely invite further 
retribution from above.
25
If the Second Seminole War manifested their fears, many abolitionists 
nevertheless believed that the central confrontation between the Slave Power and national 
interest lay in the future, with Texas. The two frontiers, Florida and Texas, were linked in 
the eyes of many, the Texas Revolution beginning only months before the ambush of 
Dade’s command. In both cases, abolitionists thought the root cause of violence to be the 
same: unscrupulous, land hungry, and slave-amassing whites had trampled laws and 
invaded foreign territory. They considered the Florida War and the possible annexation of 
Texas to be radical alterations of American policy, terrible portents of a war-torn future. 
With despair, William Ellery Channing, contemplated the annexation of Texas in light of 
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the Seminole War and imagined constant warfare: “Is the tragedy of Florida to be acted 
again and again in our own day, and in our children’s?”
26
That slavery was one of the primary motivations for the annexation of Texas was 
plain to see, plainer even than in Florida. State legislatures across the north passed 
resolutions against annexation while petitioners garnered hundreds of thousands of 
signatures, plainly stating, as one Pennsylvania broadsheet did, “the recognition of Texas 
and its annexation to the United States is a grand scheme of the slave holding party in this 
country to extend their power and perpetuate the atrocities of their oppressive system.” 
Abolitionist newspapers constantly updated their readers on the threat Texas represented, 
and, in 1837 alone, two of the most prominent abolitionists in the country, Channing and 
Benjamin Lundy, published extended tracts warning of the imminent crime against 
Mexico. Given that both Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren refrained even from 
recognizing Texan independence and that only state legislatures in the Deep South 
publicly campaigned for Texas’ incorporation, the level of abolitionist activism was 
remarkable.
27
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As was the case with their opposition to the Florida War, abolitionists castigated 
the legal and cultural mores which obscured the causes of the potential war. Calling to 
mind Harriet Martineau’s assertion that over-attenuated nationalism blinded Americans 
to the true nature of the Second Seminole War, Lundy complained that “the real objects 
of this war are not understood by … the honest, disinterested, and well-meaning citizens 
of the United States.” He insisted the public mistakenly believed that the revolutionaries 
contended for “the sacred principles of Liberty, and the natural, inalienable Rights of 
Man,” but in reality they fought to extend the dominion of slavery. Likewise, Channing 
explained that while many considered the Texas Revolution to resemble the American 
Revolution, in reality, “the Texas revolt, if regarded in its causes and its means of 
success, is criminal.” When, in 1838, the House of Representatives moved to vote on a 
joint resolution for annexation, John Quincy Adams staged one of the most drawn-out 
quasi-filibusters in American history, intermittently devouring floor-time over the course 
of three weeks to forestall debate. He focused intently on the role of the gag rule, 
believing that “the systematic smothering of all petitions against his measure … could 
have no other intention than to disarm the resistance against it which was manifesting 
itself throughout all the slaveless States of the Union.” The silence of slavery had been 
written into the fabric of Congress.
28
Taken together, both frontier conflicts had dire implications for America’s future 
relationship toward the rest of the world. In the pages of a Boston newspaper, a writer 
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penned a remarkable letter tinged with sadness and regret to Mexico’s ambassador to the 
United States. He warned that “our Indian wars and our acquisition of slavery must have 
taught you, that neither the laws of God nor of nations, nor the sanctity of treaties can 
restrain us … We are a stronger people than you, and we want Texas.” His desperate 
counsel echoed John Quincy Adams, who, in 1836, envisioned a future war with Mexico, 
and bleakly asked, addressing his pro-war colleagues, “what will be your cause in such a 
war? Aggression, conquest, and the re-establishment of slavery where it has been 
abolished.” A hollow republic, his country deserved only scorn.
29
Joshua Giddings and the Crime against Congress
When Joshua Giddings launched the most public denunciation of the war to date, 
he did much to combat the political influence of slavery, but little to defend the 
sovereignty of the Seminoles. The legislative battle against the Second Seminole War did 
defeat the gag rule and convert thousands to the cause of antislavery, but it also extricated 
the fate of the Seminoles from the center of the debate. Antislavery critics did much to 
reform the institutions to which they belonged, but little to aid the Seminoles.
30
As they agitated against the presence of slavery in the territories and the District 
of Columbia, antislavery activists chafed against the institutional silence which bound 
them. Following the 1840 elections, in which Adams, Giddings, and William Slade of 
Vermont were joined by fellow antislavery Whigs Francis Andrews of Ohio and Seth 
Gates of New York, the dissidents concluded they had the necessary momentum to 
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challenge the gag rule. As any attempt to confront the issue of slavery directly would be 
immediately defeated by parliamentary rule, the congressmen decided that their best hope 
lay in introducing the subject obliquely, while addressing a bill already before the floor. 
As no other tangential event drew on slavery so directly, the Second Seminole War 
seemed an ideal opportunity.
31
In February 1841, Joshua Giddings seized his chance. Giddings represented the 
Western Reserve in Ohio, a region dominated by evangelical politics, and he disdained 
slavery as anti-republican, a powerful special interest which undermined the intent of the 
Founders. Giddings would grow more radical in later years, but, at the time of the Second 
Seminole War, he claimed to have no intention of threatening Southern slavery.  
Nevertheless, though his climatic speech against the Seminole War was constrained by 
his ideology, it made national waves for more than its tactical brilliance. Marshaling 
letters, petitions, treaties, committee reports, and constitutional theory, Giddings launched 
the most prominent, well-researched, and wide ranging assault against the entanglement 
of slavery and national expansion in United States history to that point. Between the 
passing of the Indian Removal Act and the close of the Mexican-American War, perhaps 
no one more persuasively questioned the underlying assumptions that guided the violent 
expansionism of the United States. Printers ran off thousands of copies of his speech and 
it was distributed throughout the North.
32
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In his speech, Giddings built on the narrative other antislavery activists had 
constructed over the past five years. He told his peers that he intended to trace out a 
single strand of the war, one the current bill had overlooked - an aspect of a war, he said, 
in which “our army has been defeated, and I fear that our national honor has not remained 
altogether untarnished.”  Briefly touching upon the deficiencies of the various treaties 
with the Seminoles, he moved forward to the central problem which confounded him, the 
problem that other abolitionists had wrestled with over the past half-decade: why did the 
United States need, at great expenses of blood and treasure, this one remote, miserable 
tract of land? The answer, of course, was slavery. Citing a letter from Indian Agent Wiley 
Thompson written a year before the outbreak of the war, Giddings noted that the 
Seminoles’ main objection to emigration was the United States’ demand that they 
amalgamate with the Creeks, whose acceptance of chattel slavery would threaten the 
Black Seminoles, with whom many Seminoles had intermarried. The Seminoles were left 
with a choice: emigrate and allow the Creeks to seize their wives and children or remain 
in Florida to deal with the overwhelming might of the United States. Forcefully, Giddings 
cast down the gauntlet: “With them, sir, it was war on one side, and slavery on the other 
… This interference of the Federal Government on behalf of slavery … appears to have 
been the origin of all our Florida difficulties.”  With this, two Georgia representatives, 
both Whigs, jumped to their feet and moved to quiet him, but were overruled.
33
Giddings was no fire breather. He denied that Congress had the authority to 
regulate slavery in the slave states. Nevertheless, he declared the assault on the Seminoles 
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a clear abuse of federal power. Quoting the words of former Florida Governor William 
Duval, Giddings asserted that it became the policy of the government that the Seminoles’ 
“slaves were made to fear for themselves.” Initially citing the example of the 
bloodhounds, Giddings found other examples of “negro stealing,” from the plight of 
Econchattimico to Disbursing Agent Joseph W. Harris’ recommendation that the United 
States fund the war by selling captured slaves. Testing his boundaries, Giddings reminded 
his listeners that “among the people of the free States, nothing is regarded with so much 
disgust and abhorrence as the buying and selling of men, women, and children.” Citing 
slaveholder letters and petitions, Giddings noted that they had opposed every attempt to 
end the war that did not ensure them ownership of the Black Seminoles, placing their 
economic interest above the safety of Florida. Having persuaded Jesup to imprisoned 
captured slaves, they had transformed the government itself into a corporate slaveowner. 
His prescription for ending the war was exceedingly circumscribed. Chase the Indians 
from Florida he said, but allow anyone, black or Indian, who surrendered peacefully free 
passage to the West and a federal guarantee to safeguard his life, liberty, and family.
34
Given his passionate language urging the immediate end of an Indian war, 
Giddings evinced very little concern for the Seminoles themselves, outside of faint regret 
that they would soon be murdered in the name of slavery. As an abolitionist tract, 
Giddings’ speech left much to be desired as well. Comfortable within the moderate wing 
of antislavery, Giddings merely hoped to denationalize slavery and isolate the free states 
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from its influence. If the Slave Power agreed not to involve the North in the perpetuation 
of slavery then Giddings would happily accept that truce. Audacious as it may have been, 
Giddings’ speech reflected the most moderate of antislavery positions and, in its nominal 
opposition to the war, was largely indistinguishable from other mainstream Whig 
critiques.
Where his assault on slavery was merely glancing, his view of his nation’s destiny 
could not be dismissed. As David Lee Child, Harriet Martineau, and John Quincy Adams 
had grouped together Indian Removal and the Texas Revolution as categorically 
identical, Giddings marshaled reams of evidence to do the same, adding factual 
dimensions to their largely circumstantial associations. Giddings was not merely debating 
slavery in the halls of Congress. What made his speech so bracing was its implicit 
argument that slavery and the problems of national expansion could not be unraveled, 
that the central issue of the coming decades would be slavery’s influence on the nation.
In the days following Giddings’ speech, abolitionist papers celebrated his rhetoric, 
not as a bold violation of the gag rule, but as evidence of the perfidy of the slave power in 
Florida. In his report to The Emancipator, correspondent Joshua Leavitt, one of the 
founders of the Liberty Party, wrote breathlessly of Giddings’s charges but mentioned the 
gag rule only obliquely. Throughout the country, Giddings received far more attention for 
the substance of his argument than the mere fact that he had flouted congressional 
procedure. One of Giddings’ local newspapers argued that slaveholders had caused the 
government to spend tens of millions of dollars to recover a few thousand dollars worth 
of human property and concluded “this is to us a most weighty proof of the blinding, 
hardening, and ruinous tendency of the system of negro slavery.” The Philanthropist
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worried that the nation had spent millions to “support a grand slave-catching enterprise” 
all to “lose something in its swamps, more precious than money.” In laying out reasons to 
vote for the Liberty Party, Tappan’s Emancipator explicitly referred to Giddings’ speech 
and promised that the new party would end the war and prevent the country from 
“commencing any more wars for the defence of slaveholding.” The public understood 
Giddings to be anti-war and anti-expansion as much as he was anti-slavery. The genius of 
his argument was that there was no distinction between the two.
35
Fittingly, the day following his speech, Giddings faced withering criticism from 
Representative Mark Anthony Cooper, a Georgia Whig. Cooper had served as a volunteer 
officer in the Second Seminole War, where his passionate states-rights views led him into 
conflict with Winfield Scott. Cooper and his colleague Edward Black of Georgia were 
serving out their terms in Congress as lame ducks, each having lost elections several 
months before. Frustrated due to their defeats and furious at Giddings’ accusations, they 
responded to his speech on the floor of Congress. Black was merely rage personified - he 
spoke for two hours, but reporters only jotted down his threat to Giddings: “come to 
Georgia and avow such sentiments. Let him come to my Country and talk this strain, and 
we will show him the mercies of Lynch Law. We will [give] him an elevation such as he 
had never dreamed of. We will give him blood and thunder, wounds and wonder.”  
According to reports, the House broke out in reams of laughter at his buffoonery, a 
contrast to Black’s deadly serious words.
36
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Cooper spoke as violently, but with more ideological heft. In response to 
Giddings’s annunciation of values, he bound together martial violence, nationalism, and 
white supremacy to offer principles of his own. Where Giddings and his allies 
sympathized with blacks and Indians even in the midst of war, Cooper asserted that he 
and his neighbors would never hesitate to repel Indian attacks against women and 
children. Though Northerners complained of the cost, Cooper asserted that he would 
never tarry: if the nation went to war with Britain over the Canadian border or, as Cooper 
characterized it, a strip of land “fit only for firewood,” Georgians would “hold it to be our 
country’s cause, and for her cause and her honor we would bleed and die.” Pivoting from 
the “negro-stealing” with which Giddings charged Georgia, Cooper asserted that the true 
thieves were Northerners who both aided runaway slaves and obstructed wars of 
subjugation, including the Second Seminole War, whose purposes were to safeguard 
slave property. At the midpoint of his speech, his turned his glare directly to Giddings 
and asserted his opponent had claimed that slavery was the cause of the Florida War, a 
calumny against his region. Giddings, icily returned his gaze and held, “the gentleman is 
right.”
Following their brief confrontation, Cooper held forth his own solution for the 
war. It was to follow the example of Major William Harney, who was famous for 
summarily executing his Indian enemies. According to Cooper, the fatal error of his 
nation’s strategy was “that those who managed the war did not make it a war of 
extermination from the beginning.” Then, overcome with bitterness, Cooper railed at 
Giddings’ fellow Whigs who had refused to disavow his abolitionist rhetoric, accused 
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Giddings of betraying William Henry Harrison and all who voted for him by supporting 
abolition, and announced that his political career had come to an end. He closed by 
urging his fellow southerners to take heed. In Europe and New England, in churches and 
local societies, among men and among women, abolitionists were massing their strength 
and the South must be ready to confront them.
37
Cooper’s plea, certainly not isolated, reverberated beyond the immediate debate, 
as did Giddings’s speech. Over the coming decade, Southern leaders, increasingly aware 
of antislavery mobilization in the North, demanded their Northern allies explicitly 
endorse proslavery measures, regardless of the political effect in their home districts. 
With the triumph of Tennessee’s James K. Polk in securing the Democratic nomination 
for president over New York’s Martin Van Buren, northern Democrats found themselves 
increasingly isolated from the faction in power. Rather than strengthen their bonds of 
interest with the Northern half of its party, the Polk administration instead took its loyalty 
for granted and launched the Mexican-American War, a second expansionary war on the 
frontiers of their nation. He would be the last southern president who could be assured of 
northern support.
The war wound down in abolitionist circles as it did for the rest of the country, 
quietly, and largely without incident. Following the debate over Giddings’s speech, 
Congress passed another appropriation to fund the war over nominal opposition, though 
fighting remained sporadic. When John Tyler finally announced his intentions to bring 
the war to a close in 1842, abolitionists welcomed the news, though they opposed 
Thomas Hart Benton’s Armed Occupation Act as a proslavery measure. Despite fierce 
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abolitionist opposition both in and out of Congress, the bill passed, dealing them another 
defeat. There were, however, wider successes to come.
38
By casting the debate over Florida in such stark terms and in such a public 
moment, Giddings had helped to inextricably link slavery and expansion in the minds of 
Northern audiences. In the aftermath of the Texan Revolution, a decade of antislavery 
rhetoric had focused on the frontiers, and Giddings’s oratory was the most prominent 
demonstration of that connection. A few years later, the Mexican-American War 
appeared suspiciously familiar. Mobilized by the unquenched nationalism of Manifest 
Destiny, many initially supported the war, but their enthusiasm did not persist, the link 
between slavery and expansion too explicit. The Second Seminole War was just one of a 
number of issues in which antislavery reformers identified the connection between 
expansion and slavery, but it helped them learn a series of lessons, ones all too applicable 
over the coming decades.
39
    
When David Wilmot, along with other Democratic Congressmen allied with 
Martin Van Buren, advanced the Wilmot Proviso, they responded as much to Joshua 
Giddings and a decade of abolitionist agitation as to James K. Polk and John Calhoun. A 
legion of antislavery activists, newspaper writers, Congressmen, and signers of petitions, 
had successfully highlighted the relationship between slavery and national expansion. 
The Second Seminole War, a war fought largely by slaveholders against an Indian nation 
bound together with runaway slaves and free African-Americans, provided the best and 
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most persuasive evidence of that link. Though his critique did little to directly defend the 
rights of the Seminoles, in uncovering the actions of the Slave Power, Joshua Giddings 
and his allies explained to the North that they had two options: to ignore slavery’s evident 
influence and follow meekly in its wake or demand a thorough reexamination of national 
priorities. In their obscurity, they continued to struggle.
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Chapter 6
“We Do Not Live for Our Selves Only”: The Competing Strategies of Seminoles 
and Black Seminoles amidst a Crusade of Conquest
In October 1837, when Thomas Jesup deceived Osceola, others were caught up in 
the trap as well. One of them, a Black Seminole named Titus, quickly demonstrated his 
worth to his captors. He recounted that during a council of chiefs a few weeks before, 
Osceola and chief Coa Hadjo, who had recently reached an agreement with Jesup to 
surrender many fugitive slaves to their nominal white owners, had clashed with Abiaka, a 
Seminole religious leader, by insisting that the Seminoles could not maintain the war for 
another year. Abaiaka steadfastly insisted that he would not leave Florida and would 
survive there by any means, subsisting on game until his bullets ran out, fishing until his 
lines frayed, and then weaving new ones with horsehair. Abiaka was resolute - if the 
cause seemed lost, he would escape to the remotest parts of the Everglades and live there 
until his dying days. The United States officer who recorded Titus’s account in his own 
correspondence added his opinion that Titus would soon prove an excellent guide in the 
service of the United States.
1
Within these tangled narratives lay vital details about Seminole and Black 
Seminole politics during the Second Seminole War. Titus, the Black Seminole, likely 
believed himself to be a man without a country. Trapped between the white supremacists 
of the United States and Seminole leaders like Coa Hadjo who cast aside the Black 
Seminoles to further their own interests, his only refuge appeared to lay with Abiaka, a 
leader of a religion in which Titus held no faith and who promised a hardscrabble future 
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of privation and flight in the mires of southern Florida. Little wonder, then, that Titus 
might willingly lead United States officers against his former allies. Coa Hadjo, one of 
the leaders of his people, was not a craven man. As he resisted emigration, he saw the 
members of his band nearly starving, swaddled in rags. To him, the status of African-
Americans like Titus must have seemed exceedingly abstract and increasingly 
expendable. Unlike Coa Hadjo, Osceola was a war leader, not a hereditary chief. 
According to most white accounts, he had long argued that the fate of the Seminoles and 
Black Seminoles were intertwined and it was his intervention that had prevented Coa 
Hadjo from fulfilling his half of the agreement with Jesup. Yet Osceola, too, was not 
blind. His reserves were dwindling, his own health was fading, and the enemy appeared 
as irresolute as ever. Abiaka, motivated by his faith, was deeply rooted in the Florida soil. 
However, he was not a blind zealot, and he had a realistic strategy of resistance and flight 
designed to frustrate his antagonists. The interaction of these four men, Titus, Coa Hadjo, 
Osceola, and Abiaka, and their understanding of their common enemy demonstrated the 
limits and possibilities of opposition to Andrew Jackson’s crusade of conquest.
2
Throughout the Second Seminole War, the Seminoles and the Black Seminoles 
fought protracted struggles against a foe they could not defeat. They did not lose on the 
battlefield. When United States soldiers and Seminole warriors exchanged fire, the 
soldiers were repulsed more often than not. By any accounting, the United States suffered 
dramatically more casualties in the conflict - more white soldiers died during the war than 
there were Seminole warriors at its outset. However, faced with the nearly inexhaustible 
                                                          
2
 For more on Osceola, see Patricia Wickman, Osceola’s Legacy (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 
2006); Mark Boyd, “Asi-Yaholo or Osceola,” Florida Historical Quarterly, 33.3/4 (Jan., Apr., 1955), 249-305; 
Kenneth Porter, “Osceola and the Negroes,” Florida Historical Quarterly, 33.3/4 (Jan., Apr., 1955), 235-
239. For more on Abiaka’s belief system, see Susan Miller, Coacoochee’s Bones: A Seminole Saga
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 1-31.
268
resources of the United States, the Seminoles could not win by depleting their enemy’s 
reserves of men. Instead, as they likely understood it, their only means of achieving 
victory lay in extending the war over time and space, forcing the United States to waste 
money and lives to the point that its leaders might find it prudent to moderate their 
absolute insistence on removal. When formulating their strategy, the Seminoles did not 
understand that United States officials would pursue the extension of white supremacy 
and the consolidation of its authority without regard for the cost in money or lives. For 
the vast majority of Seminoles, it was their downfall.
3
The Seminoles’ decision to go to war in 1835 could not have been an easy one. 
Less than two decades before, the Seminole leadership, comprised of many of the same 
men as in 1835, had decided to retreat in the face of General Andrew Jackson’s invasion 
of Spanish Florida, an offensive that commanded many fewer men. They had dealt 
directly with Indian agents like Wiley Thompson and governors like William DuVal who 
made it clear, repeatedly, that the United States was firmly committed to their removal. 
When confronted with the same dilemma, most of the other southeast Indian nations 
negotiated their own removal, rightly calculating that to defy Andrew Jackson would be 
to risk their own annihilation. However, not only did the Seminoles fight, they continued 
fighting for seven long years. Hundreds of them fought until United States leaders 
themselves grew weary of fighting, and the Seminoles succeeded in securing territory in 
southern Florida that remains there to the present day. 
The Seminoles fought because they had few other options. Their culture and 
identity inveighed against compromise in the face of United States bellicosity. Faced with 
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United States demands to subsume their nation within that of the Creeks, to agree to 
emigrate on their enemy’s terms might have meant their obliteration. Having rooted their 
identity in opposition to United States geographic and cultural expansion, Seminole 
leaders were predisposed to resist American overtures. Those leaders were further 
prodded by influential young warriors like Osceola, whose influence were augmented by 
the decentralized nature of Seminole self-government. Osceola himself made clear the 
price of capitulation when he found and murdered Charlie Emathla, the leading voice of 
removal among their people, in the months before the war. 
The calculation made by leaders like Abaika that victory remained within their 
grasp was not irrational. Viewed from the perspective of Washington, DC, the possibility 
that nonwhite resistance might force a Democratic administration to moderate its 
demands appeared exceedingly unlikely, but the Seminoles were not dealing with 
Andrew Jackson or Martin Van Buren. The representatives with whom they interacted, 
generals like Thomas Jesup and Edmund Pendleton Gaines, portrayed themselves as 
being willing to allow the Seminoles to remain in Florida, given certain concessions. 
Having dealt with United States officers over a period of years who were, at best, 
ambivalent proponents of Indian removal, many Seminole leaders reached a reasonable 
conclusion that if they held out another season, raided a few more homesteads, ambushed 
another soldier on patrol, their enemy’s resolve might weaken.
Faced with that same intransigence, the Black Seminoles came to a different 
conclusion, forgoing their alliance with the Indians. With their roots in United States 
slave society, the Black Seminoles better understood the unyielding constraints in which 
they were bound and, as Titus did, cleverly set their enemy’s primary objectives of Indian 
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removal and re-enslavement against one another. In prioritizing their own freedom over 
their residence in Florida, they found that their antagonists placed regional hegemony 
ahead of the re-enslavement of hundreds of African-Americans. Their agreements with 
United States officials often required their assistance as scouts and interpreters against the 
Seminoles, directly undermining their former allies, but having concluded the war was 
unwinnable, most Black Seminoles believed that bringing their former Indian allies to 
terms would be for the common good. 
The Second Seminole War pitted two nations with decentralized political systems 
against one another. The exigencies of the war, which exiled United States army officers 
to a far flung corner of the continent and dispersed Seminole bands across the peninsula, 
necessarily isolated leaders of each group. Even as the attacks of the United States forced 
disparate factions of Florida Indians to act with some measure of unity, the pressures of 
the war prevented them from making collective decisions throughout the conflict. 
Similarly, circumstances left army officers, many of whom were largely hostile toward 
Indian removal, with the primary responsibility for enacting that policy. Given those 
circumstances, the Seminoles fought largely in vain. Unable to coordinate their attacks 
and misled by army officers who did not accurately represent the interests of their 
superiors, the Seminoles were unable to convince United States leaders that removal and 
conquest were not the most cost-effective means of securing their interests.
4
This chapter will recast the events of the Second Seminole War from the 
perspectives of the Seminoles and the Black Seminoles. Through the use of fragmentary 
documentary evidence, it will examine the dynamics of Seminole and Black Seminole 
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politics throughout the course of the war, with a focus on two pivotal incidents. First is 
the decision to attack Dade’s command, which provided a window into the various 
factions that dominated the Seminole leadership. The second half will be dedicated to the 
effects of Thomas Jesup’s decision to compromise with the Seminoles and the Black 
Seminoles. Once Jesup applied pressure at specific weaknesses, the intensity of the 
United States’ offensive strained and eventually shattered the linkages between the two 
groups. The main body of the chapter ends with the Battle of Okeechobee, in which the 
Seminoles dealt the United States heavy casualties yet failed to advance their interests in 
any meaningful way. The concluding passage examines the decision of Coacoochee, 
perhaps the greatest Seminole warrior, to emigrate, and exactly why he announced on his 
departure, “the whites are too strong.”
Seminole Unity and the Ambush of Dade’s Command
During the final months of 1835, the Seminoles were faced with a problem that 
likely appeared nearly insoluble. With the United States’ deadline for removal rapidly 
approaching, the Seminole leadership confronted an enemy commanding overwhelming 
resources and what must have seemed like an implacable will. Their own nation, a 
grouping of polyglot bands of Indians with different heritages stitched together by a 
common interest, had few institutional or material resources upon which to draw. In 
contrast, given the bellicosity of Indian Agent Wiley Thompson, Governor Richard Keith 
Call, and the hoards of white settlers on the frontier, they were certainly aware of the 
depth of their antagonists’ commitment to removal. Bound to their land by history and 
religion, however, the Seminoles were strongly opposed to emigration, even though their 
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own recent history counseled against violent resistance. Two decades before, Andrew 
Jackson’s invasion had demonstrated their relative weakness compared to their enemy. 
Yet, they were likely aware of the Cherokees’ inability to forestall removal nonviolently 
through institutional channels in the United States. The Seminoles’ own solution, an 
overwhelming show of force and then constant harassment of their enemy, was designed 
to obviate their own weaknesses and leverage whatever cracks might exist in their 
opponents’ political system. Their tactics could not have succeeded more wildly, nor 
been less effective at achieving their overarching goals.
On December 23, 1835, 180 Seminole warriors ambushed two companies under 
the command of Major Francis Dade. Of the 110 United States soldiers who marched that 
day, only three survived the night. In stark contrast to their actions during the First 
Seminole War, the Seminoles demonstrated a clear intention to confront the United States 
with all the resources at their command. That same day, Osceola’s assassination of Indian
Agent Wiley Thompson delivered a similar message – removal would not be decided 
through diplomacy, but through spilt blood amidst the Florida swamps. In the aftermath 
of the battle, the Seminoles concentrated much of their population near the cove of the 
Withlacoochee River and launched periodic raids against settlers along the Florida 
frontier. They were prepared for a long, drawn-out war.
5
One Seminole account of the collective decision to attack Dade’s command was 
recorded and translated into English. According to the renowned warrior Halpatter 
Tustenuggee, Osceola, Ote Emathla, and he had advocated forcefully for the attack. 
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Micanopy, the hereditary head-chief, had been reluctant, “timid” in Tustenuggee’s words, 
until Ote Emathla had addressed the massed Indians and announced that he was marching 
that day and those “with faint hearts” could remain behind. Micanopy recognized the 
implicit challenge to his leadership and declared himself ready to depart. In a group, 180 
Indians marched to the designated location, waited for the arrival of Dade’s companies, 
and, at the fateful moment, Ote Emathla gave the signal. Micanopy fired the first shot, 
felling Dade. The war, with Micanopy’s active participation, had begun.
6
The Dade ambush made a wider war inevitable. For leaders like Micanopy, older, 
wealthy men hesitant to go to war, the ambush effectively forced their hand. He could not 
oppose the war outright, lest he risk alienating influential warriors and forfeiting his 
already unsteady hold on power. Though Micanopy was likely shielded by his hereditary 
chieftaincy, Osceola’s assassination of Charley Emathla made the consequences of 
appearing to acquiesce to the demands of the United States all the clearer. This was not 
an idle threat – just three years later, Cherokee warriors would murder the Indians 
responsible for signing the Treaty of New Echota. Despite his familial lineage and active 
involvement in the Dade ambush, as a non-war leader Micanopy was necessarily out of 
step with the rest of his nation following the declaration of hostilities. Nevertheless, 
Micanopy had no choice but to stand by his people. Enraged at what they perceived as 
Seminole perfidy, United States officials were hardly in the mood to differentiate 
between “friendly” and “militant” Seminoles, especially a friendly Seminole leader who 
had personally assassinated a major in the United States army. Following the April 
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departure of Seminole bands who had already sought refuge at army posts in the 
aftermath of Charley Emathla’s death, it would be over a year before any Seminole 
leaders considered surrendering to United States forces.
7
Not only did the Dade ambush forestall compromise, it solidified the alliance 
between the Seminoles and the Black Seminoles. The account of Ransom Clark, the only 
United States soldier to survive the ambush long enough to recount the ordeal, made clear 
that the Black Seminoles were an integral part of the attack, firing along with the Indians, 
executing the wounded, and looting the dead. According to several white accounts, 
Osceola, Halpatter Tustenuggee, and Ote Emathla had strongly advocated that they resist 
the United States almost as much to protect their African-American allies as to prevent 
removal. They would not allow hesitant Seminole chiefs to barter away the freedom of 
the Black Seminoles, regardless of what concessions they might have received in return.
8
The Seminoles followed their initial success with a focused assault against the 
institution of slavery in Florida, a highly combustible strategy. If the Dade massacre 
committed hesitant Seminole leaders to the Black Seminoles, a series attacks against 
plantations along the St. Johns River committed the Black Seminoles to their cause. 
Launching a full-scale campaign against the institution of slavery within the Florida 
Territory, the Seminoles liberated friends and family of their allies and made the 
alignment of their interests with those of the region’s African-Americans explicit. As 
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there numbered only about 1200 Seminole warriors at the beginning of the war, Florida’s 
slave population, nearly 25,000 in all, represented the most viable means of augmenting 
their ranks. The Seminoles could hardly hope to build on their battlefield victory against 
the United States unless they harnessed the latent hostility of the masses of African-
Americans in bondage in Florida and throughout the South. With the counsel of the Black 
Seminoles, the Seminole leadership was certainly well aware of the potential of mass 
rebellion, especially just two decades following the 1811 uprising in the Orleans territory, 
well within contemporary Seminole communication networks.
9
The focused assault on Florida slavery had its drawbacks as well. If the Seminoles 
had predicated their strategy upon convincing United States elites that the cost of 
emigration would far outstrip its benefits, their offensive was counterproductive, fully 
committing Southern whites to the dispossession of the Seminoles. The cost of the war 
could not outpace the benefits of what became a regional imperative. As African-
Americans streamed to the Seminoles’ cause, some 400 by one detailed count, Southern 
volunteers flooded the state. Their service itself did not set back the Seminole war effort. 
Utterly ineffective as soldiers, jarringly disruptive to their battalions, and 
disproportionately expensive compared to enlisted men, the volunteers were a drain on 
the United States’ campaign. Their commitment, however, indicated something of the 
dilemma into which the Seminoles had placed themselves. For their enemy, no price was 
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too high to secure white supremacy within the territorial boundaries of the United States
10
It was a serious miscalculation, one to which Black Seminole leaders might have 
contributed. Circumstantially, the Black Seminoles benefited greatly from the assault 
against the St. Johns River plantations, liberating family members, augmenting their 
population amongst the Seminoles, and cementing the Seminoles’ resistance to the white 
planters who held illegitimate claims upon them. In the long term, they were the primary 
beneficiaries of the effects of the raids upon the strategy of United States leaders as well. 
As removal seemed more urgent, secondary objectives, like the re-enslavement of the 
Black Seminoles, no longer seemed so pressing. To assert that Black Seminole leaders 
like Abraham anticipated this course of events would be to credit them with remarkable 
but not implausible foresight.
As the Dade ambush committed the Seminoles and Black Seminoles to the 
conflict, to the north an entire nation rushed to war in lockstep. Duncan Clinch 
immediately marched to the Withlacoochee, Edmunds Gaines set off from New Orleans 
at the earliest opportunity, Secretary of War Lewis Cass dispatched Winfield Scott from 
Washington, Florida’s legislative council expanded its militia, Congress appropriated 
funds for the war, and volunteers in Southern cities across the region signed up for an 
adventure. The Seminoles were well prepared for the onslaught. Whipped into a rage by 
the Dade ambush, successive United States battalions sped headlong into battle lacking 
knowledge of Florida topography, adequate supplies, and a developed strategy. They 
were lucky to make it out of Florida alive. Just after Christmas day in 1835, Duncan 
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Clinch led 750 men to the Withlacoochee to confront the Seminole force. Inexperienced 
in warfare, Clinch avoided a Seminole ambush only because he was unaware of the 
easiest location at which to ford the river. Even so, after 250 of his men crossed the river 
via the only means available, an old leaky canoe, they came under heavy fire, suffering 
60 casualties. To similar effect, two months later in February 1836, General Edmund 
Pendleton Gaines barreled through the Florida wilderness to the Withlacoochee, where 
he, too, was surrounded by a larger Indian force. Had Clinch not come to his aid, Gaines 
and his 980 men might have suffered the same fate as Major Dade.
11
The events on the Withlacoochee likely contributed to the Seminoles’ mistaken 
belief that the United States might moderate its position. Having trapped Gaines’s 
outmanned force in the makeshift Fort Izard, the Seminoles must have thought 
themselves on the verge of another great victory. Their assumption would only have been 
confirmed by Gaines’s decision to welcome negotiations after several days of 
bombardment. When Gaines did not unilaterally reject the offer of the Seminole leaders 
to abrogate the Treaty of Payne’s Landing and remain south of the Withlacoochee, 
explaining that he would have to submit their terms to his superiors, that small opening 
might have misled the Seminoles into thinking that Gaines’s superiors were malleable. 
Being skeptical of Indian removal himself, Gaines could hardly have conveyed the true 
circumstances in which the Seminoles now found themselves. 
In the aftermath of the battles near the Withlacoochee, the Seminoles dispersed 
into smaller bands and secreted themselves in central and southern Florida. It was a wise 
choice. By May 1836, Winfield Scott had entered Florida at the head of an overwhelming 
force buttressed by legions of Southern volunteers, a coalition the Seminoles could not 
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defeat on the open battlefield. In dividing themselves into smaller bands of a few hundred 
warriors and noncombatants, the Seminoles effectively countered Winfield Scott’s 
complex plans to encircle his quarries between the three massive wings of his army. 
Instead, the Seminoles utilized the spring and summer to plant crops and prepare for 
further conflict. Having interacted with white officers at trading posts for over a decade, 
the Seminoles knew that their enemies detested the Florida climate and thought the 
summer months miasmatic. They would not have to fear a summer offensive and could 
prepare for renewed engagements in the fall.
12
After dispersing into smaller groups, Seminole society fell back into its traditional 
forms of localized leadership and autonomous communities. The conflict with the United 
States had forced increased political unity upon the disparate groups that made up the 
Seminole nation, broadly defined. Faced with the common United States threat, distinct 
bands were willing to set aside societal, cultural, and historical distinctions to act in 
concert against the United States. If, once dispersed, these decentralized Indian bands 
could not coordinate their actions according to a broad strategic plan, they nonetheless 
would resist the invading Americans in defense of their homes. National leaders, like 
Micanopy, Osceola, and Ote Emathla, could trust isolated bands to strike at United States 
forces without their active participation, knowing that their allies were ideologically 
committed to the same cause.
13
The Seminoles’ decision to disperse into small bands may have aided them in 
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eluding Winfield Scott and Richard Keith Call, but having separated themselves by 
dozens of miles, they could no longer make effective, collective decisions. Some 
Seminole bands continued to harass the frontiers in East and West Florida, while others 
remained in the central part of the territory, gathering their resources and preparing for 
the coming violence. Having instigated the war, the Seminoles had no option other than 
to wait for the inevitable counteroffensive. With the United States having reinforced the 
peninsula, there was likely no more they could accomplish beyond frustrating their 
antagonists. 
It did not appear a futile strategy. Through their intermittent contacts with white 
officials and the experiences of Black Seminoles who had only recently escaped white 
owners, the Seminoles knew that some whites were more committed to their removal 
than others. They were probably aware of the upcoming 1836 presidential election and, 
given their relatively favorable relationship with John Quincy Adams’s appointees, might 
have believed that a Jackson defeat would end the war. Though isolated, the Seminoles 
were not entirely quarantined from knowledge of white culture. Osceola, for example, 
demonstrated a keen sense of racial politics in the United States when, a few months 
before the war, he protested against an action of Indian Agent Wiley Thompson utilizing 
contemporary white racial discourse: “Am I a negro? A slave? My skin is dark, but not 
black. I am an Indian – a Seminole. The white man shall not make me black. I will make 
the white man red with blood; and then blacken him in the sun and rain.” Before the war, 
Osceola and other Indians often spent time at frontier forts, Osceola himself becoming 
renowned for his skill with a ball, and he had reportedly formed a strong friendship with 
at least one officer. Given the number of Seminoles and Black Seminoles who interacted 
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with whites, for the Seminole leadership to piece together some idea of the contours of 
United States political culture was certainly possible.
14
Through the first year of the war, the Seminoles weathered, and beat back, the 
campaigns of three separate generals. In the process, they demonstrated an unprecedented 
sense of Seminole nationhood, uniting elder chiefs and younger warriors, binding Black 
Seminoles to their cause, and bridging societal gaps between bands. Fifteen years before, 
they had scattered in the face of Andrew Jackson’s offensive, but during the first half of 
1836, they won every important battle. Through their assault on slavery in East Florida, 
they struck the United States at its most vulnerable point. Thousands of soldiers and 
volunteers streamed into Florida, hundreds died, and the Seminoles remained in Florida, 
undeterred. Having dispersed into small parties onto lands unmapped by whites, they 
were beyond the grasp of their antagonists. The United States military establishment was 
in disarray - Gaines and Scott were sniping at each other in the press, Jackson had 
accused Call of cowardice, and Jesup was in the midst of surreptitiously undermining 
Scott’s command. The Seminole coalition had never been stronger, the United States 
military never so fractured. And yet, even at that early point, they could not win. Unable 
to coordinate larger attacks, dwarfed by the size of the United States army, having failed 
to spark a wider slave rebellion, and isolated from other Indian nations, the Seminoles 
could only hope to evade the enemy, antagonize its forces, and wait in vain for its leaders 
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to set aside the consolidation of white supremacy as its overwhelming objective in 
Florida. However, Jackson’s vision of the United States was characterized most of all by 
the dogged pursuit of securing white supremacy within his nation’s borders. The United 
States would not relent.
Distinguishing Race and Removal
If the United States and the Seminoles were similarly fractured by race and 
politics, only the United States was in a position to leverage its opponent’s weaknesses. 
As the war stretched into its second year, the Seminoles remained in a holding pattern, 
avoiding Thomas Jesup’s patrols, harvesting their crops, and waiting in vain for the 
United States to falter. Jesup was much more proactive. Insightfully perceiving the 
cleavages in Seminole society, Jesup manipulated them to his advantage, moderating his 
most extreme objective – the re-enslavement of the Black Seminoles – to secure his 
primary one, the removal of the Seminoles. With his revised war plan, Jesup targeted the 
groups within the Seminole coalition least opposed to emigration, the Black Seminoles 
and older chiefs, leaving them a choice between the security of the West and a harsh, 
nomadic existence in Florida. The Black Seminoles who, whatever the nuances of their 
status, were slaves amongst the Seminoles, cast their lot with Jesup and freedom. Several 
older Seminole chiefs, leaders of their people, attempted to do the same, but were not 
secure enough in their power amid the influence of younger, more determined warriors, 
chiefs, and religious leaders. The threat of overwhelming violence was corrosive, 
weakening the bonds between and among various Seminole bands and the Black 
Seminoles. If United States coercion had made the Seminole alliance of Florida Indians 
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possible, it also eventually led to its destruction. As the conflict dragged on, their schisms 
widened while the United States remained fixated on its goals.
15
At the end of January 1837, Jesup sent a prisoner of war into the wilderness with 
an offer to negotiate. He received his answer in the person of Abraham, the most 
influential Black Seminole among his people and Micanopy’s chief interpreter. In 1837, 
Abraham was about 45 years old, having been born into slavery and probably serving his 
youth as a household servant in Pensacola in Spanish West Florida. As a young man, he 
seized on the British offer of emancipation during the War of 1812 and most likely was 
present during Richard Keith Call’s destruction of the Negro Fort. In the aftermath, he 
made his escape south, to Bowlegs’ town on the Suwanee River, where he first 
encountered Micanopy. By all accounts an intelligent man, Abraham must have struck 
Micanopy as an ideal interpreter, well acquainted with white culture and possessed of a 
sagacious intellect. By 1835, Abraham was married, liberated from slavery, and had 
fathered several children. According to white observers, Abraham had risen in Seminole 
politics to become Micanopy’s chief advisor and it was his insistence that the Seminoles 
safeguard the relative freedom of the Black Seminoles that had instigated the war. Once 
the war began, Abraham was especially prominent in the hostilities, taking warriors into 
battle against enemy battalions and often leading the charge. In 1837, Abraham met with 
Jesup and agreed to organize a meeting between the general and Micanopy within days.
16
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An able leader of the Black Seminoles and a trusted confidante of Micanopy, 
Abraham’s interests and those of the chief likely aligned at their March meeting with 
Jesup. Micanopy had never been fully committed to war and the long year of conflict 
would have done little to assuage his doubts. The Second Seminole War had had a 
debilitating effect on Seminole society as deprivation, starvation, and privation wracked 
Indians across the territory. At the meeting, with Abraham interpreting, Micanopy’s 
representatives - mostly close allies and family members, along with the Black Seminole 
leader John Cavallo - reached a deal with Thomas Jesup to end the war and emigrate west 
in return for compensation for their physical property, one year of subsistence, and a 
guarantee that their African-American slaves would accompany them. The agreement 
represented a decisive victory for the vast majority Black Seminoles, sparing them from 
the ravages of the United States chattel slave regime. Only the status of fugitive African-
Americans who had joined the Seminoles after the ambush of Dade’s command remained 
ambiguous, all others were safe from being reincorporated into the Deep South. 
Micanopy would no longer have to vie with ambitious young warriors to establish his 
authority over his people, but he was not blind to the threats that remained. The 
agreement with Jesup mandated that Micanopy himself would travel to Jesup’s camp and 
serve as a hostage to guarantee his peoples’ surrender. For Micanopy, who knew that his 
rivals would almost certainly resent his agreement, living in a United States outpost as a 
hostage might have been more secure than returning home.
17
Micanopy had reason to believe he now occupied a precarious position. Some of 
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his most prominent rivals had acceded to his agreement, including Ote Emathla who 
signed it, but Osceola and Abiaka remained conspicuous in their absence. By May, 
Micanopy, Ote Emathla, and even Halpatter-Tustenugee had brought their bands to the 
designated posts near Tampa Bay, but Osceola, Abiaka, and Coacoochee, another 
military leader, sent only assurances that they would come along shortly. With 700 
Seminoles and Black Seminoles isolated and nearly committed to emigration, the 
situation was highly volatile as malaria swept through the Indian camps and slave 
catchers, some with the permission of Jesup, identified Black Seminoles who had been 
claimed by white masters. Further undermining the agreement he had made with 
Micanopy, Jesup struck a deal with the Seminole chief Coa Hadjo, who agreed to 
surrender every enslaved African-American who had joined the Seminoles since the start 
of the war. Betraying dozens of African-Americans who faced a bitter homecoming to 
hostile masters, Coa Hadjo alienated both Black Seminole leaders and Seminole warriors 
who identified with their interests. The delicate situation collapsed at the beginning of 
June when Osceola and Abiaka, leading 200 warriors, swept into the post and left with 
nearly all of the Indians and African-Americans who had gathered there.
18
The exact chain of events that led to Osceola and Abiaka destroying Jesup and 
Micanopy’s agreement was never laid out clearly. Certainly, the two hardliners believed 
that the Seminoles could still win the war, Abiaka perhaps inspired by his faith and 
Osceola his military successes. Several white observers were convinced that Osceola and 
Abiaka had acted in defense of their African-American allies. The two leaders had long 
been closely aligned with leading Black Seminoles and they may have been reacting 
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against Jesup’s dalliances with local slaveholders. Osceola himself claimed that the 
Seminoles and Black Seminoles gathered at Tampa Bay had acted on their own volition, 
fearing that malaria might further spread through their settlements. Regardless of the 
precise thinking of Osceola, Abiaka, and the 200 warriors under their command, they 
reignited the war believing victory possible. Not having had to elude United States 
patrols throughout the duration of the agreement had allowed several bands to plant 
sizable crops and, with the oppressive Florida summer imminent, United States troops 
would remain in their quarters, fearful of the climate.
19
Abiaka and Osceola forced Micanopy, Abraham, and their followers to make
even more difficult decisions. Confronted with Osceola’s arrival, the two men chose 
differently. Micanopy returned to the wilderness with his band while Abraham remained 
behind in Jesup’s custody. For Micanopy to remain at Tampa Bay likely would have 
meant the end of his chiefdom – for the remainder of the war, he followed Osceola, 
Abiaka, and Coacoochee’s lead. The next year, when Micanopy was again in United 
States custody, he explained he had only abandoned the agreement because he had been 
kidnapped by Osceola under the threat of violence. Regardless of whether Osceola had 
overtly threatened Micanopy, the warrior had proven more than willing to kill chiefs who 
submitted to United States compulsion and the threat had almost certainly hung in the air 
that night. That Micanopy never attempted to surrender again and, in fact, rebuffed offers 
to negotiate despite often being geographically separated from his rivals, suggested that 
younger, more militant leaders like Osceola, Coacoochee, and Abiaka held considerable 
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political influence beyond their capacity for violence.
20
Abraham and several other Black Seminoles reacted differently to Osceola and 
Abiaka’s arrival. Abraham had lobbied heavily for the agreement, spending months 
contacting hesitant chiefs and convincing them to emigrate. It was possible he believed 
Osceola and other warriors would never overlook the degree of his collaboration with 
Jesup. With his family living at Tampa Bay, Abraham decided to remain with Jesup and 
cast his lot with the United States. Unlike other Black Seminoles who had gained renown 
throughout the Seminole nation for their prowess in battle, Abraham was primarily a 
political leader whose influence was rooted almost entirely in his relationship with 
Micanopy. Where Micanopy was protected by his familial history and hereditary 
authority, Abraham would have no such safeguards. By all accounts a pragmatic man, he 
likely understood, as Abiaka and Osceola did not, that the possibility of success in the 
Second Seminole War was remote. In remaining at Tampa Bay, Abraham made a 
conscious choice to forgo his ties to the Seminoles and offer his services to the United 
States, which he had spent the past decade urging Micanopy to rebuff. 
He had good reason. An able interpreter with intimate knowledge of Seminole 
government and culture, he, like other Black Seminoles, had much to offer to the army as 
guides and scouts. It was a service that he correctly calculated might be rewarded with a 
guarantee of freedom. Twenty-five years before, Abraham had escaped life as a slave in 
West Florida and joined with the British, embracing a future whose shape he did not 
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know. Isolated at Tampa Bay, he made the same decision and, once again, there was no 
turning back. Jesup had learned, and was happy to tell Abraham, that Seminole leaders 
had already tasked twenty warriors with the mission of assassinating the Black Seminole 
leader.
21
Abraham understood the bind in which Osceola, Abiaka, and Coacoochee had 
placed wavering chiefs. Several months later in September 1837, Abraham transmitted a 
message to Coa Hadjo, who had escaped along with his fellow chiefs, warning him that 
to hold out against the United States would be his downfall. Though Abraham was almost 
certainly aware that Hadjo had struck a deal with Jesup to surrender African-American 
slaves who had joined the United States after the start of the war, he nevertheless urged 
the chief to come in peacefully. His interests, Abraham argued, no longer aligned with 
those of the warriors. Reminding him that years ago they had spoken in Arkansas as two 
members of the Seminole delegation that had inspected the territory, he recalled Hadjo 
comparing the relative lushness of the Arkansas countryside to the bitter deprivations of 
the barren reservation set aside by the Treaty of Moultrie Creek. According to Abraham, 
the last time they had talked Hadjo “did not know who would kill you first, the whites or 
your own people.” With defeat nearly assured, he warned Hadjo not to “sacrifice yourself 
to the advice of crazy men.” Abraham insisted that he still sympathized with Micanopy, 
Coa Hadjo, and Ote Emathla, all of whom he believed desired peace. Counseling him 
against the threats of Abiaka and his band of Micasuki Indians, Abraham reminded him 
that Abiaka did not speak for the traditional hereditary leadership and that only the events 
of the previous decade had bound their people together. Loyal to Micanopy’s faction, 
Abraham argued that surrender did not betray the Seminole nation but would instead 
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preserve it in the west.
22
Other Black Seminole leaders, including John Cavallo who signed the agreement 
with Jesup, chose differently. Cavallo had been born the son and property of Seminole 
Indian Charles Cavallo, his mother being one of Charles Cavallo’s African-American 
slaves. In his early 20s at the start of the war, Cavallo distinguished himself for his 
prowess in battle and was a close ally of the warrior Coacoochee, a chief’s son who was 
earning acclaim for his leadership under fire. Though he was likely a leading member of 
the faction of Seminoles and Black Seminoles committed to war, Cavallo was married to 
a relative of Micanopy, leading him to go along with Micanopy and Abraham’s 
agreement with Jesup. Whatever the case, he actively joined Osceola and Abiaka on their 
march to Tampa Bay and was instrumental in convincing the people gathered there to 
renew the conflict. More thoroughly integrated into the military command of the uprising 
than other Black Seminoles, Cavallo chose to forgo the alliance with Jesup that Abraham 
had welcomed.
23
The schisms that separated Seminoles and Black Seminoles in the wake of the 
agreement with Thomas Jesup sparked a chain of events that critically wounded the 
Seminole war effort. Following the peaceful summer months as United States soldiers 
remained indoors safe from the blinding Florida sun, detachments again trudged through 
the Florida wilderness in search of their enemy. One officer, Brigadier General Joseph 
Hernandez, had a stroke of luck. On the morning of September 8, a Black Seminole 
named John belonging to Chief Philip, the father of Coacoochee, came into camp with his 
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wife and surrendered. According to John, he and his wife had tired of the hardships of 
war and he threw himself on the mercy of Hernandez. To prove his loyalty and to 
safeguard his wife from re-enslavement, John offered to direct Hernandez to Chief 
Philip’s encampment. That night, a United States force swept through the settlement and 
captured Philip, the most influential Seminole captured to that point in the war.
24
Through Philip, Jesup shattered the militant faction that had dominated Seminole 
politics. Likely utilizing the threat of force, he ordered Philip to send out messengers to 
bring in his son for a parley. Once Coacoochee arrived, Jesup detained him and several 
other leading warriors, violating the implicit promise of the white flag that protected 
wartime negotiators. He imprisoned several warriors in a nearby fort, only allowing 
Coacoochee to leave as a messenger because he held his father as a hostage. In October 
1837, Jesup repeated the deception, meeting with Osceola, Coa Hadjo, and John Cavallo 
under a white flag and again taking the leaders into custody. In swift succession, Jesup 
had captured several of the most influential Seminole warriors and, with Abiaka the only 
prominent proponent of war remaining in the field, critically undermined the Seminoles’ 
war leadership. Jesup had so much success utilizing the white flag as a means of 
deception that he would repeat it multiple times, in the most prominent instance, seizing 
Micanopy, Ote Emathla, and several other chiefs following their meeting with Cherokee 
mediators in December, 1837.
25
With success in their grasp, however, army officials made a critical mistake.
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Jesup confined his most famous prisoners in Fort Marion where Coacoochee, John 
Cavallo, Philip, Osceola, about 20 warriors, and several women were locked into a room 
measuring eighteen feet by twenty feet, with a hole about eighteen feet above the floor to 
provide light. Over the course of several days, the prisoners formulated a plan of escape, 
prying the bars off the lone window and weaving blankets into ropes. On the appointed 
night, 20 of them were hoisted up about 13 feet to a ledge underneath the window, 
squeezed out through the tiny opening, and made their way to freedom. Philip and 
Osceola chose to remain behind, Philip being an old man and weary of war and Osceola 
then suffering from the quinsy that would soon kill him.
26
With the Seminole and Black Seminole leadership decimated – Micanopy, Ote 
Emathla, Osceola, Philip, Coa Hadjo, and Abraham all were still in United States custody 
– the escape of Coacoochee and John Cavallo was instrumental in extending the war. 
Coacoochee was a young man, renowned for his courage and able to unite disparate clans 
through his hereditary claims to leadership. No one else could have inspired the 
remaining Seminole bands to continue their resistance. Similarly, John Cavallo, who had 
proven himself an able commander over the previous two years of the war, could best 
rally the remaining Black Seminoles to his cause. With Micanopy, Coa Hadjo, and 
several other older chiefs still in captivity, Jesup’s opportunity to settle the war peacefully 
was over. Coacoochee and his men fled directly to Halpatter-Tustenugee and Abiaka who 
had gathered their forces near Lake Okeechobee.
27
In some respects, for the Seminoles and the Black Seminoles who massed at Lake 
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Okeechobee, carving notches in trees to steady their guns while they awaited the coming 
United States storm, the calculus of the war had been greatly simplified. Jesup had 
successfully captured many of the older chiefs, mostly men of an earlier generation who 
had not welcomed conflict with the United States. Those who remained at Okeechobee 
relished the fight. Zachary Taylor, marching for their location at the head of a thousand 
men, might have ended the Seminole resistance had they been overcome. The Seminoles 
and Black Seminoles remaining in the field had little choice. Victory over the United 
States army in a direct confrontation would reignite their prior strategy of wearing down 
their enemy’s patience beyond all endurance.
28
Taylor’s men came in waves at the Seminoles’ position and were rebuffed. 26 
whites died in the attack and over 110 lay wounded. The Seminoles suffered 
comparatively minor losses. The victory at the Battle of Okeechobee represented the last 
gasp of effective Seminole resistance. The Seminoles melted away into the wilderness, 
Taylor being unable to follow because he had to care for the wounded.
The Battle of Okeechobee was almost an overwhelming success for the 
Seminoles. In its aftermath, Jesup wrote to his superiors and made a serious proposal to 
allow the Seminoles to remain in Florida. They had whittled away at the general, 
undermined his faith in the war effort, and shaken his resolve. His superiors, however, 
were unyielding. After the Seminoles dispersed into the Florida wilderness and the Van 
Buren administration rejected Jesup’s overtures, the course of the war trudged forward in 
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a grinding process of attrition.
29
If the aftermath of the Battle of Okeechobee revealed how far the Seminoles were 
from victory, it justified the Black Seminoles’ involvement in the war. In early February, 
as Jesup appealed to his superiors to allow the Seminoles to remain in Florida, he sent a 
message through African-American messengers to John Cavallo telling him that should 
Cavallo and his people surrender, he would guarantee them their freedom from both 
white and Indian owners and protect them from Seminole reprisals. For the Black 
Seminoles, many of whom were claimed by white owners and the vast majority of whom 
were actually owned by Seminole Indians, the offer amounted to an emancipation 
proclamation. Jesup had only one demand of the Black Seminoles. Radicalized by the 
Seminoles and unbound by white overseers, they would have to remove themselves from 
Florida and go west, to Indian country.
30
The vast majority of Black Seminoles seized on Jesup’s offer. By March, he had 
sent nearly every Black Seminole in his custody to Fort Pike in Louisiana to begin the 
journey to Arkansas. In April 1838, John Cavallo led 27 other Black Seminoles to an 
army outpost and surrendered. Though most embarked immediately, some Black 
Seminole leaders including Abraham remained in Florida, receiving pay from the army in 
return for their service as interpreters. For his work, Abraham earned a daily wage of 
$2.50, a sizable sum for the time.
31
As a scout and interpreter, Abraham did not take up arms against the Seminoles. 
He continued to advocate for peace among the Indians, persisting in his belief that the 
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Seminoles could not hope to survive in Florida with the United States committed to their 
removal. His council was instrumental in convincing Halpatter-Tustenugee to surrender 
and it was his emissaries who had reached John Cavallo and convinced him to come in, 
secure in he and his band’s freedom. As Jesup prepared to leave Florida, Abraham sent 
him a letter, attesting to his faithful service and requesting written confirmation that he 
would be protected against slavecatchers and hostile Seminoles. Reminding the general 
that he and his fellow Black Seminoles “do not live for our selves only, but for our wives 
& children who are as dear to us as those of any other men,” he hoped Jesup would repay 
him for his aid in bringing the war closer to a conclusion. With his last act as commander 
of the Florida War, Jesup complied, recognizing Abraham and other Black Seminoles’ 
contributions in writing and pledging to protect their freedom in the west. With Jesup 
relieved of command, the vast majority of Black Seminoles having surrendered, and 
much of the traditional Seminole leadership captured, the war moved on to another phase. 
Among the most influential Seminoles, only Coacoochee and Abiaka remained in the 
field.
32
By the third year of the Second Seminole War, the alliance of the Seminoles and 
the Black Seminoles had become even more splintered by the competing interests of 
coherent factions. These divides did not follow strict racial lines. Rather, some Black 
Seminoles and some Seminoles favored removal given certain guarantees from the 
United States while other Seminoles and Black Seminoles prioritized resisting removal. 
When individual leaders – first Micanopy and Abraham, then Halpatter-Tustenugee and 
John Cavallo – concluded that the cause was hopeless, they approached Thomas Jesup 
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and accepted emigration. For the Black Seminoles who achieved their emancipation, this 
chain of events justified their participation in the war and protected them from the worst 
ravages of the slave society they abandoned. They did not betray the Seminoles. 
Abraham had counseled conciliation, as both chief advisor to Micanopy and as a United 
States interpreter. John Cavallo had remained in the field, fighting beside Coacoochee 
and many hundreds of other Seminoles, until he made the same calculation and 
surrendered. In all, the African-Americans who survived the war had benefitted from it 
greatly, aiding the Seminoles until their cause war appeared lost and gaining significant 
concessions from their enemy when they laid down their arms. For the faction of leaders 
like Micanopy and Coa Hadjo who advocated conciliation, the war fundamentally 
undercut their authority. When the Seminoles arrived in the Indian Territory, they would 
not enjoy the influence they once had. The militant Seminoles who had led the fight 
against the Americans suffered as well. With the exception of Abiaka, they were forced 
to confront a bitter truth: no matter how convincing the logic, the United States could not 
be dissuaded.
“The Whites Are Too Strong”
Over the final years of the war, Coacoochee and Abiaka fought lonely battles 
against the forces arrayed against them, still determined to elongate the war beyond the 
endurance of the United States. Their strategy remained the same as it had been during 
the first years of the war. They and their followers hid in the wilderness, moving further 
south, away from United States patrols. When Major General Alexander Macomb arrived 
in Florida to sign a peace, Abiaka readily agreed when he believed it might allow his 
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band to remain on their land. When he found out he was being misled, he reignited the 
war by having his allies launch an attack against an unprepared military trading post, 
killing dozens of whites. In the aftermath, they again dispersed, unwilling to confront the 
enemy en masse. With their ranks of warriors diminished and the Black Seminoles 
having abandoned the field, the Seminoles no longer had the capability to defeat 
concentrated United States forces in a pitched battle.
33
Faced with the intractability of his enemies, Coacoochee accepted emigration as 
well. Personally, he was willing to bear any sacrifice to remain in Florida, but would not 
ask the men and women who followed him to do the same. With the departure of 
Coacoochee’s band and in the aftermath of John Tyler’s inauguration, removing every 
Seminole down to the last man, woman, and child no longer appeared so urgent. In 1842, 
Tyler, the last commanding officer of the Florida campaign Colonel Worth, and Senator 
Thomas Hart Benton, arrived at a series of policies that they believed would secure 
United States regional hegemony in the southeast. Worth sent a message to Abiaka and 
Holata Micco, the leader of another band of Florida Indians, and informed them of an 
informal arrangement. So long as the remaining Indians, numbering about 300, remained 
south of the Pease River in the southern part of the peninsula, they would be allowed to 
remain in Florida undisturbed. After seven years of fighting and amidst the decimation of 
Seminole society, the Florida Indians had finally worn down the United States.
34
A year before, prior to his emigration, Coacoochee had struggled to comprehend 
how the Seminoles had won every major battle and lost the war. Upon the warrior’s 
surrender, Colonel William Worth had held him captive and threatened his life unless he 
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sent messengers into the wilderness who could convince the rest of his band to come in. 
The message Coacoochee sent was a wrenching one, with a bitter admission at its core: “I 
have turned my back and closed my eyes upon our land and the graves of the Seminoles. 
The whites are too strong.” And from Coacoochee’s perspective, his enemies must have 
appeared unfathomably strong. They had persevered through lost battles, ambushes, 
strategic setbacks, and month after month of futile searching for an enemy they could not 
pin down. The United States commanded vast resources – innumerable soldiers, river 
boats, ocean vessels, endless stocks of weapons, inexhaustible ammunition. And yet, the 
United States had fought for seven years and withdrew with hundreds of Seminoles 
remaining in Florida. The war had begun when Andrew Jackson scribbled a brief order 
on the back of a letter sending a few hundred troops to quell the Seminole uprising and 
by its end his party was two years out of power.
35
The whites may have been too strong, but it was a peculiar kind of strength. It was 
rooted not in their tremendous resources or some fount of inexhaustible courage, but in a 
dogged preoccupation with the consolidation of national authority in Florida and, with it, 
the regional hegemony of white supremacy. It was an unyielding focus, one that allowed 
intelligent actors like Abraham and John Cavallo to manipulate United States officials 
and secure their emancipation. For the Seminoles, the fight was not entirely in vain. 
Chastened by seven years of humiliating defeats, the United States surrendered many of 
its most stringent demands, even if it would not allow a critical mass of Seminoles to 
remain in Florida under any circumstances. Yet, Coacoochee was right, the whites were 
too strong. Not too strong to defeat the Seminoles, but too weak to admit they could lose 
to them, which, at a cost of tens of millions of dollars and over 1500 lives, amounted to 
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the same thing.
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Chapter 7
The “Mock-War Spirit”: The Unsteady Path from Conquest to Imperialism
On June 1, 1839, the words “Shame!!! Shame!!! Shame!!!” would have drawn the 
eyes of any reader of the Tallahassee newspaper, The Floridian. In the unlikely event 
they did not, seven hands pointed downward and, from below, an additional seven hands 
pointed upwards, themselves bracketed by an additional chorus of “Shame!!! Shame!!! 
Shame!!!” The occasion: Major General Alex Macomb had concluded a treaty with the 
Seminoles that allowed them a small reservation in the southwestern tip of Florida, far 
from the frontier on lands that few whites had ever seen. Prior to the treaty’s signing, the 
vast majority of the territory’s population considered the land literally uninhabitable. 
Nevertheless, many recoiled at ending the war on any grounds aside from total victory. 
“We fear we shall be laughed at, the next 4
th
 of July,” protested a writer for one 
Mississippi paper. Over the coming weeks, Democratic newspapers scoffed at Macomb 
for presuming Indians would abide by their treaties and citizen committees in Florida 
dashed off ever more urgent appeals to Washington to abrogate the agreement. The war 
did not end.
1
A little over three years later, on August 14, 1842, the final commanding officer 
in Florida, Colonel William Worth, announced an end to the Florida War through the 
medium of an informal declaration. The terms of his peace were largely the same as those 
of Macomb’s. Indians who were willing to go west would be given land, supplies, and 
transportation, while those whose wished to remain in Florida could do so, provided they 
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confined themselves to a strip of land in southern Florida of little value to white settlers. 
Once again, many Florida citizens complained. They argued that frontier violence had not 
wholly abated and, regardless, they could not countenance living in such close proximity 
to the Indians who had haunted them over seven years. Their pleas fell on deaf ears. The 
end of the Second Seminole War passed quietly, occupying brief stories on the third 
pages of newspapers across the country, occasioning minor debate in the House of 
Representatives, and fading away, largely out of the national consciousness. 
Though there were few battles and fewer breakthroughs, the three years between 
Macomb and Worth’s agreements were not uneventful. In their struggles to ease the 
tensions of national expansion, subjugation, and republicanism, several influential leaders 
experimented with both pacifistic and violent solutions to end the war. Macomb’s treaty 
briefly experimented with the principle of dealing with Indians as a sovereign people 
under international law until his peace was shattered by the massacre of Major William 
Harney’s command several months later. Harney’s brutal counter offensive, along with 
Colonel Zachary Taylor’s controversial tactic of importing bloodhounds from Cuba, 
galvanized despondent Jacksonians across the country. Their provocative repudiation of 
moral constraint in Indian warfare seemed to fulfill Jackson’s vision of the nation even 
while they discarded his insistence on protecting Indians from the worst excesses of 
settler violence. Yet those methods failed as well, unable to overcome the Seminoles’ 
insurmountable tactical advantages and defeated by brief, voluble protests of national 
Whigs and anti-slavery leaders.
The politicians and officers who ended the Second Seminole War overcame 
unyielding constraints. Criticism from partisan papers, appeals from southern planters, 
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and the cries of Florida settlers prevented them from signing any treaty with the 
Seminoles. Yet both the exigencies of the battlefield and a long tradition of moral 
restraint inveighed against extermination as well. The preceding several years of political 
wrangling had inexorably led to a single conclusion - Indians would not be allowed to 
remain on land east of the Mississippi River against the wishes of the white populace. 
Indian removal, by one means or another, would remain the settled law of the United 
States. The solution upon which politicians and officers converged - armed occupation -
was the only means by which they could mediate the tensions of contemporary political 
culture and the undeniable reality that some Seminoles could not be removed.
The war itself ended slowly, in fits and starts. Over a period of years, William 
Henry Harrison defeated Martin Van Buren, Vice President John Tyler succeeded 
Harrison, and several commanding officers entered Florida, flailed in the wilderness, and 
requested transfer. Finally, in 1842, Tyler, Secretary of War John Spencer, and 
commanding officer Colonel William Worth began the slow process of ending the war on 
terms satisfactory to themselves and the public. Worth neutralized as many Indians as 
possible using every tactic, violent and peaceable, available to him. At the same time, 
Spencer seized on Benton’s Armed Occupation Act as the most effective means of 
securing the Florida frontier. The two campaigns were inextricably linked. On August 4, 
1842, Thomas Hart Benton shepherded his bill through Congress and eight days later 
Worth wrote to Tyler, unilaterally declaring the war at an end.
The terms of the Armed Occupation Act laid bare the implications of a war 
against Indian sovereignty. It appropriated hundreds of thousands of acres that had once 
belonged to the Seminoles and conveyed them to white settlers, at no monetary cost. The 
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newly arrived settlers had to make only one payment, a pledge to police their homesteads 
against the trespasses of the Indians who had once lived upon their property. Though 
Worth’s peace and Benton’s homestead bill forced the Seminoles to emigrate dozens 
rather than thousands of miles, they nonetheless erected a new status quo in Florida, one 
in which whites were legally empowered to seize Indian land and specifically marked 
Seminoles, who lacked legal, bureaucratic, and institutional relationships with the United 
States, as enemies of the state. 
Three years after the end of the Second Seminole War, the United States 
welcomed Florida into the Union. It took its place alongside its neighbors, Georgia and 
South Carolina, fully integrated into the cultural and political fabric of the Deep South. 
Plantation slavery, which had once only been predominant in Middle Florida, slowly 
spread into East Florida, enveloping the ground upon which the Seminoles had once trod. 
If a few hundred Seminoles remained in southern Florida, if the war lasted seven years 
amidst multiple humiliating setbacks, if the Democratic Party had lost its hold on the 
presidency in some small part due to its failure there, the southern slaveholders who had 
provoked the war and demanded its perpetuation nevertheless emerged victorious. It was 
more a material victory than an ideological one, but they had fulfilled their goals 
nonetheless.
The Perils of Treaty Making
In the spring of 1839, Major General Alexander Macomb departed for Florida. 
Like a generation of military officers, Macomb had risen to prominence during the War 
of 1812, defeating the British in the Battle of Plattsburgh and earning promotion to the 
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rank of general. When Major General Jacob Brown passed away in 1828, Macomb had 
the good fortune to be less personally combative than his peers, Edmund Gaines and 
Winfield Scott. Not wishing to exacerbate their feud, John Quincy Adams elevated the 
less-accomplished Macomb to the rank of commanding general of the entire United 
States army. Like Scott and Gaines, Macomb belonged to an earlier era of frontier 
relations. Born in Detroit during the Revolutionary War, he retained a romantic view of 
Indian character and infamously, just a decade before, had published a play, Pontiac, 
commemorating the life and death of the famous chief to a resounding dearth of acclaim. 
A man out of time, in testing the boundaries of the United States’ nascent expansionistic 
culture, Macomb would learn the limits of both his romanticism and the earlier ideals of 
Indian relations to which he clung.
2
Following the calamitous events of the previous few months - Jesup’s failed 
treaty, the controversial ambush of Osceola, and Osceola’s death in captivity – in March 
1839, Secretary of War Joel Poinsett dispatched Macomb to Florida with orders as 
muddled as the ones that had hamstrung previous commanders. At once, Macomb was to 
protect the settlers, vigorously prosecute the war, and convince the Seminoles to accede 
to the terms of the Treaty of Payne’s Landing. In no way did Macomb’s mission 
represent a change in United States policy; his orders were identical to those of Gaines, 
Scott, Jesup, and Taylor. However, Poinsett did leave Macomb a loophole. While the 
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final details of removal were arranged, Macomb could offer the Seminoles land in the 
southern tip of Florida, as they awaited transport.
3
When Macomb arrived at Fort Heilmann to meet with the commanding officer in 
Florida, Zachary Taylor, he found the men station there in a state of abject depression. 
Taylor immediately volunteered his opinion, one he said was nearly universal among his 
officer corps, that the war could not be won unless the government allowed the 
Seminoles to remain in Florida. However, he warned Macomb that even negotiating with 
the Seminoles would be difficult. Having witnessed many of their fellow chiefs being 
captured deceitfully under a white flag, the remaining Seminole leaders were 
understandably reluctant to meet with Macomb. Nevertheless, the major general sent 
several messengers into the wilderness and waited for responses. When he finally earned 
an audience with several Indian chiefs from Abiaka’s band, though not Abiaka himself, 
Macomb made a surprising offer. Misleading either Poinsett or the Seminoles, Macomb 
informed the Seminoles of Poinsett’s offer of a temporary reservation in Florida while 
they awaited further arrangements for removal. However, in his words, not thinking “it
politic … to say any thing about their emigration,” he allowed the Seminoles to think the 
situation permanent. Whether he intended to challenge Poinsett to undermine a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict or to trick the Seminoles onto a small piece of land to facilitate 
their capture, he did not say.
4
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Whatever Macomb’s plan, it stood little chance of success. Of the four remaining 
hostile Seminole bands, he had only managed to make contact with one. The other three 
roamed the Everglades unbound by their agreement. Accordingly, Taylor continued to 
militarize the frontier, extending posts along rivers and at checkpoints in hopes of 
choking off further Seminole escape routes. His actions could hardly have convinced the 
other three groups of hostile Indians to abide by a peace treaty of which they had learned 
only through rumor. Further north, Florida citizens were in a panic. Terrified at the 
prospect of sharing the peninsula with the Seminoles, many young men petitioned 
Governor Richard Keith Call for permission to revive the Florida militia and march on 
the Seminoles themselves.
5
If Macomb’s treaty was tactically limited in the field, it was even more of a 
political disaster. Van Buren never commented upon it. Poinsett quickly sent letters to 
members of the Florida elite assuring them that removal remained the war’s overarching 
objective. Within days, excerpts of letters in which Poinsett implicitly declaimed 
responsibility for Macomb’s actions reached newspapers and further isolated the 
commanding general. Over the preceding several years, nearly every prominent 
American who had spoken of the war had written the Seminoles out of Florida, whether 
through violence or through negotiation. By countervailing that trend, whatever his 
intentions, Macomb had embraced the unconscionable. It was likely of little comfort to 
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him, but he was given the benefit of the doubt: newspapers tended to refer to him as a 
dupe for trusting Indians at their word rather than as a coward afraid to fight.
6
Macomb’s critics were sure it was only a matter of time before the Seminoles 
struck again. Skepticism ran high among army officers in Florida, who agreed that by 
failing to strike bargains with each of the four belligerent Seminole bands, Macomb’s 
peace was doomed to failure. Nationally, the criticism of Macomb turned on less 
pragmatic concerns. For the most vocal detractors, peace on any terms save removal was 
itself a chimera. They argued that with Seminole bands to the south, Florida settlements 
would suffer the constant threat of massacre. In the event of a foreign invasion, the new 
reservation would serve as a ready-made beachhead for onrushing troops. In short, they 
reiterated the underlying rationale of the war itself. Absent both a pragmatic justification 
for Florida’s continued security alongside Seminole settlements and an ideological 
defense of treaty making as a viable aspect of United States frontier policy, Macomb’s 
treaty fell victim to the same political realities that had instigated the war in 1835.
7
With the truce still in place, however tenuously, during the summer of 1839, 
Taylor instructed Lieutenant William Harney to organize a trading post at Fort Van 
Buren, near Tampa Bay. Along with twenty-two dragoons, Harney opened the store and 
Indians came and went peacefully, abiding by the terms of Macomb’s peace. On July 22, 
1839, Harney returned exhausted to his camp late at night from hunting swine on a 
nearby island and collapsed in his tent, neglecting to check his camp’s defenses. He 
awoke to chaos. Nearly 160 warriors had invaded his post, and his men, caught unawares, 
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were largely unarmed. Harney ran for the nearby woods, darkened his face with mud, and 
walked to the coast. By nightfall, he had connected with ten of his men and, upon 
returning to camp, discovered eight bodies. In all, the Indians had killed sixteen soldiers 
and civilians stationed at the fort.
8
In some respects, it was as Macomb’s critics had feared. He had made his peace 
with chiefs who lacked the authority to command every Seminole remaining in Florida. 
The band who had led the massacre, the so-called “Spanish Indians,” was a loosely 
organized group of Indians who had lived in southwestern Florida for several years. Their 
ties to the rest of the Seminoles were weak, and they almost certainly did not consider 
themselves bound by Macomb’s treaty. Led by a warrior named Chakaika, the band was 
attracted by the frontier post’s abundant trade goods and its lax defenses, a dangerous 
combination amid the chaos of war. Casting Macomb’s treaty in a worse light, many 
accused Abiaka, with whose band Macomb had struck his peace, of helping to plan the 
attack. Further implicating the chief, after Abiaka promised to apprehend those 
responsible, he invited several officers to his camp only to have several warriors open fire 
upon their approach. As Taylor restocked his battalions, Seminole bands attacked isolated 
outposts, small parties, and passing steamships. Macomb’s peace was over.
Whether Abiaka was responsible for the attack or not, the Harney ambush 
demonstrated the impossibility of peace in Florida in 1839. Through their strained, 
though not yet shattered, relationship with the Black Seminoles and Florida’s African-
American population, the Seminoles were not wholly isolated from the white press. They 
might have been aware of Macomb’s public protestation that peace was only temporary, 
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giving lie to all that Macomb had promised during the negotiations. At the very least, the 
Seminoles knew of the hostility of vocal whites throughout the country and within 
Florida who would not accept their survival in Florida at any price. Along with Jesup’s 
exploitation of the white flag, the thrust of white strategy had all but discredited treaty 
making by the war’s fourth year. Once the Harney Massacre shattered that peace, the 
resumption of war was inevitable. Even if Abiaka had dissembled from the start and 
never intended to honor his peace with Macomb, he reflected the same dishonesty as 
those with whom he dealt. No moral chasm separated Osceola’s white flag, Macomb’s 
silence over emigration, and the Harney ambush.
9
William Harney and War to the Rope
During the summer of 1841, one New England newspaper castigated General 
Walker Armistead for signing a minor treaty with one band of Indians. Victory “must be 
effectual to be permanent,” the author wrote, “and to be effectual it must be either entire 
extermination or complete subjection.” Throughout the eighteen months following the 
Harney ambush, the United States experimented with extermination. Where Jackson had 
launched the Second Seminole War ostensibly to bring “progress and civilization” to both 
Florida and the Seminoles, military officers in 1840 employed tactics that demonstrated a 
callous disregard for Seminole personhood, the accepted norms of warfare, and the long-
standing identification of United States war aims with the spread of liberty. Thomas 
Jesup’s seizure of Osceola was deceptive and shameful, but it paled in comparison to the 
actions of Governor Richard Keith Call, General Zachary Taylor, Lieutenant William 
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Harney, and scores of others who forcefully cast aside moral restraint in their war against 
the Seminoles. Call and Taylor’s decision to import bloodhounds from Cuba and 
Harney’s murderous rampage through the Florida wilderness represented a radical shift in 
tactics, embracing Indian eradication in place of Indian removal. Hailed in some quarters 
and castigated in others, their actions clarified the stakes of United States frontier policy. 
The alternative to Indian removal might not have been the ideals of assimilation that had 
animated early republic Indian policy. It might have been annihilation.
10
For several years, Florida citizens had lobbied for the importation of bloodhounds 
as the easiest, most effective means of winning the war. The dogs had earned a reputation 
from their service in the Caribbean. Able to track enemies, invariably nonwhite, through 
swamps and wildernesses, they possessed heightened senses that neutralized the natives’ 
knowledge of the environment. Implacable, untiring, and unmoved by empathy, they 
appeared the ideal corrective to a United States army that many derided as merciful, 
languid, and overly compassionate. The dogs’ capabilities were infamous, colonial states 
having employed them against nonwhites in both the Haitian Revolution and the Second 
Maroon War in Jamaica. The dogs were bred to be beasts. Prior to the Haitian 
Revolution, French officials had sacrificed imprisoned black men to the dogs, holding 
showcases in which the bloodhounds literally devoured their victims. Weapons meant to 
be unleashed against the subhuman, the bloodhounds seemed fitting predators against the 
Seminoles.
11
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Though many Florida elites and United States officers had considered utilizing 
Cuban bloodhounds in the past, they had decided it unwise. Thomas Jesup had 
infamously suggested and disclaimed their use in the same letter, believing the public 
unwilling to countenance such an extreme tactic. Despite Jesup’s public reluctance, 
Secretary of War Joel Poinsett claimed to have received numerous letters from military 
officers in Florida and, as he put it, from “the most enlightened citizens of that Territory” 
urging their adoption. In 1838, Poinsett himself endorsed their use following a request
from Zachary Taylor, but neither chose to make the arrangements for their importation, 
likely not wanting to be held responsible for their use. However, following the Harney 
ambush, public outcry within Florida for their importation mounted steadily.
12
Governor Richard Keith Call took the initiative by sending an emissary to Cuba 
who returned with thirty-three of the notorious Cuban bloodhounds and four trainers in 
tow. Upon their arrival, Call’s successor, Robert Reid, offered the dogs to Zachary 
Taylor, who accepted them readily. In the field, the fabled bloodhounds amounted to 
nothing. Several decades before, they had effectively brought the decades-long Maroon 
War in Jamaica to an end, but in Florida, the bloodhounds wandered aimlessly, unable to 
track the Seminoles through the Florida wilderness. In trial runs, when military officers 
sent captured Indians off into the woods and loosed the dogs on their trail, the trainers 
watched dumbfounded as the dogs showed little interest in pursuing them. Either the 
bloodhounds’ reputation had been overblown or the skill of their trainers had atrophied 
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over the previous decades. Whatever the case, the bloodhounds added two thousand 
dollars to the cost of the war and contributed nothing to its conclusion.
13
Though the bloodhounds produced few results on the battlefield, advocates and 
critics of the war nevertheless seized upon them as emblematic of the conflict. 
Abolitionists believed the use of the dogs demonstrated the war’s perfidiousness, the 
army acting as no more than a motley group of slave catchers. Proponents of the use of 
dogs were equally passionate in defense. The Seminoles had violated the norms of 
civilized warfare, they argued, and the only solution was pure, unrestrained bloodshed.
14
For their defenders, the use of bloodhounds was exhilarating. Finally, the United 
States was dispensing with the petty moral restraints that had hamstrung the war effort 
and recognized instead what one Florida newspaper described as the Seminoles’ true 
nature: “They should be hunted out, as felons are hunted out – as murderers and fugitives 
from justice are hunted out … and hunted down as the wild tiger is hunted down.” A 
letter-writer to a Washington newspaper decried the Seminoles as “wolf-like,” reminded 
the editors that they would not bind themselves by any treaty, and asked why “should 
they not be pursued and destroyed by dogs, as are other beasts of prey.” Those who 
supported the dogs could imagine no other end to the war save through pools of blood. 
Though some officials protested the bloodhounds were meant to corner Indians not rend 
their victims limb-from-limb, those who embraced the dogs thought the ameliorative 
efforts counter-productive. In an oft-reprinted article, one writer castigated the 
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government for muzzling the bloodhounds before sending them after their prey. The use 
of muzzles was absurd, he argued, akin to soldiers who “have been directed shoot blank 
cartridges.”
15
The proponents of the bloodhounds celebrated their use not merely as an 
alternative to allowing the Seminoles to remain in Florida, but as embodying the very 
principles that underlay Indian removal. Though at times some authors demurred, the 
implication of their arguments was clear: the Seminoles were too savage to survive. They 
did not insist that abject fear of the dogs would motivate the surrender of Indian bands, 
nor did they imagine that the dogs might force Indians to climbs trees in which they 
would be easily captured. Rather, the use of the dogs allowed proponents to fantasize 
about the violent deaths of the Seminoles, enemies they explicitly and implicitly argued 
lacked the compassion of fully rounded human beings. The bloodhounds were a tool of 
extermination, not removal.
The proponents of extermination were even more animated by William Harney’s 
return to the field. Since the massacre that bore his name, Harney had waited over a year, 
biding his time as Zachary Taylor and his successors gradually extended patrols 
throughout the Florida wilderness. He had seethed, still haunted by the sight of the bodies 
of his men strewn about his camp. Finally, in December, 1840, General Walker 
Armistead authorized Harney to lead ninety-six men and a young African-American 
guide, John, against the Spanish Indians who had massacred his command.
16
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Harney, a life-long military officer, earned distinction throughout his career for 
both his service and his ruthlessness. Born on the Tennessee frontier, Harney proved 
himself to be especially capable in Indian conflict, leading successful expeditions against 
various Indian nations over several decades, including the Seminoles, Sauk, and Sioux. 
Fifteen years after the end of the Second Seminole War, once again on a punitive 
mission, Harney would lead several hundred men into battle against a Sioux village, 
leaving dozens of men, women, and children dead. Among the relatives of his victims, he 
became known as “Squaw Killer.” Against the Seminoles, Harney was no less violent. As 
he exclaimed in a letter to Zachary Taylor, “our humane efforts to save a portion of the 
Indians from extermination have only led to another exhibition … of malice and 
disregard of their pledges … There must be no more talking – they must be hunted down 
like so many beasts … Let every one taken be hung up in the woods to inspire terror in 
the rest.”
17
Harney took his men deep into the Everglades, traveling terrain where, as one 
Florida newspaper put it, “us white men have never been.” Directly ignoring an explicit 
order from Armistead, Harney and his men disguised themselves as Indians, hoping to 
come upon their prey unaware. Two days into their expedition, they encountered the 
enemy: two warriors and their families traveling in canoes. Fulfilling his promise to 
Taylor, Harney and his men captured the Indians and, with their families watching, hung 
the two warriors from the tallest tree they could find. In the aftermath, when his African-
American guide momentarily lost his bearings, Harney turned to the captive Indian 
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women and threatened to hang their children if they did not lead them to the Spanish 
Indians’ camp. To his credit, when they refused, Harney decided not to carry out his 
threat and waited for his guide to regain his sense of direction. Several days later, still 
disguised as Indians, Harney and his men crept into their enemies’ camp soon after 
sunrise and launched an ambush of their own, shooting and scalping the unarmed chief of 
the band, Chakaiaka, and, after a fierce firefight, killing nearly every Indian combatant. 
In all, the troops captured several dozen Indian women and children and three warriors. 
Harney ordered his men to retrieve Chakaika’s body, had his men hang two of the 
captured warriors that night and, before the chief’s captured wife, mother, and sister, 
hanged Chakaika’s bloody body from the same tree. Harney and his men returned, 
proudly, to Key Biscayne about a week later with thirty-six captives.
18
More significant than Harney’s violent actions were the extent to which they were 
celebrated. Harney, alone among the officer corps, personified the all-consuming Indian-
hatred that animated the war’s most ardent supporters. Upon the major’s return, 
newspapers throughout the South lionized his campaign. Naturally, his first admirers 
hailed from Florida. The day after an 1841 New Year’s party, the people of St. Augustine 
threw a second festival, publicly commending Harney’s service and displaying a banner 
bearing the words “Lieut. Col. Wm. S. Harney," “Everglades!,” “No more treaties,” and 
“War to the Rope!” It marked a raucous celebration with music and spontaneous cheers 
from the assembled town, punctuated by the firing of cannon. Overlooking the revelry, 
the organizers raised a man-sized replica of an Indian and suspended it from a tree. At 
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once, they cheered Harney, the execution of Indians, the repudiation of treaty making, 
and the violent affirmation of white supremacy. Not to be outdone, the territorial 
legislature of Florida quickly passed a resolution applauding Harney. The resolution 
argued that as the Seminoles “had forfeited all claims to the usages of civilized warfare,” 
Harney’s summary execution of the “males and warriors” was wholly justified. The lives 
of every male Seminole, regardless of their level of engagement in the war, were declared 
forfeit.
19
Terror and violence animated Harney’s defenders. The correspondent of one 
Georgia newspaper wrote that he was like the commanders of old, “the bible in one hand, 
and the halter in the other – one teaching them they will never die, and the other in a 
moment bringing them to an end.” Others argued that the value of Harney’s tactics 
transcended the visceral. By invoking terror in his enemies he would more quickly bring 
about the end of the war, regardless of how many men he hanged. According to a 
Baltimore newspaper, there would be no more temporizing: the Indians would have to 
surrender or die, and most likely they would wither in the face of Harney’s resolve.
20
The ranks of Harney’s defenders did not entirely consist of the bloodthirsty. As 
the St. Augustine banner that had forsworn treaties had implicitly argued, in the context 
of the controversy over Macomb’s treaty and the long trajectory of United States Indian 
policy, Harney’s offensive was a political statement. Consequently, when one Alabama 
newspaper argued that Harney had finally discovered the most expeditious means of 
removing Indians west (“fanatics will rail, never fear; an ‘express’ for males – through 
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by light – no halfway house – places airy and elevated – passengers allowed their own 
swing – all settling done without calling at the ‘captain’s office’ – no charges at the bar, 
slings gratis – we trust the new line will be everywhere encouraged”), they argued not 
only against treaty-making as the foundation of United States policy, but even against 
Jackson’s policies of institutional subordination. Applause came from all over the 
country. One Connecticut newspaper argued that Harney’s “energy and enterprise” had 
done more to bring the war to a conclusion than “half a dozen of the Generals who have 
endeavored to effect the same object by means of treaties.” At stake was the future of 
United States Indian policy and whether removal or extermination would predominate.  
Treaties, and the ideals that had been the bedrock of an earlier era, were barely a 
consideration.
21
In lauding Harney’s conduct, his advocates lumped together proponents of Indian 
removal, United States commanding generals, and critics of removal as all being 
similarly empathetic toward the Seminoles, obliterating the chasms that separated those 
groups. To the bloodthirsty, all three groups imagined the Seminoles and, by extension, 
Indians generally, to have a place in American society, in the most literal sense. Where 
Washington, Jefferson and, to a very limited extent, Jackson wrestled with the question of 
Indian fitness for republican society, those who idealized Harney believed Indians had no 
right to life. Their Indian-hating spanned several levels of consciousness: visceral hatred, 
pragmatic self-interest, and nationalistic fervor.
Despite the volubility of his most ardent supporters, Harney’s actions did not 
inspire the same volume of protest as the bloodhounds. In part, that was because the 
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imagined viciousness of the bloodhounds was far more horrifying than the actual 
execution of Seminoles, the rending of bodies being as rare as hanging was common. 
Moreover, Harney’s violence was as much personal as political. Few doubted his right to 
avenge himself against the Indians who had massacred his command. In contrast, the use 
of the bloodhounds had been condoned, even endorsed, by some of the most powerful 
politicians in the country. For all that his supporters tried to galvanize his violence into a 
political movement, Harney remained a man apart, in both the extent of his fury and the 
circumscribed nature of his symbolism.
Harney’s fury and the calculated importation of the bloodhounds were born of 
vastly different historical legacies as well. Where violence was endemic to the American 
frontier, the importation of bloodhounds was intimately associated with the brutal 
enforcement of slave society. The chance that extermination would become the official 
Indian policy of the United States was remote. By 1840, support for Indian removal was 
nearly universal among political elites. Though no Whig nominees for national office 
ever campaigned for its reversal, neither did any anyone argue for Native American 
annihilation, whether individual or tribal, until well after the Civil War. In contrast, 
northerners required only the slightest familiarity with southern culture to understand the 
implication of the bloodhounds. It was far more realistic and therefore far more troubling 
to imagine plantation owners loosing dogs after fugitive slaves than military officers 
routinely lynching Indians.
Regardless of Harney’s success in the field, he failed to meaningfully influence 
the army’s campaign tactics. After inheriting his command in the aftermath of Thomas 
Jesup’s controversial pacifistic appeal to the secretary of war, Zachary Taylor had 
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instituted a policy he described as “squares,” dividing Florida into adjacent squares, each 
twenty miles on a side. Within each square, he assigned a garrison of 21 men to search its 
environs, hoping to root out Seminole bands and drive warriors further south, away from 
the territory’s more densely populated regions. After Taylor requested transfer from 
Florida, his successor, General Walker Armistead, capitalized on Taylor’s plan, utilizing 
Taylor’s infrastructure to launch offensives even in the sickly summer season. The 
Seminoles, weakened by the gradual attrition of warfare and the severe dislocations of the 
previous five years, proved far easier prey than in the past. Armistead successfully 
captured dozens of Indians and compelled several influential chiefs to consent to 
removal. Though some of the most intractable chiefs remained in the field, Armistead 
estimated that his expeditions had reduced the number of Seminole warriors remaining in 
Florida to around 300. In May, 1841, Armistead requested and was granted transfer from 
Florida. 
Armistead’s departure roughly coincided with William Henry Harrison’s brief 
term in office. The former Indian fighter and frontier governor authored few changes in
the war, though he did reappoint Richard Keith Call as governor of Florida, the erstwhile 
general having switched parties following his falling out with Andrew Jackson. It was 
reported that just prior to taking to his deathbed with a chill, Harrison had informed his 
advisors that he intended to bring the war to a close, but he never had an opportunity to 
either decisively recalibrate United States policy or actively perpetuate Van Buren’s 
strategy. With his death, the presidency passed to John Tyler, a lifelong politician who 
had rarely demonstrated any interest in frontier issues throughout his long career. He 
inherited Harrison’s cabinet, including Secretary of War John Bell, who as a senator 
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during the Van Buren administration had criticized the handling of the war, but implicitly 
endorsed its perpetuation.
22
Tyler and Bell named Colonel William Jenkins Worth the new commander of 
United States forces in Florida, the first military officer below the rank of general to 
command United States troops in the theater. A protégé of sorts to Winfield Scott, Worth 
was an able soldier who had served his country with distinction since the War of 1812. 
He was a late arrival to Florida, having come with his brigade only in late 1840, but 
Worth was determined to perpetuate the strategies of his predecessors. In practice, he 
built on the successes of Armistead while adopting Harney’s tactics. 
In March 1841, Coacoochee, one of the most influential Seminoles remaining in 
the field, agreed to surrender to Armistead’s forces. Upon his assumption of command, 
Worth learned that some his officers suspected Coacoochee might renege on his 
agreement. He immediately had the chief seized, chained, and transported to New 
Orleans. Upon reflection, however, Worth ordered Coacoochee returned to Florida and 
met the chief on the bow of the ship that had returned him. There, he professed 
admiration for Coacoochee’s bravery and respect for his patriotism. He spoke of 
Coacoochee as a peer, another war leader dedicated to the defense of his people, and set 
for him a simple task. The chief was to name several representatives and then decide how 
many days they would need to locate their band, convince them to emigrate, and return. 
The consequences of failure were simple as well. If Coacoochee’s messengers failed, he 
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and the rest of his men, still manacled, would be hung by their necks from the masts of 
the ship on which they stood.
23
Choked with emotion, Coacoochee agreed to Worth’s demands. As the general 
and the chief waited several long months for their answer, Worth continued Armistead’s 
strategy of sending out small, quick raids upon remote locations. When he successfully 
captured individual Indians, Worth again offered them the same choice he had offered 
Coacoochee: bring in your fellows or die. By August 1841, the vast majority of 
Coacoochee’s band had surrendered to Worth, sparing the chief’s life. When Coacoochee 
himself went into the wilderness and brought back the renowned eighty-five year-old 
chief Hospetarke and fifteen warriors to parley, the Indians walked onto the ship only to 
find themselves surrounded by soldiers and thrown in irons, a reprisal of the same ruse by 
which Jesup had captured Osceola. In October, Worth shipped 211 Indians, including 
Coacoochee, west. Only a few Indian leaders remained in the field, including, by 
reputation, the most intransigent of all, Abiaka.
24
Six year before William Harney and William Worth had risen to prominence in 
Florida, Winfield Scott had chafed against his orders, charging it was nearly 
unprecedented to deprive a military commander of the “diplomatic faculty” to initiate 
treaty deliberations. In the aftermath of the Macomb fiasco, in a vivid demonstration of 
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Scott’s complaints, Harney and Worth acted out the inevitable consequences of those 
orders. Harney was the product of a political culture that actively denied the Seminoles 
individual and collective rights. If Worth’s transgressions were more pragmatic in nature, 
they nevertheless reflected a forceful refutation of Seminole humanity. The crimes they 
committed in the service of their country were set in motion years before and many were 
complicit.
The Imperial Synthesis
Following President John Tyler’s May 1842 instructions to Secretary of War Bell 
to bring the war to a close, both Worth and Senator Thomas Hart Benton worked 
separately toward a single goal. Desperately hoping to secure an armistice with Abiaka, 
Worth suspended all active operations and redirected his resources toward securing the 
white settlement of northern Florida, prioritizing the consolidation of white supremacy 
over the removal of nonwhite enemies. In this, he was matched by the lobbying of 
Benton, who reintroduced his plan for Florida, the Armed Occupation Act, as a means of 
institutionalizing white yeoman settlement as the foundation of Florida society. Benton’s 
vision, in which the federal government would offer land, arms, and supplies to white 
settlers in return for their solemn promise to defend their land against Indian attack, 
would be passed by both houses of Congress and signed into law mere days before Worth 
declared an end to hostilities that allowed the remaining Seminoles to stay in Florida. 
The results of Worth and Benton’s contradictory initiatives to recruit white 
settlers to the frontier, even as the Seminoles gained a foothold to remain there, brought 
about a new status quo in Florida and enshrined a nascent imperial ethos as the 
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underlying principle of United States frontier policy. It was a cultural, not a legal, policy 
as Worth elided the pratfalls of both Macomb and Harney by pursuing an informal 
armistice rather than a treaty. As the bands of both Abiaka and Holatta Micco proved too 
intractable to be cowed into surrender and too well concealed to be found, Worth grasped 
for a peaceful solution that would nevertheless earn the approval of the most bellicose 
members of the federal government and the Florida public. He found it by informally 
allowing the Seminoles possession of land in the southern tip of the territory, ending the 
war without recognizing in writing any Seminole claim to property or collective 
sovereignty. 
Benton’s Homestead Act functioned in harmony with Worth’s strategy. The 
federal government organized the land it had seized from the Seminoles, divided it, and 
offered it to any white family who pledged to defend it against Indian attacks. Through 
the dispossession of the Seminoles, the law enriched white settlement as a means of 
protecting the frontier from future Seminole invasions. The implications of Benton’s plan 
were stark. Under its terms, the United States formally identified the stated objectives of 
their war policy: the seizure of foreign territory, its transformation into a resource to 
benefit white settlement, and the eradication of any tie between native peoples and their 
former land. Though the effect was not codified into law, the Seminoles became a 
colonized people, denied the right to be ruled by the consent of the governed and policed 
by white settlers tasked with compelling their subordination.
It took Worth, Bell, Benton, and Tyler one long year to bring the war to a 
conclusion. During the interim, the military hierarchy experienced another upheaval. At 
the end of June 1841, while sitting for a portrait in his War Department office, Alexander 
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Macomb suffered a stroke and passed away. In the aftermath, Tyler bypassed General 
Edmund Gaines for his own nominal political ally, General Winfield Scott, appointing 
the latter general-in-chief. As Scott was Worth’s patron, his promotion secured greater 
influence for the colonel. In the fall of 1841, as Worth gradually reined in offensive 
maneuvers to secure his armistice with the Seminoles, the Tyler administration 
underwent a seismic shift following Tyler’s second veto of Henry Clay’s prized banking 
act, as John Bell resigned as Secretary of War along with the rest of the cabinet. To 
replace him, Tyler appointed John Spencer, a New York lawyer who had served in state 
government for thirty-five years. He was a prominent Anti-Mason, but had demonstrated 
no expertise in military strategy, Indian policy, or the rules governing army conduct. In 
office, he deferred to Scott and Worth, his more experienced colleagues.
25
With the surrender of Coacoochee and his band, Worth faced the daunting project 
of locating the remaining three hundred Seminoles in the dense tangles of the Everglades. 
If anything, the mission had only grown harder - with fewer Indians to find, operations 
were even more difficult to carry out. Frustration was widespread, one of Worth’s 
officers complaining in his diary, “Col Worth’s orders is to exterminate or capture – no 
chance.” The despondency of some officers, however, was matched by the bellicosity of 
others. Though William Harney, complaining of ill health, had left Florida in 1841, there 
remained dozens of officers and soldiers who preferred to actively take the fight to the 
enemy rather than wait for the signing of an armistice. Worth, however, believed an 
agreement to be the only viable means of ending the war and would do nothing to 
endanger one. Writing to his superiors, Worth made clear his dilemma: “the operations 
since June conclusively demonstrate …the utter impracticability of securing them by 
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main force. The object must be attained by pacific and persuasive measures, or not at all.” 
The problem, he explained, was that if he were to pursue a pacifistic end to the war, the 
public would flay him relentlessly.
26
Worth’s solution was exceedingly elegant. He wrote to Scott and suggested that 
the United States draw down its army in Florida by over eighty percent. At once, the 
withdrawal would demonstrate his sincere commitment to peace to the remaining 
Seminoles in Florida, dramatically lessen the expense of the war, dampen the urgency of 
the war in Washington, and take the war out of the public’s eye by effectively terminating 
hostilities, laying the groundwork for an enduring Seminole presence in the southern tip 
of Florida. Worth had made the same pragmatic calculation Jesup had advanced years 
before – the costs of removing the remaining Seminoles far outpaced the benefits. The 
administration would risk an immediate uproar in Florida, whose citizens clamored for 
more protection, but would ensure a long-term solution to a conflict that, with the 
Seminoles decisively weakened by several long years of war, no longer offered any 
tangible benefit to the United States save the affirmation of its pride.
27
It was a sensible proposal, but Tyler and his leading military generals responded 
negatively. National pride, however defined, was a goal still worth fighting for. Secretary 
of War Spencer convened a council of senior military leaders in Washington to discuss 
Worth’s proposal. Winfield Scott, though he held Worth in high esteem, dissented from 
his protégé. Following Scott’s lead, the council rejected Worth’s plan, but granted him 
extensive leeway in prosecuting the war. It was reported that only General Thomas Jesup, 
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who knew all too well the futility of extended campaigns, had supported Worth’s plan in 
every respect.
28
Worth responded with a final campaign that encompassed the full range of tactics 
that had marked the Second Seminole War. He sent lightly provisioned detachments into 
the wilderness, moving quickly in search of the remaining Seminole bands. They were 
led by African-American guides, former Black Seminoles who had gained their freedom 
in return for their service. Soldiers were spurred on by the promise of a bounty, one 
hundred dollars for every warrior killed or captured. In April, they finally found one of 
the last remaining bands of Seminoles, led by Halleck Tustenuggee near Lake Ahapopka. 
The Indians repeated the tactics that had been so successful at Okeechobee, whittling 
notches into trees to steady their rifles as they secreted themselves in dense hammocks. 
The battle was inconclusive with few casualties on either side, but the attrition of seven 
years of warfare proved too much for the chief. Soon after the battle, he returned to 
Worth in hopes of signing a peace. In the midst of the negotiations, upon one of Halleck 
Tustenuggee’s visit to his fort, Worth recapitulated Jesup’s duplicitous entrapment of 
Osceola, seizing Tustenuggee and about one hundred men, women, and children. Giving 
him about a thousand dollars, he sent the chief into the wilderness and urged him to 
spread the word among the remaining Seminoles. If they remained in the southern tip of 
Florida, they would be allowed to remain in the territory. There was no treaty, and Worth 
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had no explicit authorization from his commanders. He simply had no other means of 
ending the war.
29
By May, 1842, Tyler and his administration had come to agree. Writing to 
Winfield Scott, Secretary of War Spencer informed the commanding general that Tyler 
had decided to end the war. His message was bracingly non-ideological. Laying out the 
terms of the withdrawal, Spencer explained that some 240 Seminoles would be allowed 
to remain in Florida unmolested, Worth would continue to peacefully lobby them to 
emigrate, and the administration would urge Congress to pass Benton’s Armed 
Occupation Act. There would be no declaration of victory, no insistence that the war had 
achieved its goals. His message lacked even an enunciation of what those goals might 
have been. In practice, Tyler’s armistice was identical to that of Macomb. They erected 
the same borders for the new Seminole reservation and were dependent upon the same 
decentralized leadership structures of the Seminoles to function. Nevertheless, the 
reception to Worth’s peace differed markedly from that of Macomb’s.
30
 Spencer’s announcement of the end of the war sparked neither celebration nor 
debate. One Boston newspaper likely spoke for many when it titled its story on the end of 
the war, “The Florida War Ended Again!” implying, of course, that it had not. In 
Congress, Florida Territorial Delegate David Levy Yulee railed against the president for 
“claiming before the nation the éclat of an achievement which has not been performed, 
when the consequences, however agreeable to himself for a time, may be so fatal to the 
country.” Yulee then drew on a series of newspaper reports detailing recent attacks by 
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Indians in Florida and insisted that even if the United States intended a ceasefire, the 
Seminoles did not. His stance provoked a response from Caleb Cushing, who first 
mocked the idea of “the United States, an enlightened nation of 17,000,000 inhabitants, 
declaring war against 80 Indians,” then followed with defense of the Armed Occupation 
Act.
31
It was a fitting evasion of the fact that the Armed Occupation Act was itself an act 
of war against 80 Indians and that Cushing, like so many of his peers, had so rigorously 
ignored the implications of the United States’ setbacks against a small nation of Indians 
on its frontier. Politicians and activists of both parties seized on the Armed Occupation 
Act as an enduring solution to the chaos of Florida. The passage of time had made 
Benton’s vision more palatable. Compared to an endless war of removal, Benton cast 
“armed occupation, with land to the occupant” as “the true way of settling and holding a 
conquered country.” His plan would offer 160 acres of Florida land to any young male 
who pledged to settle and improve the land, live in residence for five years, and defend 
his homestead against Indian attacks. President Tyler, in his May letter to William Worth 
authorizing a ceasefire, endorsed Benton’s plan. Six days later, Benton brought the bill to 
the floor once again.
32
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Speaking in favor of the 1842 bill, Benton replicated the arguments of several 
years before. He stated that there remained too many Indians in Florida to justify the risk 
of settlement, but not enough to necessitate a military campaign. Several recent attacks 
on white homesteads had furthered Benton’s conviction that only armed settlement could 
defend the territory. According to Benton, settlement and defense remained linked, and 
that link was the very principle of the bill.
33
Notwithstanding Benton’s logic, the resurrected Armed Occupation Act bore 
several vital changes from the version that had died in the House several years before. 
The original document was plainly born of military necessity. It elaborated on the martial 
duties of each settler at length and essentially inducted him into the military hierarchy, 
specifying that upon arrival he would report to a particular officer, who would report to 
the commander of the troops in Florida, who would report directly to the Secretary of 
War. Each settler, then, was only two steps removed from the head of the War 
Department. The emigrants were required to bring guns and farming equipment, while 
the army would provide ammunition and supplies. In return, officers would survey 
settlers periodically, ensuring that their guns and ammunition were in sufficient condition 
to patrol the countryside. In contrast, the 1842 version of the bill was a true Homestead 
Act. Unlike the volunteers who had streamed into the territory with no intention to 
remain in 1836, the bill hoped to attract settlers who would occupy Florida space 
permanently. Rather than task the army with the administration of the bill, Benton relied 
upon the General Land Office to oversee the transfer of property. Similarly, save for its 
own title and an initial reference to the settlers being able to bear arms, the bill was silent 
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over the matter of ammunition and firearms. Instead, it focused on the vital details of 
settlement: the surveying of land, the duties of each homeowner, and the criteria by 
which settlers might attain unqualified title to their newly acquired land. It was of a piece 
with the evolution of the legislation. Where the first bill was pitched as a means of 
winning the war, the second, in practice, was intended to consolidate the fruits of 
victory.
34
The stakes of the second debate, then, were considerably lower than in 1839, 
when the war seemed unending and Martin Van Buren was drifting toward defeat. It 
occurred in the context of Tyler’s stated intention to end the war and his implicit decision 
to do so absent a treaty with the Seminoles remaining in Florida. With neither a 
declaration of war to resolve nor an armistice to pass, Congress’s authority over the end 
of the Second Seminole War was minor. The conflict’s conclusion was inevitable, the 
proposal no longer pivotal. 
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Amidst the squabbling over minor details of the bill (whether the settlers would 
be provided ammunition, whether married men would get more land, whether an official 
survey was necessary), two men opposed the bill forthrightly. John Quincy Adams and 
Horace Everett had been the two most prominent critics of the war in 1836 and they 
would be its most prominent critics in its last months. They had not staved off the 
removal of the vast majority of the Seminoles, obstructed Florida’s path to becoming a 
slave state, or prevented Indian removal from being enshrined as the consensus frontier 
policy of the nation. Nevertheless, at its close, Everett and Adams dissented again.
Horace Everett argued that the bill served to enrich land speculators rather than 
advance the war effort. He remembered the ideals that had once animated a nation and 
suggested that persuasion, negotiations, and bribery could best offer security to the 
people of Florida. Adams spoke briefly, near the end of the short debate over the bill. 
Likely, he knew that its passage was assured. In the face of defeat, Adams questioned 
why Congress was moved to address the protection of the people of Florida against the 
remnants of the Seminoles as opposed to, for example, the people of Massachusetts 
against the possibility of a foreign invasion. Though he agreed that it was the duty of the 
federal government to defend its citizens, he insisted it would cost less money to secure 
peace through a proper treaty negotiation, arguing diplomacy might induce the few 
remaining Indians to remove at a much cheaper price. Thinking of the options available 
to the federal government in Florida, Adams concluded, “this bill was not calculated to 
answer the purpose contemplated.”
35
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Adams did not require a spectacular leap of deduction to understand the full 
implications of the bill: Florida Territorial Delegate David Levy Yulee explained them 
quite well. After praising the bill for helping to rid the territory of Indians, Yulee argued 
passionately that it authorized “the acquisition of five millions of acres heretofore 
abandoned to the Indians, and ten millions more which were now unsettled because of the 
hazard of settling them. It would also add much to the productive wealth of the country 
by facilitating the settlement and cultivation of the rich lands of Florida.” The numerous 
amendments to the bill belied the focus on the “rich lands of Florida.” Horace Everett 
offered several amendments linking the bill directly to the course of the war effort, 
requiring settlers to perform a tour of duty with the army and appropriating money to 
negotiate removal with the remaining Indians. Another delegate offered an amendment to 
require settlers to live four miles away from military outposts rather than two as a means 
of enlarging the defended area. A third delegate suggested furnishing arms to settlers too 
poor to purchase them. All four proposals were defeated. Its supporters envisioned the 
bill as a means of distributing property, not of removing Indians. That work had been 
done.
36
In contrast to the previous bill, the reintroduced Armed Occupation Act passed 
both Whig-dominated Houses of Congress with relative ease. In the Senate, Southern 
Whig opposition evaporated. Sectionalism, not partisanship, dominated the vote. Every 
Democrat voted in favor as did every Southern Whig, save one Kentucky senator. 
Assuming the House vote mirrored that of the Senate, the attitude of Southerners toward 
the bill had evolved greatly over the previous years. One of the senators who changed his 
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vote, South Carolina Whig William Preston explained the shift. Two years before, he had 
believed it would require “more active and effective measures” to win the war, but given 
the relative success of removal, he now believed armed occupation prudent. Preston 
declared he knew that many young men throughout the South would gladly acquire free 
land from the government, and, as he said, “move there with their families and with their 
slaves.” Florida, having been made safe for settlement, was now safe for slavery as well. 
Preston, who had remained largely ambivalent toward the war while it persisted, now was 
ready to revel in its peace.
37
The bill attracted exactly whom Benton had expected. The vast majority of 
applicants migrated either from within Florida or from neighboring Georgia. They 
brought with them a deep commitment to slavery, a healthy fear of Indians, and a 
sufficient capacity for labor that transformed the Florida frontier.
38
The Armed Occupation Act implicitly justified the Second Seminole War on the 
basis of racial difference. In practice, it institutionalized racialism into the Florida 
landscape by redistributing once contested land into the hands of white settlers in return 
for their commitment to the perpetuation of white rule in the territory. The Indians who 
remained were shut out of the emergent society, the new emigrants being explicitly 
tasked with the mission to defeat the Seminoles’ claim to the land that had once been 
theirs. The Armed Occupation Act branded the remaining Seminoles as enemies of the 
state, denying them any legal standing within, or institutional relationship with, the 
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United States, their resources appropriated and redistributed to those deemed members of 
the body politic. By omitting nearly every reference to the war effort, the text of the bill 
divorced the new status quo of Florida from the Second Seminole War. Instead, it argued 
for the enrichment of white settlers at the expense of nonwhite claimants as a universal 
good on its own terms.
In tandem with Tyler’s decision to forgo a treaty with the Seminoles, the Armed 
Occupation Act accomplished what six military commanders had not. Where military 
campaigns failed, Benton’s act effectively wrote the Seminoles out of Florida and 
deprived them of all legal standing in the territory. The new status quo of Florida exiled 
them to its southern environs. On their northern border, they were surrounded by a new 
population of white settlers, men and women who feared and hated Indians and were still 
committed to absolute removal. As the territory remained unbound by any written treaty, 
the Seminoles lacked any guarantee that the legislature would not unilaterally extend its 
jurisdiction over the Indian reserve. They had survived seven years of war within the 
borders of one of the most powerful nations on the planet. They had witnessed their land 
given to white settlers whom they despised, the vast majority of their people forcefully 
driven to the west, and their own confinement to the least arable stretch of the territory. 
They endured nonetheless.
Ten days after Tyler signed the Armed Occupation Act, William Worth declared 
the Second Seminole War to have reached its conclusion and took his leave of the 
territory. Though sporadic violence persisted in the coming months, Worth did 
effectively end the Second Seminole War. The three hundred Seminoles remaining 
emigrated to their unofficial reservation in South Florida where they would be allowed to 
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remain, unmolested and unbowed. It did not go entirely smoothly. In the weeks that 
followed the declaration of peace, a few chiefs and their bands obdurately refused to 
move to the reservation. Worse, a Seminole band who had refused to leave the environs 
of Tallahassee had murdered a white family on the frontier, leaving only one child alive. 
Immediately, following the lobbying of outraged Florida citizens, the War Department 
sent a message to the field contravening the terms of Worth’s armistice and demanding 
that those responsible be brought to justice.
39
In response, the War Department dispatched a seventh commanding officer to 
Florida, Colonel Josiah Vose. Vose, the son of a general, hailed from Massachusetts. Like 
many of his peers, he had earned renown in the War of 1812 and slowly moved up the 
ranks of the army. Upon receiving his orders from his superiors, however, Vose 
distinguished himself from many of his predecessors. He sat down and wrote two letters. 
In the first, he explained, patiently and exactingly, the quandary in which he found 
himself. The great majority of Seminoles had obeyed the terms of the treaty. They had 
moved slowly, but he insisted they had no knowledge of the murders and had instead 
pledged to prevent further violence. Vose noted that he had personally promised the 
chiefs that he would abide by the agreement and they had done nothing to violate its 
terms. So, he explained, “it was with no less astonishment than mortification that I 
suddenly found myself instructed by the Secretary of War to forfeit every pledge I had 
made to the Indians & pursue a course which in the present state of affairs … would 
incite the entire Indian population to acts of retaliation and revenge.” It was a heavy 
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burden and, after careful consideration, he delicately informed his superiors that he had 
decided to suspend his orders, in the name of justice and peace.
40
Two days later, Vose wrote again. He regretted to report that a “vagabond class of 
citizens” in Florida had exhibited “a spirit of implacable resentment towards the Indians.” 
These men, whom he accused of having displayed abject cowardice during the war, now 
urged their fellows to seize this new moment of Seminole weakness and march on their 
enemies, removing them from the territory through extermination rather than removal. He 
worried that their actions might upset the delicate balance of power that his predecessors 
had achieved, especially as he had no legal standing under which he could restrain the 
settlers. He finished the letter and, apparently at the last second after having endorsed it, 
added a postscript on its outer edge: “would not the shameful interference of white men, 
as herein reported, require some executive action – some public admonition and warning 
against such lawless & selfish mock-war spirit?”
41
                                                          
40
 Albert Kendall Teele, The History of Milton, Mass., 1640 to 1887 (Boston: Press of Rockwell and 
Churchill), 441; Vose to Jones, September 12, 1842, Territorial Papers, 26:548-550.
41
 Vose to Jones, September 12, 1842, Territorial Papers, 26:551-553.
335
Conclusion
The Second Seminole War wound down quietly in 1842, but the fragile silence 
that hung over issues of slavery and expansion ended with an explosion eighteen months 
later. Following the resignations of the cabinet he had inherited from William Henry 
Harrison, President John Tyler turned to an old friend, Virginian Abel Upshur, to succeed 
Daniel Webster at the State Department. Upshur was a proslavery radical who had 
volubly defended nullification a decade before. Seizing on sensationalized reports from 
Duff Green, a newspaper editor who Tyler had sent to England to gather intelligence, 
Tyler and Upshur feared that the British might use outstanding debts to extort the 
independent Texan government into emancipating its slaves. Covertly, the Tyler 
administration planned to annex Texas to forestall that prospect. With an agreement 
nearly in place, on February 28, 1844 Upshur boarded the USS Princeton for a 
demonstration of its outsized weaponry. At the climatic moment, the gun exploded and 
Upshur perished in the blast. To replace Upshur, Tyler called upon John Calhoun, the 
leading ideologue of slavery in the United States. Within a month, Calhoun had 
submitted an annexation treaty with Texas to the Senate and, alongside it, a letter to 
Britain’s minister to the United States explaining that the United States had annexed 
Texas to prevent Great Britain from spreading abolition in the southwest. At so public a 
proslavery measure, the old guard revolted. Henry Clay and Martin Van Buren 
announced their opposition to annexation on the same day. The treaty failed to receive 
even half of the votes it needed to pass the Senate. In his 1854 memoir, Thomas Hart 
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Benton likened annexation to “a clap of thunder in a clear sky. There was nothing in the 
political horizon to announce or portend it.”
1
In 1836, at the start of the Second Seminole War, John Quincy Adams had 
predicted a war with Mexico was imminent and assured his proslavery colleagues that the 
“banner of freedom will be the banners of Mexico, and your banners, I blush to speak the 
word, will be the banners of slavery.” The annexation of Texas, the excitement of the 
Mexican-American War, the ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the 
Compromise of 1850, and the Kansas-Nebraska Act all represented attempts to blunt that 
insight, to somehow mediate the now inescapable tensions of aggressive expansionism, 
republicanism, and the institution of slavery. Those attempts, of course, were wildly 
unsuccessful.
2
Yet the Second Seminole War was nothing like the Mexican-American War. 
Andrew Jackson had never intended for Florida to be a stepping stone toward a culture of 
conquest. He believed the dispossession of the Seminoles to be instead part of a gradual 
process in which Indians would be displaced and land parceled out to white settlers. The 
interests of slaveholders ensured that the war would be fought to its conclusion, but the 
roots of the conflict lay in Jackson’s conclusion that Indian sovereignty and the 
republican project were mutually exclusive, a conception that came to be widely shared 
among political elites of the era. In casting off the ideals of an earlier generation of 
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Americans who had advanced expansion through the language of freedom and liberty, 
they instead embraced geographic expansion, racial supremacy, and the annihilation of 
nonwhite autonomy on the American continent. Unwilling to defy the collective might of 
slaveholders, that formulation went unchallenged.
3
Others perceived the true implications of the Second Seminole War. As General 
Thomas Jesup pleaded with the Van Buren administration to moderate its insistence on 
removal, he came to understand what his subordinates had tried to tell him – their 
superiors prioritized national honor, defined by the triumph of white supremacy, above 
moral right. British traveler Harriet Martineau had come to the same conclusion, finding 
that the combination of nationalism and white supremacy was leading inexorably toward 
conquest. As she described that relationship, the volunteers came to personify it, flocking 
to Florida and identifying the protection of the frontier with the destruction of the 
Seminoles. William Harney and his men, as they strung up the body of Chakaiaka before 
his mother and children, carried Jackson’s campaign against nonwhite autonomy to its 
logical conclusion. By the time William Worth held Coacoochee in irons and flatly held 
his life hostage unless his people surrendered, the unconscionable had become routine. In 
1819, Henry Clay had reproached General Andrew Jackson by reminding him that “we 
are fighting a great moral battle, for the benefit not only of our country, but all of 
mankind.” In the wildernesses of Florida, that battle was lost.
The Armed Occupation Act served to institutionalize a crusade of conquest within 
Florida. White settlers would make the territory, and the region, safe for settlement and, 
concomitantly, safe for slavery. The end result, in which the United States encouraged 
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white settlement as a means of neutralizing the autonomy of nonwhites who remained 
within its territory, was not the one that Jackson had envisioned. As a means of mediating 
the tensions of frontier policy, however, it proved well suited to its task. With absolute 
removal judged to be impractical in Florida and, given the limited geographic space even 
of the vast North American continent, impossible to repeat iteratively as the nation 
expanded west, a combination of military outposts and white civilian settlement proved 
an effective means of extending the nation’s borders while curtailing the autonomy of 
nonwhite residents. Through the constant threat, and occasion imposition, of force, the 
United States marched across the continent seizing Indian land and confining Indian 
nations onto smaller and smaller reservations of limited agricultural value. Throughout 
the 1850s, filibusterers threatened to repeat the process throughout the Americas, 
launching illegal invasions of countries throughout the hemisphere. As Southern 
nationalists, the filibusterers offered a glimpse of what might have been the foreign 
policy of an enduring Confederate States of America - a global assault on nonwhite 
sovereignty.
4
Even in the aftermath of the Confederacy’s defeat, the legacies of Jacksonian 
expansion remained. Over the coming century, once the United States had broken the 
military strength of its Indian neighbors and isolated them from one another on disparate 
reservations, Congress passed the Dawes Act, which dissolved Indian nations, 
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encouraged the adoption of white cultural forms, and opened significant amounts of 
Indian land to white settlement. By the end of the nineteenth century, the United States 
began codifying the dependent relationship of noncontiguous territories into law. Rooting 
its legal justification in the conquest, submission, and assimilation of North America’s 
Indian nations, the United States extended its sovereignty over a host of once independent 
nations, legislatively, military, and judicially. The Insular Cases demarcated Puerto Rico 
as a possession of the United States that had not been fully incorporated into the whole, 
excluding its people from the rights recognized by the Constitution. In the Philippines, 
the United States imposed its rule, demanding the subordination of the Filipino people 
until they embraced “civilization” in the form practiced by their new rulers. Gilded Age 
United States leaders like Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Mahan rooted their faith in 
aggressive expansion on the long relationship between the United States and its Indian 
neighbors. Judging that the United States could best advance the spread of republicanism 
through the annihilation of nonwhite sovereignty, the new imperialists embraced the 
ideals that underlay the Second Seminole War. Distilled to their essence and applied 
across vast geographic distances upon subject peoples, they were plainly imperial.
5
Fifty years before the Spanish-American War, the Seminoles were left to deal 
with the repercussions of expansive warfare. In 1839, upon their arrival at Fort Gibson in 
Arkansas, the emigrating Seminoles found Creek bands living on the lands that had been 
promised to them. Weary of conflict, Micanopy and many other Seminoles agreed to live 
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among them, but the more militant Indians and Black Seminoles refused. Within 
Arkansas, the Creek leadership lobbied local military officers to enforce Seminole 
subordination, arguing that the terms of the Treaty of Fort Gibson clearly dissolved the 
Seminole nation and subsumed its members within the Creek polity. By 1843, within the 
Seminole leadership, factions arose that were alienated by the Black Seminoles’ 
collaboration with the United States and influenced by the Creeks. They embraced chattel 
slavery. The conflicts of the past ten years had not ended.
In 1844, with the fraying of the Seminole coalition that had fought the Florida 
War and faced with hostility from Indians within and outside the nation, Coacoochee and 
John Cavallo led a delegation to Washington to plead for a separate Seminole territory. 
There, they met with General Thomas Jesup who, upon hearing their pleas, met with the 
Secretary of War and pledged that he could not “remain passive and witness the illegal 
interference with the rights of those people.” He requested protection for all who had 
appealed to him. By 1845, the Seminoles and Creeks had signed a new treaty that 
provided land specifically marked for the Seminoles, though it remained within the 
jurisdiction of the Creek nation. It was of little respite. By the end of the decade, slave 
kidnappers sent by the Creeks had seized dozens of Black Seminoles while Indian agents 
under James K. Polk conspired to claim ownership of hundreds of Black Seminoles. 
Compounding the crisis, Polk’s Attorney General John Mason, a staunch proponent of 
slavery, had ruled that Jesup’s 1838 promise of freedom was illegal, imperiling the status 
of all of the Black Seminoles. In 1849, Micanopy passed away and tribal leadership 
passed to Jim Jumper, the leader of a pro-Creek, pro-slavery faction. Within several 
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months, claims to over two thirds of the Black Seminoles had been sold to anxious 
slaveholders. The Black Seminoles’ freedom hung in the balance. 
In November, Coacoochee and John Cavallo hatched a plan. They knew that 
Mexico, which had abolished slavery two decades before, had offered land and supplies 
to any settlers who pledged to defend its northern frontier against Indian raids. One night, 
Coacoochee and Cavallo, along with two hundred Indians and African-Americans, began 
the journey south. Two years later, the parties reached their destination and formed 
separate communities. Making contact with local officials, Coacoochee succeeded in 
securing a deal with the Mexican government. In return for their service against the 
aggressive Indian nations of the region, both communities received land, farming tools, 
munitions, and livestock. Whether intended or not, the settlements of Coacoochee and 
John Cavallo were a political statement, a multiracial alliance that demonstrated the 
endurance of nonwhite autonomy in the Americas, if outside the borders of the United 
States. However, in 1857, smallpox broke out among the Seminoles, and Coacoochee, 
along with over 50 others, fell victim to the epidemic. Political disunion wracked the 
remaining Indians in Mexico and, having learned that Seminole leaders in Oklahoma had 
secured recognition of their independence from the Creeks, they began the long trek back 
to the United States. The Black Seminoles, secure in their freedom and autonomy, 
remained behind in Mexico. When the last of Coacoochee’s group reached Seminole 
territory, it was 1861; much of the Seminole leadership had declared for the Confederacy 
and its troops were pursuing dissident Indians who had fled north, toward Kansas and the 
Union.
6
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